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Summary
This thesis has three aims.  First, I propose that researchers should focus more on 
similarities between groups of people, because they are arguably at least as interesting 
and important as differences.  I demonstrate that even effects that are usually labelled as 
large often still display more similarities than differences between groups.  In Study 1, I 
modified and extended prior procedures for describing similarities and demonstrate the 
importance of this exercise by examining similarities between groups on 22 social 
variables (e.g., types of human values, trust, moral attitudes) within six commonly used 
social categories: gender, age, education, income, nation of residence, and religious 
denomination (N = 86,272).  On average, the amount of similarity between two groups 
(e.g., high vs. low educated) was greater than 90%.  Study 2 (N = 54,082) replicated 
these findings.  Study 3 demonstrated the importance of presenting information about 
similarity, by showing that a research report led to more accurate perceptions when 
similarities were presented alongside differences. 
Secondly, I explored whether differences might emerge in relatively concrete 
variables.  In particular, human values (e.g., freedom, creativity) measured in Studies 1 
and 2 were very abstract, and people instantiate (that is to say, exemplify) human values 
differently.  I directly examined these instantiations in Brazil, India, and the UK (Study 
4).  Although some meaningful differences in value instantiation emerged, within-
country variability outweighed between-country differences.  Studies 5-7 provided 
further support for this conclusion. 
Finally, I tested the implications of one provocative difference in value 
instantiation, namely a tendency to associate the value of creativity with art and not with 
science, particularly in the UK and not in Brazil (Study 8).  Results indicated that the 
detection of this difference may depend on the ways in which art and science are 
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presented to participants, and this finding has implications for attempts to engage more 
interest in science.
To conclude, the final chapter of the thesis summarises the findings and 
discusses some limitations across the chapters.  It then outlines a range of broad 
implications, including the benefits of a stronger focus on similarities, such as increased 
transparency in the reporting of scientific results. 
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1Chapter 1: General Introduction1
Scientific research is supposed to reveal ‘the truth’ in an unbiased and reliable 
way.  However, there are different ways to describe ‘the truth.’  For instance, if we 
compare two groups of people with respect to moral attitudes, we can describe either the 
differences or the similarities between the groups (or indeed both).  We might say that 
there are highly significant differences between Britons and Eastern Europeans.  
Alternatively, we could say that there is 84% similarity between the two groups.  Both 
summaries report the same findings, but they highlight different aspects of the results.
Historically, the focus of social sciences and psychology in particular has been 
on the description of differences between groups.  Over 90 percent of the published 
research findings in psychology describe significant differences (Fanelli, 2010; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015), and most of the inferential statistics and effect sizes used 
are only appropriate for describing and measuring differences.  This lack of attention to 
similarities is important because differences between groups with so-called “large” 
effect sizes can occur even when the two groups are more similar than different, as will 
be described in Chapter 2.  Moreover, this possibility is applicable whenever people are 
clustered into groups based on a specific variable, including many common 
demographic variables in psychology (e.g., gender, age, culture, religious 
denomination).  In this thesis, I will illustrate this point by demonstrating the importance 
of appreciating similarities in addition to differences, beginning with cross-cultural 
comparisons across a range of countries (Chapter 2).  
1 The introduction is partly based on Hanel (2015b), Hanel, Zacharopoulos, Megardon, and Maio 
(2016), Hanel, Easterbrook, and Maio (2016), and Hanel, Vione, Hahn, and Maio (in press).  Chapter 2 is 
currently under review (Hanel, Maio, & Manstead, 2016), the study reported in Appendix B (Hanel & 
Vione, 2016) has been accepted.
2My analyses will focus on human values.  Values are abstract ideals that people 
consider to be important in their lives (Maio, 2010; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  
Examples include freedom, helpfulness, equality, and wealth.  Similarities and 
differences in values are important for a number of reasons, which are outlined in this 
chapter.  One of the key reasons is that cultures around the world show a lot of 
similarities in the values that they consider high in importance, even though everyday 
practices in some cultures imply much larger differences in values than the data reveal. 
Psychologically, there is an interesting jump from the values people rate as important to 
the concrete behaviours relevant to these values. For this reason, this thesis describes 
research and theories relevant to understanding how values are mentally represented as 
concrete actions, while testing whether differences across countries occur more at the 
concrete level, rather than the abstract level.  
In this chapter, I first describe cross-cultural research that has claimed to have 
found either large differences or similarities between two or more cultures.  Next, I 
provide an overview of the human value concept and related empirical findings. I then 
introduce and discuss the concept of value instantiations.  Finally, I give an overview of 
the empirical chapters.
Cross-Cultural Research
What is Culture?
Given that the present thesis could be classified as belonging to the field of 
“cross-cultural” research, the term culture needs to be defined before any empirical 
evidence is presented.  One of the earliest definitions of culture can be found in Tylor 
(1871, p. 1), who defines “culture, or civilization” descriptively as “that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”  A later, often cited definition of 
3culture is even more general: it is "the man-made part of the human environment" 
(Herskovits, 1948, p. 17).  By 1952, varied attempts had been made to define culture, 
with foci that were relatively descriptive, historical, normative, psychological, structural, 
or genetic (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952).  A more recent and often cited definition of 
culture was suggested by Hofstede (2001, p. 9), who defined culture as the “collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
people from another”.  
Unfortunately, all the definitions remain vague, lack any quantifiable criteria to 
differentiate between two cultures, and do not address the possibility that people can 
simultaneously belong to numerous (sub-)cultures (cf. Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015 for the 
latter). Moreover, as a cursory examination of any volume of the Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology reveals, most researchers equate culture with country or nation 
without providing empirical support for this treatment2.  Instead, researchers seem to 
assume that, because people from two or more countries differ in a statistically 
significant way from each other with regard to certain variables, they belong to different 
cultures.  In the General Discussion of this thesis (Chapter 5), I suggest that the findings 
of this thesis support an alternative empirical view of culture.
Two important theoretical positions in cross-cultural research are relativism and 
universalism.  Until recently, these positions were regarded as dichotomous.  The 
extreme versions of relativism ignore similarities, whereas universalism considers any 
classification of people into groups (e.g., culture) as redundant.  More recently however, 
researchers started to treat them as falling on a dimension with extreme relativism and 
extreme universalism or absolutism being the endpoints (Berry et al., 2011).  Berry et al. 
2 Other researchers (e.g., Schwartz, 2014b) also use society as a synonym for culture.  For the 
convenience of the reader of this thesis, I will follow this practice and use the terms country, culture, and 
society interchangeably, unless clearly stated otherwise.  
4(2011), for example, distinguish between four positions:  extreme relativism, moderate 
relativism, moderate universalism, and extreme universalism.  Moderate relativism 
assumes that we are born as a blank slate and adapt to function well in one specific 
culture (cf. A. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998).  A prominent example for 
moderate relativism is the distinction between societies that promote independent versus 
interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  In contrast, moderate 
universalism acknowledges cultural differences such as different interpretations of 
behaviour or values, but assumes that similarities are large.  Contemporary cross-
cultural research has rejected both extreme relativism and universalism and tends to 
endorse moderate universalism (Berry et al., 2011).  Below I discuss several studies that 
claim to have found either similarities between cultures or important differences.  
Cognition
One variable on which group differences have been argued to exist is intellectual 
ability.  Early ethnologists such as Lévy-Bruhl (1910) considered “primitive” people to 
be less reasonable than Westerners (“civilized” people).  However, whereas Lévy-Bruhl 
attributed those apparent differences in intellectual functioning to environmental factors, 
many psychologists attributed them to biological factors.  This happened, for example, 
during the Nazi period in Germany (Wolfradt, Billmann-Mahecha, & Stock, 2015), but 
can still be found in our time, albeit in a more attenuated form (Rushton, 1995). 
However, even contemporaries of Lévy-Bruhl argued for the existence of approximately 
equivalent cognitive processes across humankind, with differences occurring due to 
environmental differences (e.g., Wundt, 1912). 
Other researchers have claimed that East Asian populations rely on holistic 
thinking, whereas Westerners rely on analytic ways of thinking, because “there are 
indeed dramatic differences in the nature of Asian and European thought processes” 
5(Nisbett, 2004, p. xviii).  This relativistic claim was supported by a range of empirical 
studies and historical observations.  For example, Nisbett (2004) argued that Asians 
needed historically to rely more on each other because they were (rice) farmers 
compared to Europeans, who were more likely to be hunters and fishers, and, as such, 
not necessarily living in stable communities.  Empirical evidence also indicated that 
“when 2 apparently contradictory propositions were presented, American participants 
polarized their views, and Chinese participants were moderately accepting of both 
propositions” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p. 741).  This finding appears to provide further 
support for the view that there are cultural differences in human reasoning, because 
Chinese people were seen as preferring a “middle way,” whereas Americans preferred to 
polarize.  
The findings from Nisbett and colleagues can be criticized on at least two levels.  
At an empirical level, Lee and Johnson-Laird (2006) argued, based on Nisbett’s 
findings, that East Asians should be more tolerant of contradictions.  However, in their 
own research, Lee and Johnson-Laird failed to find a statistical significant difference 
between East Asians and Americans with respect to this tolerance.  The second level of 
critique relates to the generalizability of the findings of Nisbett and colleagues (see 
Berry et al., 2011).  They generalize to regions (e.g., East vs. West), despite the fact that 
their conclusions were based on comparisons of only two countries in several of their 
studies (and in some cases fewer than two countries, given that the Chinese participants 
in several of their studies were living in the USA; e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999).  To 
address this critique, Uskul, Kitayama, and Nisbett (2008) compared farmers, fishers, 
and herders in the Turkey’s eastern Black Sea region.  The authors postulated and found 
that members of the first two communities exhibited greater holistic tendencies and less 
individual decision making than herders, presumably because those two groups 
6emphasize harmonious social interdependence.  However, it is worth noting that the 
responses of all three groups were relatively similar (cf. also Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010).
Collectivism and Individualism
Researchers frequently compare countries on a collectivistic-individualistic 
continuum (Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).  Western 
countries (Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand) are frequently 
labelled as individualistic, whereas East-Asian countries are cited as examples for 
collectivistic societies.  Many studies have been conducted on the basis of this 
individualistic-collectivistic distinction, but the findings are not always consistent with 
predictions.  For example, it has been postulated that individualism leads to isolation.  
However, a 30-nation study found that emotional closeness is relatively similar across 
the world (Georgas, Berry, Vijver, Kagitçibasi, & Poortinga, 2006).  Related to this 
finding, participants in five countries (Hong Kong, Turkey, Greece, The Netherlands, 
and the United States) reported both expecting and giving a very similar amount of 
support to various people (e.g., family member, stranger; Fjneman et al., 1996).  
A meta-analysis (Oyserman et al., 2002) and some critical comments (A. P. 
Fiske, 2002) have further questioned  the usefulness of the individualism-collectivism 
constructs.  Fiske summarizes some 
“limitations of research on individualism and collectivism: It treats nations as 
cultures and culture as a continuous quantitative variable; conflates all kinds of 
social relations and distinct types of autonomy; ignores contextual specificity in 
norms and values; measures culture as the personal preferences and behaviour 
reports of individuals; rarely establishes the external validity of the measures 
used; assumes cultural invariance in the meaning of self-reports and anchoring 
7and interpretation of scales; and reduces culture to explicit, abstract verbal 
knowledge” (p. 78). 
Fiske’s hefty critique demonstrates that there are reasons to reject the individualism-
collectivism as a single cultural dimension.  Yet, this dimension is a major part of the 
distinctions that are often used in cross-cultural research to study differences between 
countries.  In Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis, I will use a quantitative approach to test 
whether people across countries indeed differ in individualism and collectivism.  
Personality
Cross-cultural research on personality has mainly focused on the Big Five 
dimensions of personality traits: openness for new experiences, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, extraversion, and agreeableness (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 2008).  Several 
large-scale studies have found considerable similarities across countries.  Overall, the 
within-country variability in personality traits was found to be nine times larger than the 
between-country variability (Allik, 2005; Berry et al., 2011).  It was also found that sex-
differences in Big Five personality traits across 55 countries are similar and rather small 
(Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008).  The same authors also found across 53 
countries and almost 17,000 participants that (1) all nations scored on average above the 
scale-midpoint of Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale (RSES), (2) the factor structure of the 
RSES was largely invariant, and (3) the correlates (e.g., extraversion, neuroticism) of 
self-esteem were similar in most nations (Schmitt & Allik, 2005).  Findings from human 
values research are similar (e.g., Fischer & Schwartz, 2011) and will be discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter, because of their direct relevance to the present thesis.
Some researchers from non-Western countries have claimed to have identified 
constructs that are especially characteristic for one region and are deeply rooted there.  
One example is ubuntu, which is supposed to be deeply rooted in (South) African 
8history (Mbigi, 1997).  Ubuntu literally translated means “a person is a person through 
other persons” (Berry et al., 2011, p. 125) and consists of embeddedness values (cf. 
Schwartz, 2006), such as compassion and solidarity.  Although it is described by African 
authors as being distinct from collectivism, this claim is challenged by others who fail to 
see the difference (see Berry et al., 2011).  Another example is the concept amae, which 
was described as uniquely Japanese (Doi, 1973).  Amae refers to the need to be loved 
and to depend on others, mainly in the context of the infant-mother relationship.  
Although it was demonstrated that amae can be distinguished from dependence and 
insecure attachment, amae-related behaviours were also found among Taiwanese and 
US-American participants (Yamaguchi & Ariizumi, 2006).  Finally, in a behavioural 
study, including 15 small-scale societies such as Savannah foragers or Tundra-taiga 
fishers and hunters, it was found that at least some members of all societies administered 
costly punishment for unfair behaviour (Henrich et al., 2006).  For all of these examples, 
it could be argued that the findings are actually similar to what could be observed in 
other countries.  Nonetheless, the search for unique identifiers of particular cultures 
remains an interesting pursuit in cross-cultural research.
Emotion
Emotion research is another field in which claims about the universalism of 
research findings have been made.  Some studies report similarities between various 
countries, while others have found differences.  An example of the former is a study that 
compared 12 body sensations experienced with 7 emotions in individuals from 
Indonesia and Mexico with low exposure to the Western world with three student 
samples from Belgium, Indonesia, and Mexico (Breugelmans et al., 2005).  Strong 
similarities across all five samples were found, although they were smaller between the 
groups with low exposure to the West.  With a view to researchers who claim to have 
9found cross-cultural differences in the perception and expression of emotions, it was 
argued that these differences could be due to differences in the definition and/or 
operationalization of a construct (Berry et al., 2011).  
A related disagreement concerns the criteria for how to decide whether an 
emotion is universal.  For example, Berry et al. argue that “psychological processes 
(emotions) are similar across cultures but that their behavioural manifestations 
(emotion-based behaviour) can vary substantially from one culture to another” (p. 158).  
This argument raises the question of how data can be interpreted to demonstrate whether 
a universalistic or relativistic perspective is supported.  An illustrative example is the 
debate between Ekman (1994) and Russell (1994) concerning the degree to which above 
chance recognition of six basic emotions (happy, surprise, sadness, fear, disgust, and 
anger) across many countries can be understood as support for universality.  Russell 
reported meta-analytic evidence of how well the six basic emotions were recognized 
across Western and non-Western countries.  The medians of correct recognition (in 
percentages) ranged from 77.5% to 82.6% for Western participants, and from 63.0% to 
76.0% in non-Western countries. In societies which are ‘preliterate’ and visually isolated 
from Western influence, the percentage was even lower, although in most cases 
significantly (16.67%) above chance.  These differences were used by Russell, along 
with questions he raised about the ecological, convergent, and internal validities of 
previous studies, to contest Ekman’s previous claim that emotions are universally 
recognized.  In reply, Ekman (1994) accused Russell of having misrepresented and 
misanalysed previous studies.  Ekman’s universalistic claim was further supported by a 
meta-analysis of 190 studies (Van Hemert, Poortinga, & Vijver, 2007).  The meta-
analysis found that culture-level factors explained 28% of variance in emotion variables 
and method-related factors additionally explained 14%, indicating that differences are at 
10
least partly due to methodological factors.  A related study has found that cultural 
variations across 37 countries explained less than 5% of the variance in the self-reported 
personal experience of seven emotions (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).  Overall, based on 
an extensive review of the literature, Berry et al. (2011, p. 174) concluded “that there is 
substantial overall similarity in emotion component profiles and that differences are 
found for specific components or specific emotions.”  
The discussion between Ekman (1994) Russell (1994) makes it apparent that 
there is little agreement about when results should be regarded as providing evidence of 
similarities (i.e., universalistic claim) or differences (relativistic claim).  In Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, I suggest how this gap can be closed by (1) proposing new measures of 
similarities, and (2) providing a taxonomy of when two groups of people can be judged 
as similar to or different from each other.  I also demonstrate that classical approaches 
(e.g., frequentist and Bayesian statistics) and effect sizes (e.g., Cohen’s d) are limited for 
addressing this question.
Human Values
The concept of human values has a long history in psychology, but also in 
economics, philosophy, political sciences, and sociology (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004).  It is 
therefore unsurprising that definitions of human values vary across time and academic 
discipline, as does the use of the term “human values” as opposed to other similar 
terminology (e.g., “social values”, “personal values”).3 In the following subsections, I 
first give an overview of the history of human values, before describing the predominant 
3 Until the 1960s, researchers seem to have used only the term “value.” More recently, value 
researchers have started to add ‘prefixes’ such as human, personal, or social, presumably to differentiate 
human values from numerical value or the verb “to value.”  All three terms are often used in the literature: 
“Human values” results in 438,000 hits in Google Scholar, “social values” yields 632,000 hits, and 
“personal values” results in 185,000 hits (June 22, 2016), further emphasizing the importance of values in 
the scientific literature.  Nevertheless, none of the three prefixes is unproblematic, because values can be 
both personal and social, and it is unclear whether or not animals have values.  To the best of my 
knowledge, however, there is no argument yet that animals also have values, which is why I prefer to use 
the term “human values” or simply “values.”  
11
value theory and selected empirical findings. 
A short history of human values  
The structure of the history of human values is probably similar to the history of 
any topical area in psychology: (1) The origin of human value research can be traced 
back into philosophy; (2) the methods and statistics used have become more and more 
elaborated and complicated; and (3) several important contributions made more than 
fifty years ago have either been neglected or reinvented (cf. Hanel, 2013; Witte, 2004).  
Hence, I focus on value researchers not only from psychology but from other social 
sciences and philosophy, whose contributions I feel have been neglected but are 
nevertheless relevant for my thesis.  This is not to criticize anyone – it cannot be 
expected that any one individual (including myself) is familiar with the vast literature in 
value research – but rather to link some past reflections and theorizing with modern 
findings. 
A time bar of selected value researchers can be found in Figure 1.1.  This figure 
is incomplete and misses important value researchers (for more extensive reviews, see 
Gouveia, 2013; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Maio, 2016; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; 
Spates, 1983). Nonetheless, early discussions of values can be traced back to ancient 
Greek philosophers (Maio, 2010) and can be found in the ‘neighbouring’ areas of 
morality and virtue in the history of philosophy (Schroeder, 2012).  To the best of my 
knowledge, the first systematic discussion of values that included not only psychological 
elements but also a concrete value model, was made by Hugo Münsterberg (1908).  The 
title of Münsterberg’s model is “The pure values.”  His model maps values onto a four-
by-two framework and contrasts life values with culture values on one dimension and 
logical, aesthetic, ethical, and 
metaphysical values, on the other.  In 
Figure 1.1.  Historical overview of selected
important contributions to human value research
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each of the eight cells, there is one ‘value type’ and three values, which are further 
differentiated according to whether they relate to the external, social, and internal world.  
The value types are existence, unity, 
developmental, and god values (life 
value types), and coherence, beauty, 
achievement, and basic values 
(cultural value types).  Münsterberg’s 
model appears to be similar to 
Gouveia’s functional theory, which I 
describe below (Gouveia, 2013; 
Gouveia, Milfont, & Guerra, 2014), 
although the names of the value types 
and values differ.
Another important theoretical 
contribution was made by Eduard 
Spranger (cf. Hanel, 2015a).  In his 
book, Types of Men, Spranger (1921)
differentiated between the theoretical, 
economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious man.  Spranger proposed that one of
the six types of men is predominant in each person.  The theoretical person, for example, 
strives for knowledge and truth, whereas the economic person strives for usefulness.  
Spranger influenced Allport and colleagues, who created a survey to measure the six 
types of men as values (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; see below).  In this survey, 
participants would first indicate their preference on a number of controversial statements 
before ranking other statements related to the six types of men.  
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An important theoretical contribution was made by the anthropologist Clyde 
Kluckhohn (1951).  Kluckhohn defined value as “a conception, explicit or implicit, 
distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences 
the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (p. 395).  From this 
perspective, values can be divided into several categories, such as situation specific or 
generalizable, or isolated values (i.e., values which neither conflict nor support other 
values), and integrated values, which are interlinked.  Kluckhohn further emphasised 
conceptions of the “desirable”, which includes moral, aesthetic, and cognitive elements 
of appraisal.  He considered the aesthetic dimension as dominant in value judgment.  He 
also indicated that a value functions as a “preference which is felt and/or considered to 
be justified – “morally” or by reasoning or by aesthetic judgments, usually by two or all 
three of these” (p. 396).  Kluckhohn further suggested that both personal and cultural 
values as implicit, which is in line with a social intuition approach (e.g., Haidt, 2001)
and in contrast to modern value research where values are usually considered to be 
constructs that people can self-report through high deliberation (cf. Maio, 2010).  
Consistent with this implicit approach, recently it was demonstrated that measuring 
values as spontaneous associations is possible (Souchon, Maio, Hanel, & Bardin, 2016; 
see also below). 
Prior statements that values are closely linked to emotions can be found in 
writings by Scheler (1913) and Messer (1926).  Messer argues, based on Scheler, that to 
study “the world of values” we need to feel them.  Introspection and observations are 
not appropriate.  The more we are satisfied when we feel a specific value, the higher the 
value stands in the value hierarchy.  Although this claim was echoed by important value 
researchers (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006) it has only partly been addressed in the 
literature to date.  There is evidence that we feel more positive towards the values that 
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we rate as more important, and cognitive explanations for values do not track value 
importance as strongly (Maio & Olson, 1998).  Research has also linked specific values 
with specific emotions: For example, people who endorse self-transcendence values 
want to feel more empathy (Tamir et al., in press).  Nevertheless, research has not yet 
discovered what comes first – the importance of the value or the feeling about it – and 
this remains an interesting issue for future study.  
Kluckhohn (1951) discussed the function of values.  He suggested that values 
help to resolve ambivalence because people think about them mainly when they are in 
doubt.  Consequently, values are necessary for social life and the social system, helping 
to make social life more orderly and predictable (cf. Parsons, 1937).  This view was 
challenged by Smelser (1959), who postulated that societies evolve faster when they 
loosen their value constraints.  An alternative explanation for the different predictions is 
that Smelser’s use of the term values in the societal context is closer to the concept of 
norms.  Nevertheless, both Smelser’s and Kluckhohn and Parsons’ views are intriguing 
possibilities but lack empirical support.  
Sociologists have also taken a lot of interest in the study of values.  Between 
1975 and 1982 over 400 studies of values were published in sociology (Spates, 1983).  
As in any field, there are various definitions of values.  But perhaps a very typical 
sociological definition of values is to understand values as the phenomena which 
“define, maintain, and regulate the visible social structure [and] give it cohesion and 
stability so that it crosses the narrow boundaries of place and time” (Mukerjee, 1946, p. 
101).  An early and often-cited sociological approach to describing and defining values 
was put forward by Talcott Parsons (1937), who defined values as moral beliefs which 
provide the ultimate rationales for behaviour and control social life.
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Franz Adler (1956), who considered himself as a natural sociologist, outlined an 
important behaviouristic criticism of the value concept as it was understood by 
Kluckhohn (1951), Parsons (1937), and others.  He proposed that all value definitions 
can be placed in one of the following four categories: 
(A) Values are considered as absolutes, existing in the mind of God as eternal 
ideas, as independent validities, etc.  (B) Values are considered as being in the 
object, material or non-material.  (C) Values are seen as located in man, 
originating in his biological needs or in his mind. Man by himself or man in the 
aggregate, variously referred to as group, society, culture, state, class, is seen as 
’holding’ values.  (D) Values are equated with actions. (p. 272)
Adler rejects the first two definitions as trivial, as they imply that “a value is 
what is valued” (p. 273).  Many value definitions fall into the third category, including 
the definition provided by Kluckhohn (1951; see above).  These definitions of values 
were also rejected by Adler, because they imply that values cannot be directly observed, 
fail to differentiate between values, meanings, and norms, and must be observed through 
actions.  This makes the type C definitions, redundant, as values must be equated with 
actions.  Hence, Adler suggested that only definitions that equate values with actions are 
acceptable: “The observer of the action who knows the probabilities of the preceding 
and following actions knows the meaning as well as the value which the act performs 
without attempting to enter the actor's mind” (p. 277).  Consistent with this view, 
Lundberg (1950) proposed that researchers should examine how people habitually spend 
or spent their energy, money, and time.  This is an intriguing alternative method of 
estimating values on a group level that goes beyond the focus on individual behaviour, 
and it implies that values can be inferred from historic records.  
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However, this behaviouristic view has faced competition from perspectives that 
place greater emphasis on subjective standpoints regarding values.  For instance, the 
sociologist William Catton (1959) formulated four falsifiable hypotheses relevant to 
people’s internal manifestation of values.  The first three are relevant in the context of 
this thesis.  Hypothesis 1a states that values correlate with personal desires at any one 
time.  Furthermore, the strength of the correlation increases within an isolated social 
system (Hypothesis 1b).  Hypothesis 2 states that “when values are held constant, 
desiring (or ‘motivation’) varies inversely with the ‘distance’ (in an n-dimensional 
psychological space, or value-space) between the valuer and the desideratum” (p. 314).  
Although this dissertation does not examine these hypotheses directly, they all refer to a 
link between values and emotion, which is also identified in the psychological 
perspectives on values that I will employ.
Differentiations between human values and other concepts
Researchers have given a lot of consideration not only to the question of “What 
are values?”, but also to the question of “What aren’t values?”  Differentiation between 
values and other constructs may help us to gain a deeper understanding of values.  For 
example, according to Kluckhohn (1951), values are longer-term and more broadly 
oriented than short-term, narrow response impulses, but more arbitrary than decisions 
based on rational calculus.  This position is largely consistent with the way in which 
research has treated values and neighbouring concepts in psychology, such as social 
norms, attitudes, personality traits, and needs.  Because these concepts may easily be 
confused with values, below I briefly describe how each can be differentiated from 
values. 
Social norms refer to modes of behaviour, but not to end-state of existence and 
are more externally directed than values (Rokeach, 1973).  For example, loyalty can be 
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both a social norm and a value.  Loyalty is a social norm as long as it is imposed by 
others and a value when it is judged to be (un-)important.  People can value loyalty even 
if it is based on the predominant social norm in a society or disregarded.  Further, 
attitudes are directed towards a specific object, whereas values are general beliefs 
(Rokeach, 1973).  For example, people can have attitudes towards recycling garbage.  
That is, people might regard recycling as something good or bad.  In contrast, values are 
more general (e.g., protecting the environment) and are evaluated along perceived 
importance.  Thus, attitudes can be both positive and negative, whereas values are 
inherently positive constructs (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). 
Differentiating values from traits and needs is somewhat more difficult.  Traits 
are stable descriptions of people that describe how people tend to act across situations, 
whereas values are stable life goals that guide the behavioural dispositions and may be 
shaped by them (Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2014; Rokeach, 1973).  For example, 
helpful is a trait when it is meant as a description of how people tend in general to act 
and a value when it is about life goals.  More generally spoken, traits refer to the past 
and present, values to the present and future.  Similarly, values can guide needs and vice 
versa (Kluckhohn, 1951).  For example, attaching high importance to obedience may 
lead to a higher need for dependence on an authority, and the need for dependence can 
be cognitively transformed into the value obedience.  Despite these links, values may be 
seen as being under more volitional control than traits and needs, which can be driven 
by internal, habitual, and environmental factors.  Rokeach (1973) considers needs to be 
more basic than values, because needs can also be found in animals.  
Contemporary psychological models  
Contemporary psychological research on human values has been influenced to a 
great degree by Milton Rokeach, who combined approaches of researchers from 
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different fields and aimed to measure and change values systematically.  Rokeach 
(1973) argued that the value concept should play a central role in social sciences 
because all problems within the social sciences “implicate human values” (p. ix), as 
values influence “virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth 
investigating and understanding” (p. 3).  Rokeach defined value as “an enduring belief 
that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially 
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence… along 
a continuum of relative importance” (p. 5).  He suggested that each person possesses 
only a limited number of values and that these are shared by all people, although the 
relative importance to each value may differ.  Values can be organized into a value 
system, originate from culture, personality, and society and guide behaviour.  Rokeach 
assumed that values are learnt and taught in an “all-or-none manner”.  For example, as 
children, we were taught that we should be honest, not just a bit honest.  As we become 
older, we learn to integrate different values and, therefore, come to recognize that values 
can vary in relevance and relative importance across specific situations.  Rokeach 
further claimed that the difficulty of studying values lies in the interaction with specific 
situations: It is possible that more than one value becomes activated, so a conflict arises 
between different values.  
This latter claim became easier to test after Shalom Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987, 1990) developed a model and theory of human values. This model was 
based partly on Rokeach’s work and is the most widely used perspective to study values 
in recent decades.  According to Schwartz, “values (1) are concepts or beliefs, (2) 
pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide 
selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (5) are ordered by relative 
importance” (1992, p. 4).  Later, Schwartz (e.g., 2006, p. 143) added a sixth feature of 
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values: “the relative importance of values guides action.”  However, it remains unclear 
to what extent this last feature of values is empirically justified (Borg & Bardi, 2016).  
Additionally, “values represent, in the form of conscious goals, three universal 
requirements of human existence: needs of individuals as biological organisms, 
requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups” 
(p. 4; cf. Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990).  As some of the work reported in this thesis 
builds directly on Schwartz’s work, I describe Schwartz’s theory in detail later in this 
chapter.
The most recent value theory is the functional theory of Valdiney Gouveia 
(Gouveia, 2013; Gouveia et al., 2014), which has been developed and tested during the 
last 15 years. It builds on Maslow’s (1943) theory and is based on two functions of 
values: whether values express needs (survival vs. thriving needs) or guide actions 
(personal vs. central vs. social goals), which Gouveia has maps in a two-by-three 
framework.  The functional theory was challenged by Schwartz (2014a) as not being 
distinct from his own value theory (Schwartz, 1992).  Indeed, several findings that are 
based on the functional theory (e.g., Fischer, Milfont, & Gouveia, 2011; Gouveia, 
Vione, Milfont, & Fischer, 2015) could also have been obtained using Schwartz’s 
theory.  Therefore, although ongoing research may yield important empirical differences 
between the models, the extensive evidence supporting Schwartz’s theory made it useful 
for the research presented here.
Schwartz’s circumplex model of human values
The predominant model in value research was proposed by Shalom Schwartz in 
1992.  It is based on two earlier papers by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990), who found 
that Rokeach’s 36 values could be ordered into 7 or 8 value types based on their 
motivational dynamics and that these value types, in turn, can be organized into a two-
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dimensional circumplex.  Building on these findings and a new theoretical perspective, 
Schwartz (1992) postulated the existence of 11 value types and developed a measure 
that is often used to measure values, the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS).  The 11 value 
types are self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, 
conformity, spirituality, benevolence, and universalism.  Based on analyses conducted 
by Sonia Roccas and Lilach Sagiv, Schwartz found across 20 countries and 40 samples 
(mostly students and teachers) that 10 value types could be reliably differentiated in 
most samples (cf. Figure 1.2).  Each value type consists of 2 to 9 values and can be 
ordered along two dimensions: openness versus conservation and self-transcendence 
versus self-enhancement. Spirituality did not emerge as an independent value type.  
Figure 1.2. Schwartz' (1992) circumplex model of human values displaying four higher 
value types, ten value types (bold font) and examples of values in each type (normal 
font).
Over the course of the last 25 years, in samples from more than 80 countries, 
Schwartz has found support for his proposed structure of human values (Bilsky, Janik, & 
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Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2001, 2012).  Not only was the structure of values 
found to be universal; the hierarchy was also universal (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001):  
Benevolence, self-direction, and universalism values were considered most important 
and stimulation, tradition, and power least important in samples from 56 countries.  In 
another study, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) found that country explained on average 2 
to 12 percent of the between-subject variance in three large data sets.  This finding 
refutes the widespread claim that culture shapes values and is in line with findings in 
personality research discussed above, which have also found high cross-cultural 
consistency of personality.  The findings are particularly relevant for the present thesis 
because they further support the universalistic claim in some cross-cultural research 
(Berry et al., 2011). 
In 2012, Schwartz published a revised version of his theory (Schwartz et al., 
2012), postulating 19 rather than 10 value types.  Most of the 10 value types were 
divided into two.  For example, the value type self-direction was divided into self-
direction-thoughts and self-direction-actions.  In his refined theory, Schwartz explicitly 
contrasts values with a personal focus (openness and self-enhancement) from those with 
a social focus (conservation and self-transcendence).  Interestingly, this contrast was 
proposed 60 years earlier (Parsons, Shils, & Olds, 1951).  It is worth noting that this 
apparently arbitrary sub-division of the motivational value types (Gouveia et al., 2014)
can be justified by arguing that the values form a motivational continuum.  Just as the 
colour spectrum can be divided into very few or very many categories, so too can the 
array of values (Schwartz, 2014a).  
One reason for the popularity of Schwartz’s value models (Schwartz, 1992, 
2006; Schwartz et al., 2012) is that the circular model captures motivational synergies 
and conflicts.  It predicts that importance ratings of adjacent values will be positively 
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correlated with each other, whereas orthogonal values will be non-related, and opposing 
values will be negatively correlated.  Schwartz’s (1992) original model was the first to 
propose an integrative perspective that facilitates inferences about the relations between 
values and external variables.  External variables can be defined as any variables that are 
outside the model.  If one external variable exhibits a strong positive correlation with 
one of the value types, then the circumplex model predicts that correlations should 
become progressively less positive (and then perhaps more negative) as we move around 
the circular model from adjacent value types through the orthogonal value types to the 
opposing value types.  This pattern follows a sine wave if the 10 value types are plotted 
on the x-axis of a Cartesian coordinate system, with the strength of the correlation on the 
y-axis (Figure 1.3).  
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Figure 1.3. Correlations of the 10 value types with openness to new experience, 
fitted to an optimised restricted sine wave (data taken from Parks-Leduc et al., 2014).
SE: Security, TR: Tradition, CO: Conformity, BE: Benevolence, UN: Universalism, SD: 
Self-direction, ST: Stimulation, HE: Hedonism, AC: Achievement, PO: Power.
The use of the circumplex model of values to predict this sinusoidal pattern is 
one reason why the model has had a large impact (Boer & Fischer, 2013; Maio, 2010; 
Parks-Leduc et al., 2014).  Whereas prior research relied on post hoc inferences to 
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explain patterns of association with values, the circumplex model enables researchers to 
predict patterns of relations between values and other variables.  Diverse studies have 
sought evidence for sinusoidal patterns within research on values (Kasser, Koestner, & 
Lekes, 2002; Schwartz, 1992; Sortheix & Lönnqvist, 2014).  For example, in a recent 
meta-analysis, it was postulated and found that the personality trait of openness to new 
experiences correlates positively with stimulation, self-direction, and universalism 
values, while correlating negatively with conformity, tradition, and security values 
(Figure 1.3; Parks-Leduc et al., 2014).  This pattern of correlations was qualitatively 
judged by Parks-Leduc et al. to resemble a sine function.  
Of course, it is not the case that all external variables should follow the 
sinusoidal pattern.  In order for there to be a sinusoidal fit, the external variable must be 
relevant to the psychological functioning of values and, if this relevance exists, the 
external variable must not be particularly relevant to orthogonal values in the model.  
For example, in the aforementioned meta-analysis (Parks-Leduc et al., 2014), the 
researchers expected that the positive peak correlations between conscientiousness and 
values would arise for orthogonal values in the model (conformity and achievement); 
indeed, correlations between values and conscientiousness were judged not to follow the 
sinusoidal pattern.  Several methods have been suggested to measure whether the 
observed pattern resembles a sine wave (Boer & Fischer, 2013; Brunso, Scholderer, & 
Grunert, 2004; Fischer & Hanke, 2009; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; 
Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  To overcome several limitations of these approaches, my 
colleagues and I have proposed an alternative measure (Hanel, Easterbrook, & Maio, 
2016; Hanel, Zacharopoulos, Mégardon, & Maio, 2016).  
Although this newly developed sinusoidal test will not be discussed in this 
thesis, it merits mention here because it helps to illustrate the view that I repeat 
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throughout this thesis.  Namely, I suggest that values can be modelled successfully at the 
level of both their abstract meaning and at the level of their concrete instantiations.  The 
sinusoidal test is helpful for discerning patterns at the abstract level, but this thesis 
shows that abstract level values are limited in their ability to account for differences 
between people and cultures.  For this reason, the thesis explores a methodology for 
tackling concrete differences and similarities (after first documenting the similarities at 
an abstract level of value representation).
Empirical findings
Research on values has examined associations between ratings of the importance 
of diverse human values (e.g., equality, freedom) and numerous kinds of judgments, 
affective states, and behaviour.  In the following paragraphs, I give a short overview of 
some key findings.  Research on values has employed designs that are mainly cross-
sectional and has generated mainly theoretically consistent findings.  For example, it has 
been consistently found that individuals’ ratings of value importance are associated with 
religiosity (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004), the Big Five traits (Fischer & Boer, 
2014; Parks-Leduc et al., 2014), behaviour that was derived from the values themselves 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Butenko, 2014), and social attitudes (Boer & 
Fischer, 2013).  Other research has found that values help to predict organizational 
citizenship (Arthaud-Day, Rode, & Turnley, 2012), environmental behaviour (Hurst, 
Dittmar, Bond, & Kasser, 2013; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998), and protest action (Mayton
& Furnham, 1994).  Values are associated with biological markers, including genes 
(Schermer, Vernon, Maio, & Jang, 2011; Zacharopoulos, Lancaster, Maio, & Linden, 
2016), and neuroanatomy (Zacharopoulos, Hanel, et al., 2016; Zacharopoulos, 
Lancaster, Bracht, et al., 2016).  Furthermore, several of the correlational studies just 
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listed have found support for the proposed sinusoidal pattern of correlation coefficients 
between values and the other variables (e.g., neuroanatomy).  
In contrast, research on the relations of values with well-being has produced less 
consistent findings. For example, some studies have found positive relations between 
openness values and well-being, while others found negative relations, and again others 
did not find any significant correlations (Hanel & Wolfradt, 2016; Haslam, Whelan, & 
Bastian, 2009; Jarden, 2010; Jia, Rowlinson, Kvan, Lingard, & Yip, 2009; Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 2000).  These inconsistent findings, along with their small effect sizes 
indicate that values, pose an important challenge for understanding the causal role of 
values in daily well-being.  
A set of experimental studies by Maio and colleagues focused on the proposed 
motivational oppositions of Schwartz’s (1992) model (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003; 
Evans et al., 2013; Maio et al., 2014; Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009; Souchon et 
al., 2016).  For example, Maio et al. (2009) hypothesized that if “values are related 
through the motives that they serve, then changing a value should cause changes 
throughout the whole system.  Values that serve the same motives as a promoted value 
should increase in importance, whereas values that serve conflicting motives should 
decrease in importance'' (p. 701), while orthogonal values should remain unaffected.  
Thus, in contrast to other priming studies, Maio et al. made specific assumptions about 
values and behaviour on a theoretical basis.  For example, in their Experiment 1, 
participants first had to rank 16 values in terms of their perceived importance (four of 
each higher order value type).  Next, they were allocated to one out of five conditions: 
one control and four value change conditions.  In the value change conditions, each 
participant was given fictional results of the value ranking of another student of the 
same university, in which one of the four dimensions was ranked as much more 
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important than the other three.  The task of the participants was, among other things, to 
compare their own results with the results of the other student.  Next, participants ranked 
another set of 16 values according their personal importance (p. 703f).  Results 
demonstrated that targeting one value domain increased the importance of values within 
that domain, decreased the importance of opposed values, and left orthogonal values 
unaffected.  This pattern is congruent with the motivational relations predicted by 
Schwartz’s model and is consistent with other data tracking changes in values over time 
(Bardi et al., 2009).
Issues common to the psychological models of values
Notwithstanding the evidence in support of Schwartz’s (1992) model and its 
revised version (Schwartz et al., 2012), there are couple of issues common to all 
psychological models of values that are useful to consider because they show some of 
the background rationale that underlies this thesis.  The first issue, the role of values as 
truisms, relates to how they are mentally represented.  The second issue, the modelling 
of values across nations, relates to cross-cultural similarities vs differences.  In 
combination, both issues illustrate the need to model values at both abstract and concrete 
levels of mental representation.
Values as truisms. An alternative way of thinking about values was proposed 
by Maio and Olson (1998).  They predicted and found that values are truisms, or “beliefs 
that are widely shared and rarely questioned” (p. 294).  As one of several pieces of 
evidence for this claim, they observed that participants came up with more than twice as 
many reasons for (dis-)liking beverages than for why specific values (e.g., equality) are 
important to them.  This lack of reasons for values occurred even though the values were 
considered highly important; they seemed to have been merely taken for granted.  In 
fact, (1) participants’ ratings of the valence of the reasons for their values were much 
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less strongly related to the importance of the values than were their ratings of the 
feelings they attached to the values, (2) thinking about reasons for values caused 
bidirectional value change (except when there was a prior opportunity to develop 
arguments supporting the values), and (3) value endorsement dropped in the face of 
persuasive attack (except when there was a prior opportunity to develop arguments 
supporting the values).  
Interestingly, an early insightful discussion of the “values as truism” hypothesis 
can be found much earlier in writings by Mill (1859), although Mill used neither the 
term value nor the term truism.  He argued that, because freedom of speech is not fully 
granted or practised – e.g., opinions that are clearly wrong, such as racist ones, are 
suppressed and even punished in our societies – people do not contemplate their values 
and are therefore unable to defend them.  He argued that, in the end, the meaning of the 
truth will decrease because the truth is not defended appropriately.  Maio and Olson’s 
(1998) aforementioned evidence directly demonstrated this impact of a lack of prior 
defence of values, albeit using a different approach and different terminology.
The values-as-truism hypothesis is relevant for this thesis because the hypothesis 
suggests that people have a large gap to bridge between their abstract representations of 
values and more concrete frameworks for thinking about and applying the values.  If 
people often fail to contemplate and question their values, their relevance to concrete 
attitudes, feelings, and actions may become nebulous, and the foundation for the values 
may be less clear.  I will discuss this line of thought in more detail in a subsection 
below.
Values on the country level. The value theories described so far have focused 
on values at the individual level.  However, as Kluckhohn (1951) noted, values can also 
be described on a cultural level.  Three prominent approaches of this type were proposed 
29
by Ronald Inglehart (1977), Geert Hofstede (1980, 2001), and Shalom Schwartz (2006).  
Inglehart focused on whether and how values shift across time in relation to cultural 
change.  For example, he found that economic growth is accompanied by a shift in 
values from materialism to post-materialism (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).  In other words, 
societies become more tolerant, rational, and focus less on absolute norms when they 
economically develop. 
Hofstede links values and culture in his work.  His understanding of values is 
based on the definitions of Kluckhohn (1951) and Rokeach (1973).  His definition of 
culture, “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one 
group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9), points directly to the 
aim of his empirical work: to find elements which reliably differentiate cultures.  Based 
on work he conducted for the computing corporation IBM, Hofstede (1980) identified 
four cultural dimensions, which he later extended to six dimensions: Power–distance, 
individualism vs. collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity vs. femininity, long-
term orientation, and indulgence vs. restraints (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, 2010). 
Hofstede’s perspective has been highly influential in cross-cultural psychology, 
but Schwartz’s (2006) theory of cultural value orientations (CVO) has recently emerged 
as an important alternate view.  Schwartz’s CVO model is derived from his prior theory 
of individual human values (Schwartz, 1992), which was described in detail above.  
Schwartz (2006) posits seven a priori CVOs, which are thought to “express shared 
conceptions of what is good and desirable in the culture, the cultural ideals” (Schwartz, 
2006, p. 139).  In his approach, cultural values are usually measured by aggregating 
value scores from individual responses to measures of values in a culture.  The seven 
CVOs are intellectual autonomy (being independent), affective autonomy (pursuing 
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positive affective experiences), mastery (encouraging self-assertion), hierarchy (unequal 
distribution of power), embeddedness (being part of a collective), harmony (being at 
ease with the world), and egalitarianism (being concerned for others).  The seven CVOs 
can be ordered along three dimensions in a circular model (see Figure 1.4): 
embeddedness vs. autonomy (affective and intellectual), hierarchy vs. egalitarianism, 
and mastery vs. harmony.  
The cultural values proposed by Inglehart, Hofstede, and Schwartz can be used 
to explain differences among countries.  For example, dimensions named by all three 
researchers, post-materialism, individualism, and autonomy have been found to be 
positively related to indices of peacefulness and societal development (Basabe & 
Valencia, 2007). Especially worth mentioning is the strength of the correlations 
between cultural dimensions and national indices such as economic development, 
peacefulness, and corruption, because they usually far exceed correlations at the 
individual level (Basabe & Valencia, 2007; Fischer & Hanke, 2009; Hanel, Easterbrook, 
et al., 2016; Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2006).  This is 
especially remarkable in view of the fact that the two sets of data are drawn from 
independent sources (participant responses vs official statistics).
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Figure 3.4. Schwartz’s (2006) cultural value orientation model.
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Value Instantiations
If values are guiding principles in our lives and hardly differ across countries 
(Fischer & Schwartz, 2011), how does it come about that people from different countries 
still appear to be different?  The wide variation in personal, familial, and societal 
behaviour suggests the role of values is not so straightforward.  One possible 
explanation is that values have different (implicit) meanings (Maio, 2010).  In other 
words, people may use the same words (e.g., values) but attach different meanings to 
them.  As Wittgenstein (1922) argued, many (philosophical) problems can be explained 
through linguistic misunderstandings.  The same may be true for many cross-cultural 
misunderstandings, for example about values.  For example, it was argued that “human 
dignity” is understood differently across jurisdictions and (over time) within 
jurisdictions (McCrudden, 2008).  Of importance, however, these differences in 
meaning to which I refer are visible in the concrete actions that people link to values; 
these differences are not as evident if “meaning” is understood only as abstract 
conceptualizations of the values (which tend to be affective and vague in nature).  In the 
terminology used in this thesis, these concrete actions that people link to values are 
value instantiations.  Below, I provide a rationale for why value instantiation is an 
important construct, before I give a short overview of the construct and how it can be 
used to explain past evidence.
The psychological process
When people arrive in a situation and have to decide how to act, how do they 
decide which values should guide their actions?  Here I propose a model to explain this 
process.  The model introduces a critical role for value instantiations.  That is, previous 
experiences and the context influence which behaviours are considered to be prominent 
instantiations (examples) of a value, thereby determining which values guide action in 
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the context.  For example, the security of one's own family is considered to be important 
across the world (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  Most of us are eager to protect close 
relatives and to provide them with a good life.  But what does protecting close relatives 
mean, which relatives are close, how are they close (emotionally, physically), and how 
exactly are close relatives to be supported and protected?  The specific ways in which 
we imagine family security may vary.  In countries like Brazil, family security 
pertaining to children may have a large safety component because thousands of people 
are shot dead every year.  In countries like the United Kingdom, family security 
pertaining to children may have a large socioeconomic component, because of large 
differences in the cost and quality of schools.  Although empirical evidence indicates 
that family security is considered to be an important value across countries (Schwartz & 
Bardi, 2001), different actions may be seen as promoting family security in each 
location.  
This example helps to illustrate how our mental representations of values matter.  
Even if the same level of importance is attributed to a value, different people may 
produce different concrete instantiations for a specific value.  This process is depicted in 
Figure 1.5.  Personal experiences and social-context influence the extent to which a 
behaviour is seen as an instantiation of a value or set of values, which in turn determines 
the values that are activated in the context.  Their relative importance then influences 
behaviour.  (This pathway occurs alongside other independent influences not shown 
here, such as influences of social norms and control of the behaviour.)
This model may be true for diverse values, including all of those described in 
Schwartz’s (1992) model of values (e.g., equality, protecting the environment, family 
security).  Thus, in this section, I first discuss general theory and evidence regarding the 
role of instantiation in conceptual categories, including evidence from cognitive and 
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social psychology.  While research in cognitive and social psychology has shown some 
awareness of the importance of instantiations, their role has been underappreciated in the 
context of understanding values and value-guided behaviour.  The section will therefore 
turn to describing how and why consideration of value instantiations helps us to 
understand past evidence and the role that value instantiations can play in bridging the 
gap between values and behaviour. 
Figure 1.5.  Role of value instantiations in the process linking values and behaviour.
The Cognitive Psychology of Instantiations 
Before explaining further why instantiations of human values are important, it is 
necessary to define instantiations and understand their role in general categorization.  
Instantiating a rule or concept entails applying it to a concrete exemplar.  ‘Instantiation’ 
thus refers to a particular realization or instance of an abstraction or to the process of 
producing such an instance.  Instantiation is therefore based on the relationship between 
general and specific, as in different levels of a conceptual hierarchy.  For instance, 
basketball is an instantiation of the category sport, yellow is an instantiation of colour, 
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and bikini is an instantiation of the things to wear on the beach.  It is a fundamental 
insight within cognitive psychology that levels in conceptual hierarchies such as 
‘animal’–‘dog’–‘Doberman’ are not psychologically equivalent (see e.g., Rosch, Mervis, 
Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976).  Specifically, the intermediate level (‘dog’) 
seems privileged in many cognitive contexts (such as concept acquisition or the 
likelihood or speed of naming), and empirical research has sought to determine exactly 
why this is the case (e.g., Rogers & Patterson, 2007).  At the same time, members of a 
category within a level are generally not equivalent.  Instead they vary in typicality, that 
is, the extent to which they are a good example (e.g., Rosch, 1973; Rosch, Simpson, & 
Scott, 1976).  For instance, a robin might be considered to be a good (typical) example 
for the category bird, but a penguin may not.  All instances of a category can be placed 
on a continuum of category representativeness named graded structure (Barsalou, 1985).  
It starts with the most representative or most typical member and progresses to less 
typical members, and category boundaries (the boundary between members and non-
members) are typically ‘fuzzy’ (e.g., McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978).  Fuzzy 
boundaries are prevalent in natural language categories (‘cup’, ‘democracy’, etc.) and 
cognitive concepts such as human values.  In general, the more fuzzy the boundary, the 
more instantiations are possible.
The most important determinants of graded structure are central tendency, ideals, 
and familiarity (Barsalou, 1985, 1987).  Central tendency refers to any kind of infor-
mation based on the average, median, or modal values of category instances.  In 
contrast, ideals simply reflect characteristics that exemplars should have and therefore 
do not depend on actual exemplars (for example, the ‘ideal democracy’ might not 
actually exist).  Finally, familiarity depends on how often a specific instance can be 
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found across contexts; thus familiarity is related to the frequency with which the 
exemplars are experienced or observed and the intensity of the experience.
This “graded structure” of natural language categories appears to be a critical 
and universal property of categories and the process of categorization.  In fact, graded 
structure can actually predict performance on acquisition, exemplar production, and 
category verification (Barsalou, 1985).  That is, the location of the exemplar on the 
graded structure continuum can predict the ease with which it is learnt, produced, or 
verified as a member of the category.  The most typical members tend to facilitate these 
processes (e.g., Rosch, 1973). 
Categorization in Social Attitudes and Behaviour
There is important evidence of the role of graded structure in social attitudes and 
behaviour.  For instance, a study by Lord, Lepper, and Mackie (1984) observed that 
participants with favourable attitudes toward a university’s social group were willing to 
interact with a prototypical target person to a greater extent than with a target person 
possessing only half of the attributes considered typical for members of that group.  
Participants in this research completed measures of their attitudes toward members of 
two eating clubs (of which the participants were not members themselves), evaluated 
which attributes they considered typical for the members, and how much they liked 
them or were willing to interact with them.  Approximately 3 months later, without 
mentioning the first part of the study, participants were asked to choose one student to 
work with on a project.  They received descriptions of two students; each was identified 
as a member of one of the two eating clubs, with one member described using traits that 
were 100% typical according to the participant’s own prior descriptions, and the other 
50% typical.  The authors observed greater consistency between attitudes and behaviour 
when participants were confronted with a target person whose attributes were previously 
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judged to be typical for members of that eating club.  That is, participants who reported 
more positive attitudes toward members of the eating club were more likely to choose to 
work with the typical member than participants with less positive attitudes, but this 
relation was weaker when the member was described with only half of the typical 
attributes.  Lord and colleagues also replicated their findings in a study of attitudes 
toward a different target group, gay men.  Thus, across two real social groups, attitudes 
were better predictors of behaviour toward typical members of the groups than of 
behaviour toward atypical members of the groups.
A different set of studies points in a similar direction, but instead of using known 
social groups, the researchers investigated the role of experience that participants had 
with the target.  Lord, Desforges, Ramsey, Trezza, and Lepper (1991) found that the 
correlation between attitudes and behaviour was more dependent on typicality when 
participants were less experienced and less skilled regarding the social category.  For 
instance, in one experiment, the researchers assessed attitudes to people with mental 
illness and examined willingness to interact with a target presenting signs of mental 
illness, either through typical or atypical characteristics.  Students who knew or had 
prior contact with people with mental illness displayed higher attitude-willingness
consistency regardless of the typicality of the character, whereas students with relatively 
little prior knowledge or contact exhibited attitude-willingness behaviour consistency 
when the target individual was prototypical of people with mental illness than when the 
individual was atypical.  Thus, the perceived typicality of a target affected the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour for participants who had fewer skills or 
less experience with the category.
Subsequent research found that individuals apply social policy attitudes more 
consistently toward typical than atypical persons affected by the policy (Lord, 
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Desforges, Fein, Pugh, & Lepper, 1994).  For example, participants in favour of the 
death penalty tended to apply their opinions of the acceptability of the death penalty for 
a fictitious criminal only when the character was described in terms of typical 
characteristics of murderers (e.g., impulsive), but not when he was described in terms 
that are atypical characteristics of murderers (e.g., fearful).  However, participants who 
were against the death penalty made judgments that were consistent with their attitudes, 
regardless of the presented character.  Drawing on these findings and similar results in 
another study, Lord et al. suggested that social policy attitudes may invoke principles 
and contexts that lead to asymmetries and boundaries in the extent to which typicality 
moderates the connection between social policy and attitudes and other judgments.
Together, the evidence just reviewed illustrates the importance of knowing the 
instantiations contained within people’s mental representations of concepts.  Some 
(typical) instantiations may be processed more easily, used as reference points, and 
contain more features belonging to a concept.  In social contexts, this can lead to 
stronger effects of attitudes toward a category on relevant judgments and behaviour 
when people are considering typical instances of the category than when considering 
atypical instances.  At the same time, however, the research on social category attitudes 
shows that the role of instantiations may be complex.  In this context, the role of 
instantiations is influenced by attitude strength (i.e., high experience, knowledge) and 
attitude topic (e.g., death penalty, welfare). 
Based on these and some other findings, Lord and Lepper (1999) proposed a 
model called attitude representation theory (ART).  ART consists of two basic 
postulates: the representation postulate and the matching postulate.  The representation 
postulate states that “a person’s response to any attitude-relevant stimulus will depend 
(…) on the subjective representation of that stimulus by the person” (p. 269).  The 
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matching postulate states that “the more two situations activate assumptions and 
perceptions that match (…), the more response consistency or generality our model will 
predict” (p. 270).  The ART is relevant for this thesis, as I will modify it so it can be 
applied to value-behaviour relations (Chapter 3). 
Instantiations of Human Values
Maio (2010) elaborated the relevance of the prior research on cognitive 
instantiation to understanding values.  He suggested that values can be modelled as 
mental representations that include at least three levels. The first level is the system 
level, on which values are connected to each other, as in Schwartz’s (1992) model.  The 
second level is the level of specific abstract values (e.g., equality, wealth), which 
comprise the importance that people attach to the abstract concepts.  Finally, the third 
level is the instantiation level, which includes specific issues, situations, and behaviours 
relevant to the values.  
Unlike most research on values, this thesis considers the instantiation level in 
addition to the abstract and system levels of values.  The graded-structure that is evident 
in concepts studied within cognitive psychology is especially important to goal-directed 
categories such as values.  Ideals are the characteristics that exemplars should have to 
serve a certain goal; they tend to be an extreme representation and may never be reached 
(e.g., what does a perfectly equal or free world look like?).  Two other elements of 
graded-structure, central tendency and familiarity, are also relevant to values, although it 
may be harder to think spontaneously about value instantiations in terms of them.  
Remember that central tendency refers to highly probable properties of a given category, 
so the central tendency depends directly on the exemplars of that category, especially 
those that the person has experienced.  Familiarity refers to how often the person has 
experienced a certain entity across situations. 
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These dimensions reflect a lot of potential variability between instantiations.  
This variability matters because it may influence the extent to which a value is perceived 
as being applicable to specific situations.  As Maio (2010) pointed out, this may be an 
overlooked explanation for the findings of Darley and Batson’s (1973) classical 
experiment.  Darley and Batson found that theology students were less likely to help a 
person lying by the side of the path when under time pressure than when being on time.  
Maio (2010) noted that the underlying process of this finding could have been that 
students running late simply perceived helpfulness in this situation as less relevant, but 
politeness and punctuality as more relevant.  He suggested that one potential reason (of 
several) for this lack of application of the value may be that the range of concrete 
instantiations relevant to the value was not sufficiently developed to permit easy 
detection of the value’s relevance to the situation.
This line of thought was supported by a series of experiments in which it was 
found that participants who were encouraged to think more concretely about the value of 
equality (by generating concrete arguments for or against the value) subsequently 
behaved more equally compared to participants who were merely primed with equality 
(Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001).  In another series of experiments, it was shown 
that only contemplation of typical, concrete examples of a value increased the value-
related behaviour more than did contemplation about atypical examples (Maio, Hahn, 
Frost, & Cheung, 2009).  This illustrates the importance of finding typical instantiations 
over a range of values (perhaps due to their greater familiarity or fit with the ideal or 
central tendency), which is the focus of Chapter 3 in this thesis.  
Maio (2010) indicated that value instantiations could operate in different ways.  
More specifically, concrete value instantiations “could (1) affect a strength-related 
property of the abstract value itself (e.g., value certainty), (2) act as metaphors that we 
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apply to subsequent situations through analogical reasoning, or (3) affect our perceptual 
readiness to detect the value in subsequent situations” (Maio, 2010, p. 27).  Maio et al. 
(2009) sought but found no evidence to indicate that contemplation of concrete and 
typical instantiations made values stronger or more subjectively relevant.  In contrast, 
they did find that people become more perceptually ready to detect a value after 
contemplating concrete, typical instantiations.  That is, the act of thinking about a 
typical, concrete example of a value left people more likely to spontaneously detect its 
fit to a subsequent situation and to apply the value.
Another interesting issue is that values may differ in levels of abstraction.  For 
instance, in Schwartz’s (1992) model, protecting the environment might be perceived as 
a more concrete value than world of beauty, because protection of the environment 
implicitly covers a restricted range of actions.  It is conceivable that typical 
instantiations are more difficult to obtain for the values that are higher in abstractness.  
However, this does not mean that abstract values have no instantiations, because this 
would be tantamount to saying that a specific value has no applicability to real world 
situations and plays no role in practice.  Abstraction is a reason for some variation in the 
number of available and accessible instantiations per value to the extent that, all other 
things being equal, greater abstraction means greater scope, that is, more things to which 
a value could apply.  The question, however, is the extent to which the ‘all other things 
being equal’ really applies in the values domain: It seems entirely possible that there are 
very abstract values that are used infrequently, and that there are more specific values, 
covering fewer distinct types of instances, that occur extremely often.  In other words, 
abstraction may be a factor that gives rise to differences in typicality, but, in all 
likelihood, the relationship between abstraction and typicality is not a simple, direct one.  
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I am not aware of any available method to assess level of abstraction precisely, making 
this an interesting question for future research. 
It is worth mentioning that Kluckhohn’s theory of values (1951) presaged the 
importance of value instantiations.  He distinguished between values and manifestations 
of values because “in its analytic meaning, the locus of value is neither in the organism 
nor in the immediately observable world; its locus is rather that of all scientific 
abstraction” (p. 396).  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Kluckhohn (1951) stated that 
values are manifested in behavioural regularities, ideas, aesthetic and moral norms, and 
symbols.  But what are, for example, behavioural regularities, and are they the same 
across contexts such as countries?  Kluckhohn hinted at this possibility by distinguishing 
between values and manifestations of values.  For example, “people ought to help each 
other” (p. 396) is a manifestation of a value.  Hence, Kluckhohn uses the term 
manifestation in a similar way to the way in which the term instantiation is used here 
(Maio, 2010; Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009).  
Indeed, Kluckhohn (1951) argued that it is possible that group values are shaped 
by sanctions and reinforcement through instantiations.  For example, recycling is 
promoted as a mean to protect the environment in many Western countries.  By 
reinforcing recycling while simultaneously sanctioning failure to recycle, both recycling 
behaviour and the importance of protecting the environment increases (for a caveat of 
this method, see Evans et al., 2013).  In fact, it is hard to imagine how values can be 
promoted if not by means of instantiations.  
How Instantiations Help to Explain Past Evidence
There is a need for more evidence to help explain the role of value instantiations 
in behaviour.  It is not yet clear why typical, concrete instantiations make people more 
people more perceptually ready to detect and apply a value to a subsequent situation 
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(e.g., does it affect interpretation of attributes of the subsequent situation?).  From my 
perspective, there are also broader methodological and theoretical issues to address. 
Consider first the methodological issues.  Following the example given at the 
beginning of this section, imagine a researcher who wants to investigate the relationship 
between the value of family security and behaviour.  Which behaviours should the 
researcher examine?  In an unstable and unsafe country, it may make sense to measure 
the number of CCTVs in one’s property, the ‘quality’ of the perimeter fence (e.g., 
electric or barb wire), and whether there is access to a safe car for taking children to 
school.  In a safe and stable country, it may make more sense to assess the amount of 
financial support within a family, family stability, and harmony in family relationships.  
Consequently, a researcher who measures the use of home security devices in a 
relatively safe and stable country might discover little connection with the extent to 
which individuals value family security, because people mentally represent the value in 
a very different way.  Without knowing the concrete instantiations that are most relevant 
to people’s values, it is likely that the strength of the relations between values and 
behaviour will be underestimated. 
To avoid this mistake, it is necessary to ensure that research examines behaviour 
that is typical of any targeted values within a specific country.  An example of this 
approach occurred in research by Bardi and Schwartz (2003).  They asked participants 
to generate behaviours that express each of the ten value types.  Bardi and Schwartz 
found correlations between values and behaviour that were higher than in studies where 
the behaviour was chosen on the basis of theoretical considerations, including studies of 
organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB, Arthaud-Day et al., 2012) and intentions to 
support social action (Feather, Woodyatt, & McKee, 2012).  Furthermore, studies have 
found lower correlations when they have employed a behaviour measure developed in a 
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different country.  For example, Pozzebon and Ashton (2009) used Bardi and Schwartz's 
(2003) measure, which was developed in Israel, in Canada. Pozzebon and Ashton found 
somewhat lower correlation coefficients than those that had been obtained by Bardi and 
Schwartz.  Although this trend could be attributable to diverse factors (e.g., sample 
characteristics, respondent conscientiousness), one possibility is that the behaviours 
assessed by Bardi and Schwartz were less typical of the values in the Canadian 
population than in the Israeli population.
If a behaviour is not considered typical of a value, it is not surprising when 
values predict it only weakly (see Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009).  This is precisely what 
should happen given the evidence for the typicality effect in social attitudes and 
behaviour (Lord et al., 1994).  For example, although it was postulated and found that 
specific value types like benevolence or achievement correlate with OCB (Arthaud-Day 
et al., 2012), there are other behaviours that are considered to be more typical of these 
values (see Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, for examples).  In other words, many participants 
would likely agree that OCB is related to benevolence, but would probably not come up 
with this example by themselves.  The lack of a spontaneous association between the 
value and OCB should weaken the ability of the value to predict this kind of behaviour, 
because the value may not be automatically activated when the opportunity to perform 
this behaviour exists (see Maio, 2010).  In other words, the strength of the correlation 
between a value and a relevant behaviour is likely to be moderated by the typicality of 
the behaviour for the respective value: Value–behaviour relations should be larger if the 
behaviour that is measured is considered more typical for the specific value.  This may 
help us to understand the role of value instantiations in bridging the gap between values 
and behaviour, especially in the context of cross-cultural research.  I further elaborate 
this in more detail in Study 7.
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The way in which instantiations help to bridge the gap between values and 
behaviour is further illustrated in a research project that examined the effect of value 
salience on pro-environmental behaviour (Evans et al., 2013).  In two studies, the 
investigators manipulated the salience of different reasons for a pro-environmental 
behaviour (car-sharing), emphasizing either a self-enhancing value orientation (i.e., 
saving money) or a self-transcending value orientation (i.e., saving the environment).  
Results indicated that only the salience of the self-transcending value orientation, but not 
the self-enhancing value orientation, led to a spill-over effect in other pro-environmental 
behaviour.  Crucially, the main dependent variable was recycling behaviour.  As 
described in Study 4 of the present thesis, recycling is a typical example of pro-
environmental behaviour in the UK, where the Evans et al. (2013) study took place.  For 
two other relatively atypical behaviours that were measured, namely choosing scrap 
over new paper and choosing an energy-saving mode when using a computer, no 
significant effect of value salience was found.  In the analyses of British participants’ 
instantiations of protecting the environment described in Study 4 of the present thesis, 
choosing an energy-saving mode on a computer and using scrap paper were not 
mentioned.  These behaviours are not as strongly associated in memory with the value of 
protecting the environment.  These results are in line with findings from the social 
categorization research described above (Lord et al., 1991). 
This latter example illustrates the theoretical importance of considering value 
instantiation.  It is an inherent quality of basic values that they are abstract.  This means 
that any application of such values needs to ‘bridge the gap’ between the abstract level 
of the value and the specific situation or instance to which it is to be applied.  This is 
fundamental to how values ‘work’.  It enables widespread agreement about values 
themselves, while allowing for strong disagreement in actual practice.  For example, the 
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term “human dignity” is often used in international agreements like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, because everyone can agree that this concept is important.  
Indeed, at an abstract level, human values barely differ between countries, as discussed 
above.  Differences between nations explain on average only 2 to 12 percent of the 
variance between individuals (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011).  That is, the variance in 
values is much larger within countries than between them. 
The differences between countries may be much less about how important values 
are rated in the abstract than about how the values are exemplified in different cultures.  
This hypothesis fits the definition of culture as “shared cognitive representations in the 
minds of individuals” (Romney, Boyd, Moore, Batchelder, & Brazill, 1996, p. 4699).  
For instance, it has been argued that different parties “can conceive human dignity as 
representing their particular set of values and worldview” (Shultziner, 2003, p. 5), which 
is one reason why there are many differences across the world in how humans are 
treated by their governments.  This observation is, for example, relevant to the value of 
equality.  In many countries, women are still considered to be unequal to men, and they 
are granted fewer rights and opportunities.  People in these countries (especially men) 
may have a strong sense of justice and equality with regard to treatment of men in 
relation to each other and with regard to the treatment of women with regard to each 
other, but either do not apply egalitarian notions to relations between men and women, 
or instantiate equality between men and women in a different way (e.g., according to 
perceived differences in needs, abilities, duties).  If two cultures do not instantiate 
equality relating to men and women in the same way, then the value may be endorsed 
highly despite notable differences in how it is conceptualized. 
To illustrate this effect, it is worthwhile to briefly describe an analysis of data 
from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (www.europeansocialsurvey.org).  
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This survey includes over 56,700 people from 31 countries.  Participants responded to a 
variety of questions, including items from a short version of the Portrait Value 
Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz et al., 2001).  One item assessed equality (“Important 
that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”) and was answered on a 6-
point scale (1 “very much” to 6 “not at all”).  Participants from Turkey (n = 2,416), a 
country that has been found to discriminate against women on average more than other 
European countries (Tansel, Dalgic, & Guven, 2014), agreed with this item virtually to 
the same extent as participants in the other European countries (M = 2.06, SD = .93 for 
Turkey, M = 2.10, SD = 1.06 for the 30 remaining countries, Cohen’s d = .05).  
However, a comparison of the means of two items that explicitly asked about gender 
discrimination revealed more unequal attitudes within the Turkish sample.  Specifically, 
using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly), participants 
rated their agreement with the statements, “A woman should be prepared to cut down on 
her paid work for the sake of her family” and “When jobs are scarce, men should have 
more right to a job than women”.  Turkish participants agreed with the first (M = 2.14, 
SD = .92) and second (M = 2.20, SD = 1.13) statements much more than did participants 
in the 30 other countries (M = 2.86, SD = 1.18, d = .77, and M = 3.61, SD = 1.23, d = 
1.24, respectively).  
Interestingly, responses to the equality item were weakly but positively
correlated with the two items about gender discrimination in Turkey (r[2225] = .11 and 
r[2251] = .13, ps < .001).  That is, greater endorsement of the importance of equality 
predicted more acceptance of discrimination against women.  In the rest of Europe, 
responses to the equality item were weakly but negatively correlated with the two items 
about gender discrimination (r[52007] = -.01, p = .047 and r[51659] = -.06, p < .001).  
That is, as expected, greater endorsement of the importance of equality predicted less
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acceptance of discrimination against women.  Although these latter associations were 
very small4, this brief analysis demonstrates that the instantiation of equality may differ 
between the nations, with implications for value-behaviour relations. 
Finally, and possibly most importantly, the various examples of instantiation 
discussed above make it clear that one cannot understand how values guide behaviour 
without understanding how the process of instantiation takes place.  This complex 
process entails recognizing how a specific situation falls under a general value (or, more 
likely, values) and working out the implications this has for action.  Without 
understanding how people manage this task, we will neither fully understand the role of 
values in human behaviour, nor be able to change behaviours effectively where this is 
desired. 
For example, it makes little sense to try to tackle issues of gender equality by 
emphasizing equality per se in a context whether there is little or no connection between 
gender equality and equality as a value.  Similarly, it would not make sense to aim for 
less CO2 emissions as a result of poor house insulation by emphasizing the importance 
of environment protection in a context in which no connection is made between 
insulation and these emissions.  Such attempts become feasible only when the value 
instantiations are brought into people’s conceptualization of the value itself, through 
cultural change, information campaigns, education, or other means.  However, for such 
attempts to be successful, a more detailed understanding of the process of instantiation is 
required.  Given that this process has largely been overlooked in past research, there is a 
considerable need for studies that manipulate value instantiations, examine the factors 
that make it easy or hard for instances to be recognized as instances of a value, and 
4 Value-behavior relations are often small when one specific behavior is examined, because 
values explicitly relate to large aggregates of behavior, and are much better at predicting large aggregates 
(Maio, 2010).
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examine the effects of changes in value instantiation on value-behaviour relations over 
time. 
The aims of this section were to introduce the concept of value instantiation and 
to highlight why it is important to study them.  Thus far, the literature on value 
instantiation is very limited.  In Study 4 of the present thesis, I propose a method of 
measuring value instantiations and provide the first systematic overview of how 23 
different values are instantiated.  In Studies 5 to 10 of the thesis, I explore diverse basic 
consequences of value instantiations.  
Overview of the thesis
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the extent to which people differ in 
values across countries.  First, in Chapter 2, I test whether various groups of people are 
indeed more similar than different (moderate universalistic claim) on values (in addition 
to a set of additional variables).  Prior evidence supports this claim (e.g., Fischer & 
Schwartz, 2011), but Study 1 and 2 analyse two large international datasets and with two 
newly developed statistics for measuring similarities.  These statistics utilise the 
distribution of the data and the scale endpoints instead of the distribution of the means, 
as it is done within classical statistical framework (e.g., frequentist and Bayesian).  
Moreover, I explain why the direct examination of similarities is beneficial for various 
reasons, such as a more accurate interpretation of scientific findings.  Study 3 explores 
three possibilities to improve the accuracy of the interpretation of scientific findings. 
As Chapter 2 mainly focuses on values measured at the abstract level, Chapter 3 
begins to focus on whether differences are larger when we move from an abstract to a 
concrete level (i.e., value instantiations).  Hence, in Studies 4 to 10, I test whether 
people in three countries instantiate values differently and potential implications of these 
differences.  The three countries I compare are Brazil, India, and the UK.  All countries 
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differ along various dimensions.  In terms of years of schooling, GNP, and life 
expectancy (United Nations Developmental Programme, 2014), India is the least 
developed out of the three countries, and the UK is the most developed.  Brazil and 
India are perceived as much more corrupt than the UK (Transparency International, 
2014), and the homicide rate in Brazil is 25 times higher than in the UK and almost 8 
times higher than in India (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014).  These 
differences provide an interesting context to study differences in value similarities: If 
values are instantiated similarly across these three (at least somewhat) dissimilar 
countries, this evidence would provide new support for the universalistic claim.  
Conversely, if values are instantiated differently, this evidence would support the claim 
that culture consists of shared mental representations at a concrete level (Romney et al., 
1996).  
Because most the participants in Studies 4 to 10 were students, I conducted a 
further study reported in Appendix B, in which I tested whether students are 
representative of the general population and more homogeneous, addressing a potential 
limitation of the empirical studies.  Table 1.1 provides an overview of all studies.
As already mentioned, one of the main aims of this thesis is to depart from the 
common ‘difference focus’ found in the social sciences and to focus instead on 
similarities.  However, across 18 million papers in all fields science, it was found that 
balancing conventional with atypical knowledge results in a higher impact than does 
solely focusing on the atypical (Uzzi, Mukherjee, Stringer, & Jones, 2013).  Hence, I 
aim to balance my focus on similarities with a focus on differences.  In Studies 1 and 2, 
I focus mainly on similarities and discuss differences only briefly.  Given the high 
similarities documented in Studies 1 and 2, I then turn to a search for differences by 
focusing on value instantiations.  The search across the last eight studies in this thesis 
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show in diverse ways that strong similarities remain, even while looking for (and finding 
some) nichés that expose difference.  
Table 1.1
Overview of empirical studies 
Description Countries 
included
Sample 
size
Data type
Study 1 Demonstrating that similarities 
between groups are larger than 
differences
60 from 
five 
continents
~86,000 Secondary
Study 2 Replication of Study 1 29 
European 
countries
~54,000 Secondary
Study 3 Influence of presentation type on 
lay readings of reports
UK 291 Primary
Study 4 Instantiations of human values 
(qualitative-exploratory design)
Brazil, 
India, UK
630 Primary
Study 5 Do people recognize that 
instantiations are related to the 
originating values? 
Brazil, UK 627 Primary
Study 6 Estimating the relevance of 
instantiations
Brazil, UK 250 Primary
Study 7 Influence of typicality on values –
attitudes – social norms –
perceived behaviour control –
intention relations (Theory of 
Planned Behaviour)
Brazil, 
India, UK
749 Primary
Study 8 Art bias in lay-perception of 
creativity (same data as Study 4)
Brazil, UK 67 Primary
Study 9 Conceptual replication of Study 8: 
Amount of creativity needed for 
professions
Brazil, UK 253 Primary
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Description Countries 
included
Sample 
size
Data type
Study 10 Conceptual replication of Study 8: 
Amount of creativity needed for 
various objects (pictures, 
engineering products)  
Brazil, UK 171 Primary
Appendix 
B Study
Are students an accurate estimate 
of the general public? (same data 
as Study 1)
59 from 
five 
continents
~84,000 Secondary
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Chapter 2: A Case for Documenting Similarities Between Groups of People
In the weeks after a narrow majority of British voters voted to leave the 
European Union in June 2016, the level of openly racist incidents appeared to increase 
sharply (Versi, 2016). This is in line with an upsurge of support for right-wing parties 
across Europe in recent years (Wodak, KhosraviNik, & Mral, 2013).  A similar pattern 
has been seen in the USA, where it has been argued that racism has become more 
acceptable as a result of speeches made by presidential candidate Donald Trump 
(Vasquez, 2015).  A key characteristic of racism is its focus on the fact that out-groups 
are different from and inferior to the in-group.  Here I suggest that quantitative social 
science has inadvertently been playing a role in fostering these beliefs by focusing on 
differences between groups and neglecting to highlight stronger and important 
similarities. 
This issue is of fundamental importance because scientific research is supposed 
to reveal intersubjective reality (the ‘truth’) in an unbiased and reliable way.  However, 
there are different ways to describe intersubjective reality.  For instance, if we were 
comparing two groups of people with respect to moral attitudes, we could describe 
either the differences or the similarities between the groups, or indeed both.  
Historically, the focus of social sciences and psychology in particular has been on the 
description of differences between groups.  Over 90 percent of the published research 
findings in psychology describe statistically significant differences (Fanelli, 2010; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015).  Studies that are instead consigned to the metaphorical 
file-drawer contain results that are often described as “failures” to detect significant 
differences, and most of the inferential statistics and effect sizes used are only 
appropriate for measuring differences. 
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The lack of recognition that similarities matter is important because differences 
between groups with so-called “large” effect sizes can occur even when two groups are 
much more similar than different, as described below.  Moreover, this possibility is 
applicable whenever people are clustered into groups based on a specific variable, 
including many common demographic variables studied in psychology (e.g., gender, 
age, culture).  Further, the inclusion of information on similarities, instead of a narrow 
focus on differences, can lead to more accurate perceptions of findings.  In this chapter, 
I illustrate these points, beginning with a rational of why I assume that similarities 
between groups of people are larger than differences, followed by a discussion of 
common ways of reporting scientific findings and measures of similarities.
Cultural Comparisons as an Example of Research that has Reported Similarities
Cross-cultural psychology provides one example of a domain wherein the 
importance of examining similarities has been highlighted (Berry et al., 2011; Brouwers, 
Hemert, Breugelmans, & Vijver, 2004), despite most research focusing on differences.  
Furthermore, several definitions of cross-cultural psychology emphasize differences 
(Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973; Eckensberger, 1972), while ignoring similarities 
and uniformity (see Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011).  A review 
of 200 random selected publications of the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
concluded that similarities are underrated (Brouwers et al., 2004).
Many studies that have used large-scale cross-cultural surveys, like the European 
Social Survey (ESS) or the World Value Survey (WVS), have focused almost entirely 
on differences.  For example, some studies have reported between-country differences in 
happiness or well-being (e.g., Mencarini & Sironi, 2012; Swift et al., 2014), whereas 
others have focused on attitudes towards immigrants (as a perceived ethnic threat), trust 
in other people, or trust in institutions such as the national parliament, police, or the 
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United Nations (e.g., Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; Grönlund & Setala, 2012; Marozzi, 
2014; Visser, Scholte, & Scheepers, 2013).  Using data from the WVS, studies have 
reported differences in social trust and self-reported health (Jen, Sund, Johnston, & 
Jones, 2010) or satisfaction with life (Oishi, Diener, Lucas, & Suh, 1999). 
Yet many international agreements are consistent with the view that there are 
high levels of similarity between nations.  For example, more than 190 countries joined 
the international crime police organization (INTERPOL), which indicates that they share 
at least some common policies regarding the response to criminal behaviour.  Another 
example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which has been signed 
by almost every nation and demonstrates that humans share a common system of values 
(Bobbio, 1996).  Indeed, the primary reason I became interested in similarities is the 
evidence for cross-nation similarity in values.  Specifically, as discussed in Chapter 1,
there is evidence that (a) human values are structured in the same way across 80 
countries (Bilsky et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2001, 2012), (b) the 
hierarchy of human values is the same across numerous countries (Schwartz & Bardi, 
2001), and (c) differences between countries with regard to value priorities are very 
small compared to the differences within a country (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011).  
Furthermore, a recent study that investigated 18 psychological variables (e.g., social 
axioms, personality, nationalism) in 27 countries found that the variance between 
countries only accounted for between 7 and 34 percent of individual differences (Saucier 
et al., 2015), suggesting that countries are more similar than different, although the 
paper itself only focused on differences.  
However, both of the above studies focused only on comparisons between 
countries.  Furthermore, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) quantified similarities, but only 
examined values, while Saucier et al. (2015) investigated a range of variables, but did 
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not quantify similarities.  Research needs to go beyond country differences to explore 
differences/similarities in other important group categories, such as gender, age, income, 
education, and religious denominations.  Indeed, in a second-order meta-analysis, Hyde 
(2005) found that the majority “of effect sizes for gender differences were in the small 
or close-to-zero range” (p. 586).  It may be the case that effects of other traditional 
grouping variables (e.g., age, income, education) also occur against a backdrop of strong 
similarity.  Such evidence would provide an important counterpoint to the dominant 
emphasis on differences. 
A General Test of Similarities and Methodology
The typical way of presenting research findings contributes to our ignorance of 
similarities.  Presentation usually focuses on means, line graphs, bar graphs, p levels, or
Bayes factors. These modes of presentation usually focus on differences. Another 
reason for a lack of attention to similarity may be an incorrect assumption made by
researchers. Specifically, we tend to assume that a null difference indicates high 
similarity, whereas a statistically significant result reflects low similarity. 
While the null difference potentially affirms (or at least fails to refute) high 
similarity, a significant and/or large difference is not diagnostic of low similarity. 
Consider national differences in an important contemporary topic: trust in science.
Figure 1 displays Brazilians’ (n = 1473) and Germans’ (n = 2043) trust in science, as 
reported in the World Value Survey (see below and Appendix A for more details). 
Larger scale values (i.e., towards 10) reflect greater trust in science.  As shown in Figure 
2.1A, superimposing one density distribution on the other reveals a large overlap 
between the two nations. The majority of Brazilians chose response options that were 
also frequently chosen by German respondents.  Other ways of depicting the data also 
reveal large overlap.  Figure 2.1B displays two Kernel distributions, which have been 
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smoothed to the data.  Figure 2.1C displays two histograms with five bars, and Figure 
2.1D displays two histograms with 18 bars each. Moreover, this overlap occurs even 
though a Welch’s t-test of statistical difference reveals that Germans have significantly 
greater trust in science, t(2507.10) = 13.27, p < .0001, with a moderate effect size, 
Cohen’s d = .48. The Bayes factor is > 1035, using Rouder’s default JZS of r = 0.71, 
indicating overwhelming evidence for the alternative hypothesis (cf. Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009).  Crucially, however, the overlapping density 
distributions show that these robust difference tests neglect another perspective on the 
two groups’ trust in science: Notwithstanding the moderate effect size, the vanishingly 
small p-value and the enormous Bayes factor, 81% of the responses are shared between 
the groups.  The similarities are visibly far larger than the differences. Such similarities 
are often ignored in the reporting of results, even though they have a fundamental 
relevance to the “take-home” message for readers: Brazilians and Germans both trust 
science to a great extent – they do not have opposing or dissimilar views. 
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Figure 2.4. Different ways to present Trust in Science in Brazil and Germany,
with d = .48 and PCR = 81.
To make similarities more apparent in research reports, it is important to apply a 
general and easy-to-use method for quantifying similarity across diverse research 
domains.  Although researchers have called for greater examination and discussion of 
similarities, especially in cross-cultural research (Berry et al., 2011; Brouwers et al., 
2004), a coherent approach to describing similarity has been absent. My proposal is to 
avoid the problems associated with overreliance on both null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) and Bayesian statistics by supplementing them with information about 
similarities. 
To support this aim, I have reexamined a generally neglected measure of 
similarity and developed two new methods for assessing similarities. As background to 
understanding my approach, it is important to consider current approaches to testing 
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differences and to effect sizes representing differences.  For example, a two-sample t-
test, one of the most commonly used tests in psychology, tests only the probability that 
two means are from the same population, while relying on the hypothesized distribution 
of the means and neglecting the actual distribution of the data.  In other words, a t-test 
can only help to ascertain whether the two means are likely to come from the same 
distribution; it does not allow any inferences about the actual distributions.  Similarly, 
one of the most popular indices of effect size, Cohen’s d, measures the differences 
between two means in units of variability (Cohen, 1988). 
A possible and often neglected application of d is that it can be transformed to 
yield an overlap coefficient (OVL), which allows one to draw conclusions about the 
distribution of the whole data, not just the means, by estimating the percentage of 
overlap between two normal distributions (Inman & Bradley, 1989).  In other words, the 
OVL helps to assess similarity. For example, even a large effect size of Cohen’s d = .80 
(Cohen, 1992) represents an overlap of 69 percent; a medium effect size of d = .50 
represents an overlap of 80 percent; and a small effect size of d = .20 represents an 
overlap of 92 percent (Figure 2.2). Below, I describe an empirical comparison of the 
OVL with four additional measures of similarities: The intraclass correlation (ICC[1]), 
the probability of superiority, non-parametric versions of the OVL, and a new measure 
we developed to explicitly calculate the percentage of common scores (PCS). I 
demonstrate that the OVL is essentially the same variable as the PCS and very strongly 
related to the other similarity indices. Because the OVL and PCS are almost perfectly 
correlated, I argue that it is easiest and most useful to simply multiply the OVL by 100 
and label this new index as the percentage of common responses (PCR), which is a more 
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concrete and easy-to-comprehend statement of similarity than the abstract notion of 
overlap. 
Figure 2.2. Illustration of the percentage of common responses (PCR; or 
overlapping coefficient) for different Cohen’s ds. The design of the figure was inspired 
by Kristoffer Magnusson’s interactive visualization on 
http://rpsychologist.com/d3/cohend/. 
The PCS estimates similarity simply by calculating the percentage of common 
scores across two distributions. It can be used for both normal and non-normal 
distributions, and it is easy to interpret.  The PCS can be interpreted as the percentage of 
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one group that has the same scale responses as the other group.  For example, a 
percentage of 90 indicates that only 10 percent of each group has chosen a response on 
the measurement scale that is not mirrored in the other group.  
PCS is computed using an easy-to-use function I developed in R.  In developing 
the method for calculating the PCS, two issues had to be addressed.  First, the PCS for 
an item with a 5-point response scale is likely to be larger than for an item that has a 10-
point response scale.  To address this issue, I calculate the PCS by normalizing the data 
separately for each group, counting the number of values in the following five groups: 0 
to 0.2, 0.2 to 0.4, 0.6 to 0.8, and 0.8 to 1.  Each score in the first group would be 
replaced by 0.1, each score in the second group by 0.3, and so on.  (The scores 0.1, 0.3, 
etc., are arbitrary numbers; alternatives such as 1 to 5 would have fulfilled the same 
purpose).  Through this transformation, I ensured that each variable consists of different 
frequencies of the same five scores.  That is, I standardized the number of scale points 
for all variables to 5.  I applied this transformation to all measures, because many recent 
and reliable scales use at least a 5-point scale.  A second issue is differences in sample 
size: If one sample is twice as large as the other, how can the PCS be calculated?  To 
address this, I used bootstrapping methods.  That is, from the larger group we draw a 
sample of the same size as the smaller group and calculate the number of responses in 
common with the smaller group.  After normalizing and clustering the values into one of 
the five groups as described above, the percentage of common responses between the 
two vectors is computed.  This is done 100 times for each variable.  The median of the 
100 common responses is then used as an estimate of the percentage of common 
responses.  
The interpretation of the PCS is approximately the same as the PCR when the 
two distributions are normal, especially if the sample sizes are equal.  The primary 
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difference is that the PCS refers directly to common scale responses across two groups.  
That is, a research report could indicate that one group was X units higher than the 
other, but gave the same responses Y% of the time (rather than report a difference of X 
and overlap of Y).  Furthermore, the PCS returns, on average, a more conservative 
estimate of similarity (cf. results below).  
Given that PCR and PCS are conceptually similar, I expected large correlations 
between these measures.  Indeed, all correlations were as expected, both on a single 
pairwise comparison level and on an aggregated level.  For example, within the category 
of country, PCR and PCS of moral attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviors 
correlated very strongly, r[1768] = .98. On an aggregated level (correlating the medians 
of each variable across all categories), the medians of PCR and PCS correlated highly, 
r(130) = .96, but, PCS was slightly smaller (M = 91.23, SD = 6.46), than PCR (M = 
93.30, SD = 5.37).  
There are other effect sizes that could be used to estimate similarities instead of 
the PCR and PCS.  I consider all three as interesting alternatives.  One alternative option 
is the intra-class correlation (ICC[1]; Bliese, 2000).  The ICC(1) uses the between-group 
and within-group variance directly.  It can be interpreted as the average proportion of 
total variance explained by group membership within categories, such as countries or 
age groups.  An ICC(1) of .2 indicates, for example, that 20 percent of a variable can be 
explained by group membership, or, alternatively, that 80 percent of the variation cannot 
be explained by group membership.  If similarities are large, between group variance is 
low and the ICC(1) is therefore close to zero.  However, the concept of amount of 
explained variance is not very intuitive.  Further, because the ICC(1) is calculated from 
an ANOVA model, the ICC(1) is a parametric measure.  
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A second option is the probability of superiority (PS), which is a non-parametric 
generalization of the common language effect size (McGraw & Wong, 1992).  The PS 
returns the probability that a randomly selected person from the higher-scoring group 
has a higher value than a randomly selected person from the other group (Ruscio, 2008; 
Ruscio & Mullen, 2012).  A PS of .50, for example, would indicate maximum similarity, 
whereas values close to 0 or 1 large differences.  I think PS is an underused measure to 
present differences.  However, a “probability of superiority” is not a label that could be 
applied to directly convey similarities.  
A third alternative is to smooth a kernel density estimate over the data and 
compute the overlap of the two functions.  Figure 2.1B displays such a possibility.  This 
approach can be understood as a non-parametric version of the OVL coefficient (Schmid 
& Schmidt, 2006, p. 200).  However, an evident problem is that both the distribution of 
the data and the response options vary.  Hence, smoothing a kernel density estimation 
above all data in the same way becomes practically impossible.  For example, assume 
the data in both groups are normal distributed.  When the kernel density estimates are 
smoothed in a loose way above the data, we obtain two normal distributions.  If the 
density would be smoothed exactly above the data, the result would be the same as for 
the PCS measure, without standardizing it to five response options.  
For all of these approaches, the interpretation is less direct and intuitive than an 
approach that simply ranges from 0 to 100 percent, which can be obtained easily through 
the PCR (i.e., a non-linear transformation of d).  
However, the PCR, like the conceptually related measures such as the percentage 
of common scores, the ICC[1], and the probability of superiority measure, neglects one 
other vital consideration for quantifying similarity: the absolute difference between the 
two means or medians, given a specific scale. For example, small variances result in 
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larger ds: If the standard deviation is reduced by x, d will be increased by x. In other 
words, even small mean differences can result in large effect sizes and low estimates of 
similarity in distributions. For this reason, interpretation of the PCR needs to be 
supplemented with a measure of the absolute difference between two populations. To 
illustrate, consider once again the example of trust in science. To anticipate analyses 
reported below, I compared all 60 countries from the WVS with each other pairwise, 
resulting in 1770 comparisons. On the basis of the ‘classical’ approach that focuses on 
differences, one might conclude that countries differ considerably in their trust in 
science. The average d is .31, and the largest d is 1.60 (between India and Libya, M = 
6.05, SD = 2.10, median = 6.33, vs. M = 8.92, SD = 1.53, median = 9.67). Many of the 
differences between any two given countries are statistically significant, which is not 
surprising given an average sample size of 1438 per country.  A few of the differences 
also seem appreciable when considered alongside the percentage of common responses 
for some countries. For example, the PCR between India and Libya is only 42. 
However, the picture looks different when the median scores are considered.
Participants in these two countries (and indeed in each of the 60 countries) scored 
significantly higher on average than the mid-point of the 10-point Likert scale (Figure 
2.3). In short, people in all the nations had a high trust in science.
This similarity in central tendency can be captured by calculating the absolute 
effect (AE), which I define as the median difference expressed as the proportion of the 
largest possible difference: (median group A – median group B)/(scale maximum – scale 
minimum). If the median difference is .5, measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, the 
AE would be .5/(6 - 1) = .1. An advantage of the AE is its independence from the 
distribution and the variance. In the current example, calculating the AE reveals that the 
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proportion of the median difference is rather small (median AE = .07; the maximum AE 
of .37 is between India and Libya).
Figure 2.3. Median score of trust in science per country. The horizontal line 
represents the scale midpoint.
Despite their conceptual independence, PCR and AE tend to be negatively 
related in the data we have examined (see below).  Therefore, based on these measures, I 
propose the following approach to describing similarities between two groups.  This 
approach uses three thresholds to provide a scale for interpreting similarity that is 
parallel to the common practice of dividing measures of effect size into small, medium, 
and large (cf. Cohen, 1992).  A small amount of similarity exists when the PCR is above 
50% and the AE is below .50; a medium amount of similarity exists when the PCR is 
above 66.67% and the AE is lower than .33; and finally, a large amount of similarity 
exists when the PCR is above 83.33% and the AE is below .17.  Conversely, a small
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amount of difference exists when PCR is below 50% and the AE is above .50; a medium
amount of difference exists when the PCR is below 33.33% and the AE is above than 
.67; and finally, large differences exists when the PCR is below 16.67% and the AE is 
above .83.  Because 50% and .50 are the natural mid-point of PCR and AE, respectively, 
the thresholds follow from these points.  
The Present Research
To provide a broad demonstration of the utility and importance of my proposed 
similarity indices, I performed two studies using large international datasets.  In Study 1, 
I tested for similarities across six categories: gender, age, education, income, countries, 
and religious denomination.  In Study 2, I used the same categories except religious 
denominations because the data was restricted to European countries, providing less 
variance in this variable.  Furthermore, I tested for similarities on a range of dependent 
variables, including human values, moral attitudes, trust, and well-being. These choices 
were made with an eye to examining variables that have often been reported as showing 
important differences between people. If there is evidence of high similarity in these 
tests, the data would provide an important caveat regarding prior conclusions about 
differences. 
The present research addresses this issue using newly developed tests in large, 
representative international samples across 22 dependent variables in Study 1 and 24 
dependent variables in Study 2.  I computed the described statistics, PCR, AE, and for 
the purpose of comparison, the percentage of common scores (PCS, see below and 
Appendix A), which is a non-parametric test for similarities, and Cohen’s d. Within a 
given category (e.g., countries), I compared each group with each other (e.g., Brazil with 
Germany) to compute all the statistics. For example, I compared in Study 1 60 countries 
pairwise, resulting in 1770 comparisons for each statistic and variable. For the 
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remaining five categories, I conducted 155 pairwise comparisons: 28 for religious 
denominations, 1 for gender (male vs. female), 36 for education, 45 for income, and 45 
for age. In total, I conducted in Study 1 167,284 pairwise comparisons for all of four 
statistics (d, PCR, PCS, AE). 
I expected to find large correlations between the PCR, AE and the other measure 
of similarity, PCS.  I then explored potential differences in levels of similarity involved 
across all comparisons. For example, I tested whether people were less similar to each 
other when clustered in different income groups than when clustered in countries, as 
Greenfield (2014) proposed. Furthermore, I explored which variables show more 
similarities and which variables show fewer similarities across all six (five) categories. 
Study 3 focuses on one of the key reasons why it is important to examine 
similarity in the first place.  Specifically, it may make a large difference whether people 
see results in a way that depicts the traditional focus on difference versus the same 
findings in a way the represents the similarities.  Study 3 tests whether reporting 
similarities compared to differences leads to more accurate perceptions of effects in lay 
reading of reports.  If this finding emerges, it provides important evidence that reporting 
similarity enhances the correct understanding of scientific data communication.
Study 1: Similarities Across 60 Countries
Method
Participants. I used the most recent version of the WVS at the time of 
conducting our data analyses (6th round; April 2015), which includes 86,272 participants 
(51.20% female) from 60 countries with a mean age of 41.68 years (SD = 16.58). Data 
were retrieved from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
Material. My independent variables were gender, age, education, income, nation 
of residence, and religious denomination.  Gender was measured dichotomously as 
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male/female. The continuous variable year of birth was divided into 10 equal sized 
groups, ranging from “born in 1946 or before” to “born in 1991 or later.” Education 
was measured on a 9-point scale ranging from “no formal education” (n = 4604) to 
“university-level education with degree” (n = 14,260). To estimate income, participants 
were asked to indicate their household net income, relative to the country-specific 
income distribution, on a 10-point scale from 1 (lowest group) to 10 (highest group). 
For country, I used all 60 countries in the WVS. More than 1000 participants indicated 
that they belong to one of the following eight religious denominations: Buddhism (n = 
3861), Evangelical (n = 1411), Hindu (n = 1742), Muslim (n = 18,004), Orthodox (n = 
8505), Protestant (n = 5562), Roman Catholic (n = 14,921), and Sunni (n = 3172). 
Twenty-two dependent variables were included. The ten value types postulated 
by Schwartz (1992) were measured in the WVS with a short version of the Portrait 
Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001), containing one item per value type. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they are similar to each description 
(portrait) of another person. Example descriptions include “It is important to this person 
to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way” (self-direction) and 
“It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things” 
(power). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very much 
like me) to 6 (not like me at all).  I chose the other 12 variables by considering the scales 
within the WVS, the findings of previous studies, and the results of principal component 
analyses (PCAs). For instance, although trust in other people had been measured in 
previous studies with a single scale (Jen et al., 2010), I created two factors from the six 
items, based on the results of a PCA (varimax rotation). All six items were answered on 
a 4-point scale from 1 (trust completely) to 4 (do not trust at all). The first factor 
represents trust in strangers, and is based on trust in people met for the first time, trust in 
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people of a different religion, and trust in people from a different country (α = .79). The 
second factor represents trust in people with whom one is close (family, neighbours, 
people known personally; α = .58). The correlation between the two factors was of 
medium size, r(83962) = .35. Other variables were understanding of democracy (6 
items, α = .74), trust in political institutions (6 items, α = .87), perceived respect for the 
elderly in own society (3 items, α = .71), ageism (4 items, α = .60), trust in science (3 
items, α = .73), scepticism towards science (3 items, α = .56). Trust in science was 
uncorrelated with scepticism towards science, r(83686) = -.07. Further, the items of the 
Morally Debatable Scale (Harding & Phillips, 1986) were divided into three subscales 
after a PCA (cf. Vauclair & Fischer, 2011): attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviours
(e.g., justifiability of homosexuality, 7 items, α = .89), dishonest-illegal behaviour (e.g., 
stealing, 5 items, α = .83), and domestic violence (e.g., a man beating his wife, 3 items, 
α = .78). Higher scores on these attitude scales signify more agreement. Finally, 
political attitude was measured with a single item, on which participants could indicate 
their position on a left-right political dimension from 1 (left; n = 3459) to 10 (right; n = 
5354), with most participants identifying themselves as in the middle (5 items, n = 
19,005). 
Results
First, I report validations of the measures. Next, important findings for each 
category are reported, then comparisons between all categories, and finally comparisons 
between the 22 dependent variables. Detailed results can be found in Appendix A. 
Validation of the measures.
One possible objection to the use of the PCR is that it may be biased when the 
assumptions of normality and variance homogeneity are violated. I therefore validated 
the PCR with the PCS. This new measure computes the percentage of common scores 
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while taking sample size and the length of the response scale into account.  Given that 
the measures are highly correlated (r = .95-.98) and the average difference is 2 percent, I
consider the PCR to be a valid measure of similarities.5
The large correlation between PCR and PCS indicates that the PCR, despite 
being a parametric measure, is robust against violations of normality assumptions. A 
large correlation was also found between PCR and AE (r = -.65). Given this evidence 
for convergent validity, we focus below on the two measures that we propose: PCR and 
AE.
Findings within each category. As expected, the median values for the four 
statistics revealed high levels of similarity. For all variables, the median PCR between 
two groups is 95 (M = 93), and the AE is .02 (M = .05), indicating large similarities. 
Only 274 out of 41,821 pairwise comparisons (0.66%) for both effect sizes combined 
revealed a PCR of less than 50 percent and an AE of more than .50. All 274 cases were 
found in the country category (see Table A1).  
Findings within each category
Countries.  Countries were less similar to each other than were the groups in the 
other categories.  The average PCR across all 22 variables was 84 (range = 71 – 90) and 
the average AE was .14 (range = 0 – .20).  The two variables with the smallest PCRs 
and largest AEs were moral attitudes towards personal-sexual issues and moral attitudes 
towards (domestic) violence (PCRs = 6 and 9, AEs = .67 and .41): Participants from 
Pakistan considered liberal personal-sexual behaviours (e.g., abortion, homosexuality) 
least justifiable (M = 1.60, median = 1.14), whereas those from the Netherlands (M = 
6.69, median = 7.14) and Sweden (median = 7.14) found them most justifiable.  
5 I also consider our newly developed measure, the percentage of common scores (PCS), to be as 
valid as the PCR, which is why I have also reported the results of the PCS in Appendix A.  I use the PCR 
because it is easier to compute, for example with this short command in R: 2*pnorm((-abs(0.43))/2)*100
(for d = 0.43) and because people judge it more accurately (Study 2).
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Participants in 28 countries reported that (domestic) violence is not justifiable (Ms < 2,
medians = 1), whereas participants from Rwanda found it relatively more justifiable (M 
= 4.50, median = 4.67). However, the average Rwandan reported that (domestic) 
violence is less justifiable than justifiable, as did the average respondent from the other 
59 countries (Table A1); the largest AE for these 1700 pairwise comparisons was .41, 
indicating only a small amount of similarity, following the taxonomy introduced above. 
Religious denomination.  Pairwise comparisons were made for eight religious 
denominations.  The amount of similarities across 22 dependent variables was large 
(PCR = 90, range = 85 – 96) and the average AE was .06 (range = 0 – .20).  The 
smallest PCR was with respect to moral attitudes towards liberal personal-sexual 
behaviours (PCR = 49, AE = .29), with Sunnis reporting them as least justifiable (M = 
1.82, median = 1.29) and Evangelicals reporting them as relatively more justifiable (M = 
4.06, median = 3.86).
Income.  The amount of similarities was again large with an average PCR of 96 
(range = 92 – 98) and an average AE of .04 (range = 0 – .20).  The smallest similarity 
was with respect to political attitudes (PCR = 78, AE = .22), with participants in the 
lowest 5 income groups having a stronger pro-left attitude (Ms < 5.88, median = 5) than 
those in the highest income group (M = 6.77, median = 7).  
Education.  Similarities between educational groups were large: The average 
PCR was 96 (range = 91 – 98) and the average AE was .02 (range = 0 – .10).  The 
smallest similarity was in moral attitudes towards liberal personal-sexual behaviours
(PCR = 74, AE = .19), with participants having the lowest educational level reporting 
them to be least justifiable (M = 2.50, median = 2.00), and those with the highest 
educational level reporting them to be relatively more justifiable (M = 3.94, median = 
3.67).
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Gender.  The amount of similarity was again large with an average PCR of 97 
(range = 90 – 100) and an average AE of .03 (range = 0 – .20).  The smallest similarity 
was for the value type stimulation (PCR = 90, AE = .20), with women reporting it to be 
less important (M = 3.87, median = 4) than men did (M = 3.49, median = 3), with lower 
values indicating greater importance.  
Age.  The amount of similarity was again large with an average PCR of 96 
(range = 88 – 99) and an average AE of .04 (range = 0 – .20).  The smallest similarity 
was for the value type stimulation (PCR = 65, AE = .40), with those born in 1955 or 
earlier valuing stimulation less than those born after 1978 (Ms ≥ 4.10 vs ≤ 3.50, medians 
= 5 vs 3, respectively, with lower values indicating greater importance).  Although it 
cannot be distinguished between age and cohort effects in these comparisons, the issue 
is tangential to the current focus.
Comparisons between all categories. 
To identify the categories for which similarities were the largest, I compared the 
PCRs and AEs between the six categories across the 22 variables. That is, I treated the 
variables as cases, and subjected the PCRs and AEs to 6-level (category type) repeated-
measures ANOVAs. Because of violations of the sphericity assumption, the 
Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) correction was applied. Both the PCRs (F[2.46, 51.72] = 
85.57, p < .001, = .80) and the AEs (F[3.80, 79.81] = 15.63, p < .001, = .43) 
differed significantly between categories. For both statistics, pairwise comparisons 
revealed that countries were less similar to each other than were the groups in each of 
the other categories (all ps ≤ .001). Countries were less similar to each other (MPCR = 
84, MAE = .14) than were religious denominations (MPCR = 90, MAE = .06), income 
groups (MPCR = 96, MAE = .04), educational groups (MPCR = 96, MAE = .02), women and 
men (MPCR = 97, MAE = .03), and age cohorts (MPCR = 96, MAE = .04). 
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A second category where the degree of similarity was somewhat lower compared 
to the remaining four categories was religious denomination (ps < .001), but this applied 
only for the PCR measure; the differences for AE were less consistent (see Tables A1 to 
A6 in Appendix A). The difference in PCR between religious denominations and the 
remaining four categories ranged between 5.41 and 6.86, indicating smaller levels of 
similarities between religious denominations, relative to those for income, education, 
gender, and age. 
Discussion
The objective of Study 1 was to present a case for reporting similarities.  The 
utility of doing so was demonstrated in the analysis of similarities across six important 
psychological categories and 22 topical variables.  Across all variables we examined, the 
average PCR was 93 when we compared people from different genders, ages, 
educational attainments, incomes, countries, and religious denominations6.  This high 
level of similarity was corroborated by the absolute effect (AE).  With an average of .05 
across all categories and variables, this shows that the median difference between any 
two groups was only one-twentieth of the possible difference on the scale in question.  
Countries were on average less similar to each other than were the groups in 
other categories.  This challenges the claim that countries are more similar to each other 
than are people with different socio-economic status (Greenfield, 2014).  The lowest 
degree of similarity I found across all comparisons was for moral attitudes towards 
personal and sexual issues.  This result is broadly consistent with Graham et al.’s (2011)
evidence that the largest differences between various groups of people – mainly liberals 
6 The average amount of similarity is slightly higher here than in the published social 
psychological literature. The average estimated effect size in social psychology was estimated to be d = 
0.43 (Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003), which translates into a PCR of 83.  However, it was 
found that because of publication bias and p-hacking, among other things, the effect sizes in the published 
literature are inflated by a factor of approximately two (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), which means 
that the average PCR in social psychology is around 91.
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and conservatives – is on the moral dimension purity, which is closely related to moral 
attitudes towards personal and sexual issues. 
Notwithstanding the evidence for smaller similarities between countries than 
between groups in the other categories, the high average degree of similarity between 
countries supports the moderate universalism claim in cross-cultural research, which 
holds that values, attitudes, and beliefs are weakly influenced by cultural factors (Berry 
et al., 2011).  At the same time, however, we can now be more confident that country 
has a relatively strong influence on variables like human values, independently of 
religious denomination, education and income level, or age distribution.  If country 
differences were mainly due to differences in religious denomination, education level, or 
age distribution, I would have found groups in these categories to be less similar to each 
other than countries.  By contrast, I found that countries were less similar to each other 
than were groups in these other categories. 
It is important to keep in mind that I could have presented all of the comparisons 
without PCR and AE data and focused only on effect sizes quantifying differences (e.g., 
d scores).  The differences between categories and variables would have been replicated, 
but phrased in the reverse manner.  For example, it would have been concluded that 
differences between countries are larger (Md =.39) than differences between groups in 
the other categories and that differences between gender and age cohorts are small, 
albeit highly significant (for the Cohen’s ds see Appendix A).  Such a focus would tell a 
different story, focusing on large ds, and ignoring the large number of small effects.  Not 
only would this approach result in most results attracting little attention due to small 
effect sizes (i.e., ending up in a virtual file-drawer), but the interpretation of the large 
effect sizes would have obscured the fact that the similarities are in many cases very 
large.  Adding PCR and AE to the analyses helps to put the interpretation of d-scores, p-
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values and/or Bayes factors into perspective and increases the interpretability of the 
findings, as Study 3 demonstrates.  However, before describing Study 3, I replicated first 
the findings of Study 1 using another large data set from 29 European countries.
Study 2: Similarities Across 29 Countries
Study 2 used the data provided by the European Social Survey (ESS; 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org), 6th round, collected in 2012 and 2013.  The ESS has 
been conducted every other year since 2002 in 20 to 31 European and adjacent (Turkey, 
Israel) countries.  The survey contains a variety of items that the survey designers 
selected a priori based on the items’ perceived relevance for understanding differences 
between countries.  For the sake of conceptual parsimony in my analyses, I categorized 
these items into several factors, as described below.
Method
Participants.  The sample was representative and contained 54,673 participants 
from 29 different countries.  Prior to the analyses, 591 participants were excluded from 
all of the analyses because they did not respond to four or more items on the Portrait 
Value Questionnaire (PVQ-21; Schwartz et al., 2001), leaving 54,082 participants.  The 
mean age of the sample was 48.23 years (SD = 18.56, range = 15-103), including 29,395 
women (54.35%).  
Material and procedure.  The five categories examined were country, gender, 
income, education, and age.  For country, I used all 29 countries in the ESS.  Gender 
was measured in the usual dichotomous way, male/female.  Income was measured in a 
country-specific way, by coding the total household’s net income into the respective 
decile of the income distribution for the household’s nation.  To measure education, the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) was used, splitting the 
participants into seven groups, ranging from less than lower secondary (n = 5753) to 
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higher tertiary education (n = 6674).  The continuous variable ‘year of birth’ was split 
into 10 equal sized groups, ranging from born in 1939 or before to born in 1991 or later.  
In total, 24 dependent variables were chosen.  I used all 21 items of the Portrait 
Value Questionnaire (PVQ), which measures the 10 value types according to Schwartz’s 
(1992) model of human values (Schwartz et al., 2001): security, tradition, conformity, 
benevolence, universalism, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and 
power (Schwartz, 1992).  Using a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at 
all), participants indicated how similar they were to a fictitious person who shows a 
positive attitude towards a prototypical behaviour for one of the ten value types.  
Examples for items include “Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to 
her/him. She/he likes to do things in her/his own original way” (self-direction) and “It is 
important to her/him to be rich. She/he wants to have a lot of money and expensive 
things” (power).
The remaining 151 items in the ESS that were measured on a quasi-interval level 
were factor analysed with a principal component analysis (PCA).  After varimax 
rotation, I obtained 13 factors, consisting of 67 items.  Many of these items have been 
used in international comparisons and in studies examining the ESS in particular (e.g., 
Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; Grönlund & Setala, 2012; Marozzi, 2014; Visser et al., 
2013).  I labelled these factors as engagement in different political activities (6 items, α 
= .64), attitudes towards immigrants (6, α = .89), pessimistic world view (4, α = .61), 
religiosity (4, α = .85), feeling depressed (7, α = .84), subjective happiness (4, α = .79), 
trust in other people (3, α = .78), trust in political institutions (7, α = .91), feeling 
optimistic and fulfilled (6, α = .76), relationship to neighbours (3, α = .66), relationship 
to other people you are close to (3, α = .72), trust in democratic rights (7, α = .85), and 
trust in democratic processes (6, α = .83).  Items had to load at least .50 on one 
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component and less than .40 on any other component (with a loading difference between 
the two highest loading components of at least .25) to be included in a component.  
Details of the dependent variables can be found in Appendix A.
Results
This section first reports validations of the four statistics measuring similarity.  
Next, important findings for each of the five categories are reported.  I then examine 
which categories reveal larger similarities and which of the dependent variables show 
larger similarities across all categories. 
Validation of the measures used. 
First, I validated the measures across all categories and variables, again by 
correlating them with each other to estimate their convergent and divergent validity.  
Given that PCS and PCR are conceptually more similar to each other than to the other 
two measures, I again expected larger correlations between those measures than with the 
AE.  Indeed, the medians of PCS and PCR across all categories variables correlated 
highly (r[118] = .95), but, as expected, PCR was significantly larger (M = 93.01, SD = 
4.75) than PCS (M = 92.08, SD = 5.00) on average, t(119) = 6.47, p < .001, replicating 
the findings of Study 1.  
Findings within each category.
As expected, the median values for the five statistics revealed high levels of 
similarity.  Only 17 out of the 29,464 pairwise comparisons revealed a PCR of below 50 
percent and an AE of above .50.  For all variables, the smallest average PCR between 
two groups is well above 50 percent, and the absolute effect below .30.  Thus, even 
between extreme groups (e.g., highly- vs. lower educated), large similarities were found.  
With a few exceptions (see examples below), people across the different groups within 
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each category revealed on average the same amount of similarity for the 10 value types 
as for the 14 other variables.
Countries.  The median for all 24 dependent variables indicates large similarities 
between countries.  The average PCR was 87.  That is, on average, 87 percent of the 
participants in two countries chose an answer that was mirrored in the other country.  
The average absolute effect was .08, indicating that median differences between two 
countries were less than one tenth of the response scale.  For example, the median PCR 
was 84 for the security value type.  The median absolute effect for this value was .1, and 
the largest absolute effect between two countries was .4 (see Table A7).  
There was some variation in the amount of similarity between the variables.  For 
religiosity, for example, the amount of similarities was of moderate seize (median PCR 
= 79, median AE = .19).  Also, for 17 pairwise comparisons the differences were larger 
than the similarities.  For example, the largest differences were found between Czech 
Republic as the least religious country (M = 1.67, median = 0.42), on the one hand, and 
Poland and Cyprus, on the other (Ms = 6.74 and 7.17, both medians = 7.58), resulting in 
PCRs of around 22 and AEs of .72.
Gender.  The amount of similarity was large with an average PCR of 95 (range
= 87 – 100) and an average AE of .02 (range = .00 to .12).  The smallest percentage of 
common scores was found for religion (PCR = 87), with women scoring higher than 
men (Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.36, medians = 5.17 vs. 3.92).  
Income.  The amount of similarity was again large with an average PCR of 95 
(range = 86 – 99) and an average AE of .03 (range = 0 – .1).  The smallest PCR was 
found for having a pessimistic world-view (PCR = 60), with people from the lowest two 
income deciles reporting being more pessimistic about their future compared to the 
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people from the highest two deciles (Ms = 2.51 and 2.61 vs. 3.12 and 3.26, medians = 
2.50 vs.  3.25).
Education.  The amount of similarity was again large with an average PCR of 94 
(range = 86 – 99) and an average AE of .05 (range = 0 – .10).  The smallest PCR was 
between attitudes towards immigrants and having a pessimistic world-view (69 and 66 
percent), with the lowest educated having a more pessimistic world-view than the 
second highest educated (lower tertiary educated; Ms = 2.56 vs. 3.16, medians = 2.50 vs. 
3.25), and the lowest educated having less favourable attitudes towards immigrants than 
the highest educated (Ms = 4.23 vs. 6.01, medians = 4.17 vs. 6.17).  
Age.  The amount of similarity was again large with an average PCR of 94 
(range = 84 – 99) and an average AE of .05 (range = 0 – .10).  The smallest PCR was 
for the value type stimulation (PCR = 52), with the two groups of elderly participants 
(those born in 1947 or before) valuing stimulation less than the youngest participants 
(those born in 1991 or later; Ms = 4.06 and 3.85 vs. 2.59, medians = 4.0 vs. 2.5, where 
lower numerical values indicate higher importance).  
Comparisons between all categories.  
To identify the categories for which the similarities are the largest, repeated-
measurement ANOVAs were conducted for PCR and AE separately, with the five 
categories as the repeated-measure factor across all the 24 variables.  Because of 
violations of the sphericity assumption, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied.  
The ANOVAs revealed significant differences between categories in the PCRs (F[2.61, 
60.12] = 27.02, p < .001, = .54), and the AEs (F[3.51, 80.69] = 12.52, p < .001, = 
.35).  Pairwise comparisons revealed that country differed consistently from the four 
other categories (all ps ≤ .001), indicating that countries are somewhat less similar to 
each other than are the other categories.  For PCR, countries were between 6.88 and 8.21 
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lower than for the other categories.  For AE, countries were between .03 and .05 higher 
than the other categories.  Differences between the remaining six categories were mostly 
non-significant.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated findings of Study 1.  Similarities were even slightly larger, 
which is likely due to more homogeneity of countries in terms of economic, political, 
and geographical terms.
The findings of Study 1 and 2 are intriguing and have a range of implications.  
For example, emphasizing similarities is promising for developing intervention 
programs to reduce prejudices or to increase the accuracy in which scientific findings 
are interpreted by the general public. The former example is discussed in more detail at 
the end of this chapter, whereas the latter example is empirically tested in Study 3, as 
one out of many intriguing implications of the finding that similarities between groups 
are usually far larger than differences.
Study 3: Mode of Data Presentation on the Interpretation of Results
Study 3 investigated the influence of mode of data presentation on the 
interpretation of results, using partly a one factorial between-subjects design with mode 
of presentation as the only factor.  Specifically, I was interested in exploring which of 
three ways of displaying the same results (Figure 2.4) yields in a more accurate 
estimation of similarities and is perceived as clearer and more informative. 
Method
Participants.  Two hundred and ninety-one participants (Mage = 33.75, SDage = 
11.17, 46% women) remained in the analysis after excluding twenty-four participants 
because they failed the instructional manipulation check twice (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, 
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& Davidenko, 2009), and one participant was excluded because he or she responded to 
all items with 0.  Participants were recruited via a paid online platform.
Materials and Procedure.  Three types of graphs were created, displaying 
simulated data with 1500 participants in each group (i.e., the average sample size per 
country of the World Values Survey data).  Data were simulated from a normal 
distribution, with a standard deviation of 0.80 and an overall mean of 3.  The three types 
of graphs are depicted in Figure 2.4: a graphical representation of the overlapping 
distributions assessed by the PCR measure, a default barplot with confidence intervals, 
and superimposed histograms that represent the PCS measure.  For each type of graph, 
nine versions were created with varying effect sizes: d = 0, 0.20, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.80, 
1, 1.5, and 2.  Participants were randomly allocated to rate one type of graphs, which 
were presented randomly.  The instructions for the participants were “In your opinion, to 
what extent do the data as depicted in this plot indicate that the two groups A and B are 
different or similar?  Each group consists of around 1500 people.”  To make the variable 
more concrete, I labelled it sociability.  Participants responded on a slider measure, 
ranging from 0 (“very different”) to 100 (“very similar”). Also, for each graph, 
participants rated how comprehensible they found the figure on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 (“extremely incomprehensible”) to 5 (“extremely comprehensible”).
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Figure 2.4. Three modes of depicting the same data. See text for more details.
Next, participants ranked which out of three possibilities (Cohen’s d, PCR, and 
PCS) is the clearest and most informative way to describe scientific findings.  The first 
option was “The difference between men and women was Cohen’s d = .43 with Cohen’s 
d being the difference in the two groups' means divided by the average of their standard 
deviations”, the second option was “The overlap of the responses given by men and 
women was 83 percent”, and the last option was “83 percent of the responses given by 
men were mirrored by women” (options were presented randomly).  Finally, participants 
responded to some demographic items, including their education level and their 
statistical training, before being debriefed and thanked. 
Results and Discussion
First I compared participants with a university degree and some or a lot of 
statistical training with the other participants.  The response pattern was highly similar 
across all items; therefore the results are presented across educational levels and 
statistical training. 
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Next, I tested the influence of the mode of presentation on the perceived 
similarity.  All but one between-subjects one-way ANOVAs reached statistical 
significance at Fs > 5.2 and ps < .006, indicating that mode of presentation had an 
impact on the perceived similarity of two groups.  For 6 out of the 9 graphical 
comparisons, a very similar linear pattern was observed, with the superimposed normal 
distribution plots being more accurate, followed by the barplots, and the superimposed 
histograms least accurate (Figure 2.5).  In other words, people were more accurate 
estimating similarities with the measure that represented the PCR than with any other 
measure.  For example, for graphs displaying medium effect size (i.e., d = 0.50), the 
mean estimated amount of similarity was 78% for the superimposed normal 
distributions, 65% for the barplots displaying the means and confidence intervals, and 
57% for the superimposed histograms.  The correct amount of overlap is, using the PCR, 
80 percent.  Thus, as expected, people underestimate similarities when shown results in 
the standard presentation format (means and confidence intervals); they even do so with 
the superimposed histograms, but presenting overlapping distributions attenuates this 
error.  Participants in the superimposed normal distribution condition also rated the 
graph as more comprehensible (M = 3.92, SD = 0.93) than did participants in the barplot 
(M = 3.59, SD = 1.12, p = .03) and histogram conditions (M = 3.50, SD = 1.13, p
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= .006). 
Figure 2.5. Estimated similarities for plots displaying data for various Cohen's 
ds.
Finally, all participants were asked to rank which out of three possibilities was 
the clearest and most informative way to present scientific findings.  A within-subject 
ANOVA was significant, F(2, 254) = 342.54, p < .001, = .73, with the option 
describing the PCS measure rated as the clearest and most informative way to present 
the findings (M = 1.47, SD = 0.59), followed by the overlapping coefficient (M = 1.69, 
SD = 0.55), and Cohen’s d (M = 2.84, SD = 0.52).  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
all three groups differed significantly from each other at p < .001. 
85
General Discussion
In all three studies, there was evidence for the view that similarities between 
categories should be reported, alongside differences: (1) similarities are typically 
stronger than differences; and (2) reporting similarities as well as differences results in 
more accurate interpretations of research findings. As described below, the implications 
of these results are wide-ranging.
Implications. My focal argument is not that differences should not be reported; 
rather, my point is that simultaneously reporting similarities helps readers to interpret 
differences more appropriately.  Consider an example taken directly from the mean 
result of the between-country comparisons: A researcher comparing two countries could 
report the mean difference between them had an effect size of d = .39, but with 84% 
common responses and only an 11% difference in the scale use.  Reporting the results in 
this way avoids the tendency to over-simplify by focusing on differences.  This latter 
focus is one way in which psychology may inadvertently steer people into regarding 
differences between groups as entrenched.  By reporting observed differences between 
groups in the context of the fact that the groups in question are more similar to each 
other than they are different provides one way of counteracting racism and xenophobia.  
Emphasizing similarities may also offer a way to bridge the gap between people with 
different levels of education (Spruyt & Kuppens, 2014), by making it more evident that 
members of the outgroup are more similar to the ingroup than they are sometimes 
thought to be.
Furthermore, the presentation of similarity information is useful even when 
differences are reliable but small. Although people may more easily infer from small 
differences that similarity is potentially high, this inference is misleading if it is not 
framed concretely. Discrimination on grounds of ethnicity or gender is a case in point.  
86
For example, if people belonging to a specific group (e.g., ethnic minorities or women) 
earn less than those in other groups, such differences matter a great deal, even if the 
similarities are large. The measures of similarities discussed here would enable 
researchers to frame such differences more concretely. For example, stating that the 
(small) gender wage difference in a specific company is d = .24 is less easy to apprehend 
than stating that the 90% of men and women employees share the same salary, but that 
men have higher salaries in the remaining cases. Furthermore, this conceptualization 
fosters greater realization that the key problem is to understand when these salaries 
differ and why, rather than encouraging absolutist, reductionist statements.
It should be noted that my proposal is descriptive.  Null hypothesis significance 
testing and Bayesian statistics are complementary with my approach, and could be used 
to answer questions such as, “Is the degree of similarity between experimental group 1 
and the control group larger than that between experimental group 2 and the control 
group?” When comparing two groups, larger p-values and smaller Bayes factors –
ceteris paribus – imply greater similarity, but neither index directly expresses similarity.  
In addition to reporting differences, researchers should report measures of similarity to 
fully reflect the nature of the effects in question, rather than encouraging absolutist, 
reductionist statements about the problem.  Thus, I am not arguing that small effects are 
meaningless (Prentice & Miller, 1992), but rather that researchers should always report 
such differences in the context of the much larger similarities between the categories, 
thereby helping others to interpret the data more accurately (Study 3).
A stronger focus on similarities in published research should help to reduce the 
“file-drawer” problem (Rosenthal, 1979) because both statistically large and statistically 
small differences between groups are potentially more interesting against the backdrop 
of similarity information. Reporting similarities helps to complement specific tests of 
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differences with a broader descriptive analysis. This practice would make the 
documentation of similarities between some groups and variables an interesting exercise 
in its own right, which may also increase the number of variables that are used to 
compare groups. At the moment, variables are often chosen on the basis of their 
perceived likelihood of revealing differences, potentially biasing the literature before 
any data are collected (Fiedler, 2011).
Conclusion. This chapter has presented alternative ways to describe quantitative 
data comparisons between groups. In the course of making more than 225,000 pairwise 
comparisons, I found that similarities between two groups generally far outweigh the 
differences between them. At the same time, some interesting exceptions to this pattern 
occur (e.g., for personal sexual-moral behaviours).  Routinely reporting the extent of 
similarities in the presentation of results offers a more balanced way to describe research 
findings.
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Chapter 3: Instantiations of Human Values and Their Implications
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that similarities are larger than differences between 
various groups of people, using diverse variables, including the type of variable that is 
the main focus of this thesis: human values.  However, as indicated in Chapter 1, 
differences between countries seem to be larger than the findings of Studies 1 and 2 
indicate.  People may also relate intuitively to the perception of differences because of 
their beliefs are influenced by relatively concrete instantiations of the abstract variables 
being measured.  By thinking about groups in terms of concrete instances, differences 
may be starker than similarities.  In this chapter, I test this reasoning using instantiations 
of human values as examples. 
Study 4 probed for diversity in instantiations of values across countries.  For this 
purpose, I collected data from three regions: north-east Brazil, south-west India, and 
south Wales.  As described in Chapter 1, the three countries differ in terms of various 
dimensions such as societal development, security, and perceived corruption.  This 
variety of differences enables the detection of potential differences in value instantiation 
between the nations.  For example, water conservation may be more spontaneously 
associated with protecting the environment in places where water is scarce than where it 
is abundant.  Similarly, waste recycling will be more spontaneously associated with 
protecting the environment in places where recycling is possible and promoted than 
where it is not possible and not promoted.  This difference could emerge even if the 
absolute or relative importance of the value protecting the environment – a key value 
relevant to these behaviours – is the same in both types of location.  Furthermore, this 
difference may emerge even if people in both regions recognize the behaviours as 
potential ways to promote the environment (Study 5).  That is, people in both types of 
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location may recognize that water conservation and recycling protect the environment, 
but they may simply differ in how strongly they spontaneously associate these 
behaviours with the value in day-to-day life.  
If this prediction is correct, it would be important to explore ramifications of any 
observed differences in value instantiation.  One potential implication arises for the 
emotions attached to behaviour.  That is, do people attach stronger emotions to actions 
that are typical ways to promote or threaten a value than to actions that are unusual ways 
to promote or threaten a value?  This difference in emotional implications may occur 
because of the link between importance and emotions (Nussbaum, 2004).  If behaviours 
or instantiations that are more often mentioned (i.e., more typical) are seen as being 
more important, then they may elicit a stronger emotional response.  This possibility is 
explored in Study 6.
Another potential implication is that behaviours may be predicted differently by 
values if they differ in the extent to which they are typical instantiations of the values.  
For example, protection of the environment may be more closely linked to recycling 
behaviour in places where recycling is mentally represented as a typical instantiation of 
protecting the environment.  Of importance, this prediction applies particularly to 
spontaneous actions and not necessarily to behaviours that people have time to ponder 
and explicitly consider in connection to their values.  Recall from Chapter 1 that typical 
instantiations are those that are more likely to spontaneously occur to people.  In the 
same way, actions that are typical exemplars of a value may be spontaneously linked to 
a value more strongly than atypical actions, but even atypical actions might cause people 
to consider the relevant value if they are motivated and able to do so.  I discuss this issue 
in Study 7, which examined value-behaviour connections using the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) as a theoretical framework.
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As stated in the discussion of Chapter 2, it is possible to focus both on 
similarities and differences, when interpreting results. However, because there are no 
similarity measures for some of the statistics used in the present chapter yet (e.g., 
interactions in an ANOVA design) and because this and the following chapter were 
designed to search for differences in the face of the prevailing evidence of value 
similarities, the focus will be more on differences.  Nonetheless, I still will report and 
discuss similarities to address the overall question of this thesis: Are groups of people 
more similar than different? 
I expected that people in different regions would differ in their concrete 
instantiations of values, because I assumed that personal experiences and the socio-
cultural environment have a strong influence on the concrete level (Hanel, Vione, Hahn, 
& Maio, in press; Morris, 2014).  To test this hypothesis, I focused on the comparison of 
Brazil and the UK because of the greater availability of data in both of these countries, 
but also considered India in Studies 4 and 7.
The Present Studies
The aims of Studies 4 to 7 were (1) to explore the extent to which similarities 
can be found on a concrete level of values while simultaneously finding instantiations 
which are only typical in one but not the other countries; and (2) whether typicality 
predicts the values–attitude/intention relations in the TPB framework.  Studies 4, 5, and 
6 addressed the first aim, and Study 7 addressed the second aim.  
Study 4 used a qualitative-explorative design to measure and compare 
instantiations in a systematic way across three countries and 23 values from Schwartz’s 
(1992) value model.  That is, participants were asked to report situations in which they 
considered a value as relevant, including the people in this situation and their actions.  
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This study is the first systematic approach to measure value instantiations (but see Maio, 
Hahn, et al., 2009, for an earlier approach to measure instantiations).  
In Study 5, the instantiations were matched to values.  That is, the degree to 
which instantiations are recognized as belonging to the values they originate from was 
examined.  For example, would participants recognize recycling as an example of 
protecting the environment and keeping secrets as an example of loyalty to an equal 
extent across countries?  This step was important because it shows the conceptual 
relevance of the instantiations to the values.  In other words, people should be able to 
recognize the value that a behavioural instantiation promotes, even if the instantiation is 
atypical for the participant’s region.  This matching would show how the instantiations 
vary in their spontaneous natural activation by values, but not in their actual conceptual 
relevance to values upon reflection.
Study 6 focused on the emotions elicited by the value instantiations.  That is, 
participants rated how they would feel (e.g., happy or surprised), if someone close to 
them would or would not engage in a specific action (e.g., recycling or keeping secrets).  
The actions were mainly taken from the responses made by participants in Study 4.  This 
method allowed a test of whether typical instantiations give rise to different self-
reported emotional responses, than atypical instantiations.  This method can also be used 
as an indirect way to measure the importance groups of people attribute to specific 
actions (see below).
Finally, Study 7 considered value instantiations in the context of the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB, see below; Ajzen, 1991).  As outlined below, this was done to 
test whether the relations between values, attitudes, social norms, perceived behaviour 
control, and especially intention is stronger when a typical instantiation is used as the 
target behaviour.  That is, participants completed a value measure and measures of the 
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four named TPB elements several times, with only the target behaviour (e.g., recycling 
or keeping secrets) changing.  
Study 4: Exploring Value Instantiations
This study aimed to find typical value instantiations in Brazil, India, and the UK 
and estimate the amount of similarities between them.  This enabled me to discern which 
instantiations are typical in one or two of the cultures under investigation but atypical in 
the other(s).  These aims were achieved using a paradigm that has been used to examine 
exemplars of natural categories (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969), as well as in later 
research on typicality effects (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Lord et al., 1994; Maio, Hahn, et 
al., 2009) and on the strength of associations between categories and their members 
(Fazio, Williams, & Powell, 2000).  For example, Maio et al. (2009) asked “participants 
… to list situations in which they considered equality to be important” (p. 601).  A 
different approach was chosen by Lord et al. (1994), who asked their participants to 
complete attitude concept maps on capital punishment and social welfare in order to 
identify how participants reference people who are affected by each of those social 
policy.  Specifically, participants were asked to answer the questions what, where, when, 
who, why, and how to construct a concept map by adding nodes to the central node 
which either states “capital punishment” or “social welfare”.  
Following the examples of Maio et al. and Lord et al., in Study 4 I asked 
participants to list situations in which they considered a value to be important and to 
include people and their actions. These responses were then used to create a conceptual 
map representing values and value instantiations for each country.  These maps would 
be similar to those created by Lord et al. (1994, p. 661), except that my method maps 
values rather than natural concepts (see Fig. 1 for such a values map; 22 more value 
maps can be found in Appendix A, one for each of the 23 value investigated in this 
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study).  Because of the magnitude of the concept maps, I only report a summary of the 
most common themes.  To identify prospective typical instantiations, I noted which 
behaviours were mentioned ten times or more by at least five participants in one 
country.  This threshold was selected so that in each country around 5 to 10 typical 
instantiations emerged.  This is not to claim that each instantiation in this way is 
definitively typical, but to identify a range of potential typical instantiations.  These 
were then compared between the nations and considered for future study. 
Method
Participants in Brazil. Participants were 189 mostly postgraduate students from 
João Pessoa, a coastal city from north-east in Brazil.  Because it is presumably against 
the law in Brazil to pay participants, even indirectly through a raffle, they volunteered 
without receiving any material incentive.  The average socioeconomic status (SES; 
Sharma, Gur, & Bhalla, 2012) of 18.50 indicates that the average participant was part of 
the Brazilian upper-middle class (see Table 3.1 for details).
Participants in India. Participants were 214 undergraduate and graduate students 
from Dharwad, south-west India.  Participants were not compensated. The mean SES 
was 20.78, indicating that the average participant was part of the Indian upper-middle 
class (see Table 3.1 for details).
Participants in the UK. Of the 227 participants in the UK, 122 were psychology 
undergraduate students, and 105 were other members of Cardiff University (students or 
staff).  The students received course credits in exchange for their participation, and the 
university members could add their name to a raffle of three cash prizes of 30, 20, and 
10 British Pounds Sterling. The participants’ SES was similar to the SES of participants 
in the two other countries (Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1
Demographic details of the two samples
Age % Women SES 
Brazil 25 (7.98) 67.00 18.50 (4.86)
India 22.41 (5.15) 66.40 20.78 (5.15)
United 
Kingdom
22.17 (7.94) 79.90 18.60 (5.74)
Note. Standard deviations (SD) are in brackets, where applicable. 
Design. The design was qualitative and exploratory with open questions.
Materials. I selected 23 out of the 56 values of Schwartz (1992) value model 
(Table 3.2) for study.  The values were selected according to their perceived relevance 
for explaining cross-cultural differences. That is, I expected the instantiations for the
chosen values to be more different than for some other, non-chosen values.  For 
example, the value family security was chosen instead of national security, because I 
expected the latter to be instantiated quite homogeneously across countries (e.g., 
“protection against external enemies”). However, I expected family security to vary 
stronger, depending on various contextual factors such as the safety (see Chapter 1 for 
examples). From most value types, two values were selected.  The exception was the 
value type universalism, for which seven values were selected with an eye to potential 
future studies. I chose values instead of value types (e.g., universalism), because values 
are more concrete and allow to differentiate in more detail compared to value types, 
which are a combination of several values. To measure socioeconomic status, the 
“Kuppuswamy’s Socioeconomic Scale” (Sharma et al., 2012) was used; it consists of 
three items, assessing education, occupation, and family income per month.  Participants 
responded to each item on a scale from 1 to 7, and these responses were summed up to 
one score.  In order to adjust the income classes, the most recent available official 
income distribution from all countries were used. The questionnaire was translated to 
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Portuguese from the original English version for the Brazilian sample but left in English 
for the Indian and British samples.
Procedure. Participants were asked to list typical situations in which they 
considered each value to be important.  Furthermore, they were asked to include a “short 
description of the people in the situation and what they do”. The instructions provided 
two examples that pertained to two values not included in our measures and Schwartz’s 
value model: “For example, the value ‘enjoyment’ could be relevant during leisure time.  
Relevant people in the situation can be friends and the family.  They could spend time 
together at the beach or playing games at home.” 
Participants were asked to list at least two to three situations, people, and their 
actions for each value, up to seven in total.  To reduce the risk of fatigue, each 
participant responded to four out of the 23 values (see Table 3.2 for the sample size of 
each value).  Subsequently, they completed socio-demographic items.  Brazilian and 
British participants completed the survey online, while Indians used a pen-and-paper 
version.
Data analysis. 
The data for both samples were analysed with the open access program Iramuteq, 
which is built on R and Python and designed for content and frequency analyses 
(version 0.6 alpha 3; Ratinaud, 2009), separately for the responses for each value and 
country.  For all analyses, the option lemmatization was chosen: Very similar words 
(e.g., people and person) as well as different verb forms (e.g., advice, advices, advised) 
were treated as equivalent.  Additionally, I grouped together some words that seemed 
very similar (e.g., parents, dad/father, and mother/mum), but this grouping was generally 
avoided because participants may have used the words in different ways even if they 
seemed different to me.  Furthermore, only nouns, verbs, and adjectives were analysed.  
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To analyse the data, I did a frequency analysis, because both the length (Table 
3.2) and the comprehensibility of the responses differed across countries.  I struggled to 
interpret some responses, especially those made by Indian respondents.  Often my 
Indian collaborators also had difficulties in interpreting the answers.  Therefore, a 
frequency analysis seemed to be appropriate, as the meaning of a single word is usually 
easier to understand than the meaning of a sentence.  To identify potentially typical 
instantiations, words mentioned at least 10 times in one country by at least five 
participants were analysed.  Because a substantial part of the responses consisted of 
keywords, especially within the British sample, a more detailed qualitative analysis was 
not deemed to be possible.  Because almost no negations (e.g. “recycling is not 
relevant”) were used by Brazilian and British participants, the absolute frequencies of 
specific words and their connections are meaningful.  Only Indian participants used 
more negated sentences compared to participants from the other two countries, which 
itself is an interesting finding, as they seem to have focused more on what a value does 
not mean.  However, I do not consider this as an issue for the frequency analysis, 
because such occurrences were still minor and they were not judged to be actually meant 
the opposite, just a different way of expressing the same.  For example, the possible 
instantiation for the value helpfulness, “not offering your seat in a bus to elderly 
people”, was judged to be equal to the positive version.  Our Indian collaborators shared 
this interpretation.
The Brazilian and Indian data were analysed with the help of our local 
collaborators.  The Brazilian instantiations were first identified by a native speaker and 
then translated by an experienced translator (Portuguese native speaker), who ensured 
that the meaning was correctly translated.  Our Indian collaborators helped to identify 
97
responses that were clearly non-meaningful, and these responses were removed before 
any analysis was conducted.
Because the three different response possibilities – “situation”, “people in the 
situation”, and “what are they doing” – are all part of the instantiations, they were 
analysed together.  Furthermore, family, friends, and people or person were mentioned 
for most values at least ten times as the “relevant people in the situation”.  The value 
itself was also very frequently mentioned.  Therefore, these responses are not 
informative and not discussed further. This is because words which were often 
mentioned in all countries do not provide information for finding differences between 
countries.  Nevertheless, the frequencies of these words are listed in Appendix A.
Instead, the instantiations were noted when mentioned at least 10 times across 5 
participants or more. 
Results
Overview of Responses.
The responses of the Brazilian participants for each value were on average 
almost twice as long as the responses from Indian and British participants (Table 3.2).  
However, the number of words mentioned at least ten times barely differed between the 
Brazilian and the British sample, although they were fewer in the Indian sample, 
resulting in a smaller sample of potential typical instantiations.
Table 3.2
Length of average responses for each value and number of participants 
Value Brazil 
Ø
N 
(BR)
India 
Ø
N 
(IND)
UK 
Ø
N 
(UK)
Protecting the 
environment (UN)
644 34 238 33 316 35
Wisdom (UN) 511 32 211 25 317 37
Unity with nature (UN) 554 32 185 28 252 31
World of Beauty (UN) 607 31 264 28 295 35
Social Justice (UN) 571 30 234 31 250 27
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Broad-mindedness (UN) 517 33 220 35 309 29
Equality (UN) 574 25 278 39 268 25
Freedom (SD) 474 32 240 38 245 37
Creativity (SD) 532 35 225 34 322 44
A varied life (ST) 551 28 216 27 232 37
Daring (ST) 566 26 217 37 301 23
Pleasure (HE) 599 36 189 34 265 37
Success (AC) 602 35 227 40 353 41
Ambition (AC) 511 34 195 35 323 34
Wealth (PO) 557 27 261 33 307 27
Social Power (PO) 680 25 318 31 332 29
Family Security (SE) 477 30 219 31 281 27
Respect for Tradition 
(TR)
522 33 204 37 275 39
Self-discipline (CO) 489 29 239 36 438 35
Obedience (CO) 501 33 329 37 370 33
Helpfulness (BE) 531 36 215 28 330 31
Loyalty (BE) 534 36 247 33 343 34
Honesty (BE) 574 30 273 36 320 36
Note. Ø: Average number of characters of responses including spaces, N: number of 
participants. The value types are in brackets. UN: Universalism, SD: Self-direction, ST: 
Stimulation, HE: Hedonism, AC: Achievement, PO: Power, SE: Security, TR: Tradition, 
CO: Conformity, BE: Benevolence.
Analyses of each value.
In the following paragraphs, the results of the above analysis are described for 
each value separately, comparing Brazil, India, and the UK. In parentheses next to each 
instantiation, I list the number of times in total it was mentioned, followed by the 
number of people who gave the responses.  By presenting these findings in text, I enable 
the reader to reflect on the numbers in evaluating the comparisons that I make.  This 
inclusion is important because the comparisons I make in the qualitative data (e.g., X 
instantiation was mentioned more in Y country than Z country) are necessarily 
speculative, and the numbers better support some comparisons than others.  
(Quantitative chi-square tests are not appropriate because this analysis is exploratory and 
any p values would need to correct for an unknown number of comparisons, which 
reflects an a priori testing mode that is not the aim in this study.)  By providing the 
actual numbers in text, I aim to provide a more thorough and integrated reflection on the 
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findings.  Nonetheless, for readers interested in a tabular summary, the instantiations 
below are listed alongside their frequencies in Appendix A.
Protecting the environment.  For British participants, typical instantiations were 
recycling (mentioned in total 18 times by 14 people), putting rubbish in the bin (15/8), 
switching off the lights (13/9), and reducing carbon emissions (11/8).  These 
instantiations were also mentioned by Brazilian participants (19/5, 69/21, 2/2, 3/3) but 
rarely by Indian participants (0/0, 2/1, 0/0, and 0/0).  For Brazilian participants, other 
typical instantiations were not wasting or polluting water (20/14), and that companies 
should not pollute the environment (18/9).  These two instantiations were less often 
mentioned by British (5/5 and 5/4) and Indian participants (3/2 and 0/0).  Indian 
participants frequently mentioned keeping the environment clean (12/6).  Clean was 
mentioned less often by British (5/4) and Brazilian (0/0) participants.  Overall, few of 
the typical instantiations in Brazil and the UK were mentioned by Indian participants, 
indicating that the instantiations are not typical in India.
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Figure 3.1. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for 'Protecting the 
environment' (UK only).  Numbers indicate how often two words were mentioned 
together in single responses. Shared colours indicate that words were mentioned 
together.
The context and frequency of all the words for the UK sample can be seen in 
Figure 3.1. As for instantiations of most values, friends and family were mentioned 
often together.  In the cluster at the bottom, for example, the words “lights”, “turn”, and 
“save”, in the cluster at the top the words “bin”, “rubbish”, and “recycle” were often 
mentioned together, supporting the aforementioned typical instantiations. 
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Wisdom.  For British participants, typical instantiations were giving advice, for 
example to students or children (30/18) or making important decisions (17/10).  In 
contrast, these two instantiations were not emphasized strongly in the Brazilian (7/4 and 
4/4) or Indian (0/0 and 0/0) samples.  Instead, Brazilian participants identified wisdom 
as being important for improving a difficult situation, as in conflict solving (16/7) more 
often than British and Indian participants did.  In the Indian sample, no clear pattern was 
recognizable.
Unity with Nature.  For British participants, typical instantiations were walking 
outside in nature (25/12), feeding or watching birds (12/6), or being in the garden (e.g., 
gardening, 12/8).  These instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian (6/4, 5/3, 
and 3/2) and Indian (0/0, 3/1, and 2/1) participants.  Brazilian participants emphasized 
protecting nature (11/8) more often than British (6/3) and Indian (2/2) participants.  
Brazilian participants mentioned the beach as a typical place more often (19/10) than 
British (5/5) and Indian (0/0) participants, probably because João Pessoa, the city where 
the questionnaire was completed, is on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean and has a tropical 
climate.  Finally, Brazilian participants mentioned taking care of animals more often as 
an example of unity with nature (22/8) than British (7/5) or Indian (5/3) participants.  In 
the Indian sample, no clear pattern was recognizable.
World of Beauty.  For British participants, typical instantiations were walking 
outside (21/11), waking on the beach (10/8), or going on holiday (12/10). All three 
instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian (3/2, 6/5, and 0/0), and Indian (0/0, 
0/0 and 0/0) participants. For both Brazilian and Indian participants, no common theme 
was observed.
Broad-mindedness.  For British participants, the only typical instantiation was 
meeting new people (14/9).  This instantiation was not mentioned by Brazilian or Indian 
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participants.  Brazilian participants emphasized new ideas and opportunities (18/6), and 
that the society should be more open towards minorities such as homosexuals (15/6).  
These instantiations were mentioned less frequently by British (5/5 and 5/3) and Indian 
(0/0 and 1/1) participants.  For Indian participants, a typical instantiation was to help 
others, especially poor people (10/7).  This instantiation of broad-mindedness was rare 
within the British (2/2) and Brazilian (0/0) samples.
Social Justice.  For British participants, typical instantiations were ensuring that 
justice is applied equally to all, including homosexuals and disabled people (23/6).  As a 
typical situation or environment, jobs were mentioned (10/6).  Both instantiations were 
mentioned less often by Brazilian (2/2 and 0/0) and Indian (0/0 and 0/0) participants.  
Brazilian participants considered political rights like those related to health, education, 
and security as typical instantiations (27/14), regarded the government as responsible for 
reinforcing them (15/10) and education as a way to obtain equality (13/9).  Those 
instantiations were mentioned less often by the British (13/5, 6/3, and 11/4) and Indian 
participants (0/0, 2/2, and 1/1).  Indian participants considered helping as more typical 
(10/7) than British (2/2) and Brazilian (0/0) participants.  
Equality.  For British participants, typical instantiations were treating all children 
(13/6) and students (15/9) equally.  Equality was also considered relevant during job 
applications and at the work place (24/12).  The latter finding is consistent with 
observations by Maio et al. (2009). These three instantiations were also mentioned by 
the Brazilian (10/4, 6/5, and 9/6) and Indian (3/3, 16/11, and 25/8) participants.  
Brazilian participants frequently mentioned equal opportunities for all (23/14), including 
black people (13/6) and women (11/6).  These topics were less often mentioned by 
British (1/1, 0/0, and 9/4) and Indian (3/3, 0/0, and 12/8) participants.  For Indian 
participants, typical instantiations were giving equal opportunities to various subgroups 
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(15/9) and doing this independent of caste affiliation (castism; 17/8).  These two 
instantiations were less often mentioned by British (6/5 and 0/0) and Brazilian (6/3 and 
0/0) participants. 
Creativity.  For British participants, typical instantiations were making or 
creating art (40/25), writing a book, poem, or essay (29/18), or making or composing 
music (22/16).  All three instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian (5/4, 
10/5, 3/2) and Indian (2/2, 3/2, and 0/0) participants.  Brazilian participants focused on 
new (18/13) and different (11/5) things, such as ideas and products.  Companies were 
mentioned as typical places (13/10).  These three instantiations were less often 
mentioned by British (29/14, 7/2, and 2/2) and Indian (3/2, 6/5, and 3/2) participants.  
Finally, Indian participants frequently indicated that being creative is useful to become 
happy or to solve problems (20/8).  Students were mentioned as typical people relevant 
to creativity (12/7).  Both instantiations were mentioned less often by British (28/17 and
19/14) and Brazilian (19/9 and 11/7) participants.  A more detailed comparison of the 
responses given by Brazilian and British participants can be found in Chapter 3, Study 8.
Freedom.  For British participants, freedom rights were frequently mentioned.  
Of interest, they emphasized positive liberty rights (freedom to; 34/20) more than 
negative freedom rights (freedom from; 2/1).  Job and work were mentioned as 
situations where freedom is relevant (17/10).  All three instantiations were mentioned 
less often by Brazilian (13/10, 3/3, and 6/4) and Indian (15/8, 4/4, and 3/3) participants.  
In addition to mentioning liberty rights, Brazilian participants frequently mentioned 
travelling (11/8) as an exemplar of freedom and did so more often than British (7/6) and 
Indian (2/2) participants.  A typical instantiation for Indian participants was that students 
need more freedom, especially from teachers (14/7).  Students’ need for more freedom 
in general was also mentioned by British (11/8) and Brazilian (6/5) participants.
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A Varied Life.  For British participants, typical instantiations were doing varied 
activities at work (37/20), doing different and new activities (12/9) and having new 
experiences (12/7).  The latter two instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian 
(0/0, and 2/2) and Indian (0/0, and 1/1) participants, but doing varied activities at work 
was mentioned at least somewhat frequently in Brazil (17/7) and India (7/4).  In 
addition, Brazilian participants considered trying new things and meeting new people 
(21/8) and travelling (12/9) as typical instantiations of a varied life.  Those two 
instantiations were mentioned less often by British (19/8 and 5/4) and Indian (16/6 and 
0/0) participants.  For Indian participants, no pattern was recognizable.
Daring.  In none of the three countries did a clear pattern emerge.  The written 
responses suggested some confusion about the meaning of the value, especially for the 
Brazilian participants. 
Pleasure.  For British participants, typical instantiations of pleasure were 
enjoying various things (29/15), eating (24/14), and drinking (14/12).  All three 
instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian (2/1, 14/10, and 7/5) and Indian 
(7/4, 1/1, and 2/1) participants, although eating was also mentioned frequently in the 
Brazilian sample.  In addition, Brazilian participants considered spending time with 
friends (65/21), family (32/18), and the boy- or girlfriend (i.e., partner; 21/9) as typical 
people relevant to pleasure.  These three instantiations were also mentioned by British 
participants (59/25, 38/20, and 27/14) and to a lesser degree by Indian participants 
(18/12, 7/5, and 3/3).  For Indian participants, no pattern was recognizable. 
Success.  For British participants, working (33/16) was a typical activity relevant 
to success.  The most frequently mentioned people were students (28/19), and the 
common activities were exams (22/14) and sport (17/11).  To some extent, these 
instantiations were also mentioned by Brazilian (8/6, 4/3, 3/2, and 2/2) and Indian 
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(13/11, 9/7, 6/3, and 0/0) participants.  For Brazilian participants, typical instantiations 
were companies (15/8), studying (14/11), and passing the entrance tests (12/9) for public 
positions, which everyone who wants to work in the popular public sector in Brazil has 
to pass.  The first two of these instantiations were also mentioned by British (6/4, 7/6, 
and 0/0) and Indian (2/2, 7/6, and 0/0) participants.  A typical instantiation for Indian 
participants was working hard (12/11).  This instantiation was mentioned by British 
(14/7), but not by Brazilian (0/0) participants.
Ambition.  For British participants, frequently mentioned typical instantiations 
were work (56/28), achieving your goals (15/10), and (sport) team (13/7).  These 
instantiations were less often mentioned by Brazilian (20/11, 0/0, and 0/0) and Indian 
(32/16, 5/4, and 0/0) participants.  For Brazilian participants, a typical ambition was 
having a good family life (14/7).  This instantiation was mentioned less often by British 
(2/2) and Indian (0/0) participants.  Typical instantiations for Indian participants were 
getting a good job (18/11), education (17/8), and working hard (11/8).  These 
instantiations were less often mentioned by British (3/3, 3/3, and 13/9) and Brazilian 
(1/1, 0/0, and 0/0) participants.  
Wealth.  For British participants, typical instantiations of wealth were buying 
various, mainly expensive things (24/11) and shopping (12/8).  Children were identified 
as typical people (e.g., “to provide children with what they need”, 13/6). These 
instantiations were also mentioned by Brazilian (4/3, 4/3 and 7/4) and Indian (5/4, 0/0, 
and 8/4) participants.  For Brazilian participants, a typical instantiation was health 
(10/7).  This instantiation was mentioned less often by British (1/1) and Indian (6/5) 
participants.  A typical instantiation for Indian participants was to live a good life (11/8), 
which was mentioned less often by British (2/2) and Brazilian (9/8) participants.
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Social Power.  British participants identified the police (23/10) and 
teachers/professors/lecturers (18/10) as typical groups of people holding social power, 
and voting (12/8) as a typical situation or behaviour relevant to the value.  These 
instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian (1/1, 8/4, and 4/2) and Indian (0/0, 
0/0, and 3/3) participants.  For Brazilian participants, typical instantiations were society 
in general as typical people (whereas a society has social responsibilities; 23/6), children 
as typical people (13/6); (liberty) rights (12/9) were also frequently mentioned.  These 
instantiations were mentioned less often by British (1/1, 12/5, and 3/3) and Indian (5/2, 
4/1, and 9/5) participants.  Indian participants frequently mentioned work (10/5) as a 
typical situation relevant to social power, and this instantiation was also mentioned by 
British (14/11) and Brazilian (6/3) participants.
Family Security.  For British participants, support was a typical behaviour 
(14/11), and the people mentioned were parents (including mother and father, 32/10) 
and children (including daughter and son, 26/9). Brazilian (10/5, 71/16, 37/11) and 
Indian (0/0, 11/5, 15/6) participants followed a similar pattern.  Brazilian participants 
also considered securing the family home against intruders (through electronic fences, 
demanding more police on the street; 15/7) as typical, whereas this was not mentioned 
by British (0/0) or Indian (2/1) participants.  No other instantiations arose frequently 
among the Indian participants. 
Respect for Tradition.  British participants frequently mentioned Christmas 
(24/16), church (19/15), and eating together (16/9).  These instantiations were 
mentioned less often by Brazilian (6/4, 4/3, and 7/4) and Indian (all 0/0) participants.  
For Brazilian participants, parents (34/10) and children (29/12) and the city (10/5) were 
mentioned often. (Cities are the centre for a local festival.)  Parents were mentioned by 
British (18/9) and, to a lesser extent, Indian (6/3) participants, but children and cities 
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were not mentioned as often among British (4/4, 0/0) and Indian (6/3, 0/0) participants.  
Typical instantiations for Indian participants were wearing traditional dress (16/10) and 
festivals (13/9).  These instantiations were mentioned somewhat less often by British 
(6/4 and 5/4) and Brazilian (4/3 and 11/8) participants, although Brazilian participants 
also mentioned festivals frequently (and their locations in cities; see above).
Self-discipline.  British participants identified the importance of self-discipline in 
work (34/18), exercising (19/12), and losing weight (17/13).  Work was also identified 
frequently by Brazilian (25/12) and Indian (16/10) participants, whereas exercising and 
losing weight were mentioned less often by Brazilian (2/2 and 0/0) and Indian (0/0 and 
0/0) participants.  For Brazilian participants, lecturer/professor/teacher was a typical 
person (12/7), but such persons were mentioned less often by British (4/4) and Indian 
(8/5) participants.  Indian participants frequently mentioned students (13/11).  This 
instantiation was also mentioned often by British (19/14) and Brazilian (16/11) 
participants.  
Obedience.  British participants mentioned children (31/14), parents (27/14), and 
teachers (24/15) as typical people relevant to obedience, mostly in the sense that 
children should obey their parents and teachers.  A similar pattern was shown by 
Brazilian (32/16, 63/21, and 22/11) and, to a lesser extent, Indian (5/4, 15/10, and 16/12) 
participants.  Brazilian participants also frequently mentioned the verb to ask (20/10)
and rules (20/10). These instantiations were mentioned less often by British (0/0 and 
13/8) and Indian (2/2 and 0/0) participants, although British participants did mention 
rules frequently.  Indian participants identified work (19/9) as a typical situation or 
activity and students (14/10) as typical people.  These instantiations were also 
mentioned by British (13/9 and 21/10) and Brazilian (4/4 and 21/12) participants.
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Helpfulness.  British participants frequently connected helpfulness with work 
(13/10), students (12/7), and customers (11/5), as did Brazilian participants (40/18, 
21/12, and 8/5), but not Indian participants (2/2, 3/3, and 0/0).  For Brazilian 
participants, typical people were colleagues/classmates (24/9) and elderly (18/11), while 
the street (17/11) was a typical place.  These instantiations were mentioned less often by 
British (6/5, 8/6, and 1/1) and Indian (1/1, 0/0, and 0/0) participants.  No typical 
instantiations for Indian participants were found.
Loyalty.  British participants often mentioned work (22/12), relationships 
(19/14), (providing) support (18/12), and (keeping) secrets (10/6).  These instantiations 
were also mentioned by Brazilian (25/11, 3/3, 4/3, and 2/2) and Indian (5/4, 5/4, 1/1, and 
2/2) participants.  Brazilian participants also frequently mentioned (business) companies 
(17/8), colleagues (13/5), and husband-and-wife (15/7).  These instantiations were less 
often mentioned by British (6/4, 15/7, and 4/1) and Indian (1/1, 0/0, and 10/4) 
participants, aside from British references to colleagues and Indian references to 
couples.  In both countries, being loyal to friends was mentioned at least three times as 
often as being loyal to any other group of people.  No typical instantiations for Indian 
participants were found.
Honesty.  Typical instantiations of honesty for British participants were 
relationships (31/21), not cheating (13/9), and the courtroom (11/8).  These 
instantiations were mentioned less often by Brazilian (7/5, 0/0, and 0/0) and Indian (3/3, 
2/2, and 1/1) participants.  For Brazilian participants, typical instantiations included 
money (21/10) and returning money (mostly money found on the street or after 
receiving too much change, 15/8).  These instantiations were less often mentioned by 
British (2/2 and 0/0) and Indian (8/5 and 7/4) participants.  Typical instantiations for 
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Indian participants were parents (15/10) and work (10/6), which were also mentioned by 
British (8/4 and 7/6) and Brazilian (14/5 and 12/8) participants.
Further analyses
In a next step, I computed the number of instantiations where differences were 
observed, based on the definition of differences suggested in Chapter 2.  I adopted a 
conservative approach: an instantiation had to be mentioned by at least 50 percent more 
participants in one nation than in another country before I labelled it as a difference.  
However, because the majority of all instantiations in all countries were mentioned by 
less than 50 percent of the participants, only two instantiations revealed significant 
differences: 62 percent of the Brazilian participants considered throwing garbage into a 
bin as typical for protecting the environment, whereas only 3 percent of the Indian 
participants did so.  Also, 57 percent of the British participants mentioned art as a 
typical instantiation of creativity, whereas only 6 percent of the Indian participants did 
so.  All the other instantiations were less different between nations, although this does 
not mean that the differences were meaningless, as I discuss below.
Finally, I looked for similar instantiations in different values across all samples.  
In the descriptive analyses above, it is easy to discern a number of instances where the 
same instantiation was mentioned for different values, and sometimes participants in one 
nation used the same example for a different value than was used in another nation.  To 
illustrate this diversity with only the relatively common examples, I list below only 
those words which were mentioned at least 10 times for different value types. 
- New is relevant for ambition (self-enhancement), as well as for daring, varied 
life, creativity, broad-mindedness (openness and self-transcendence).  
110
- Eat is relevant for pleasure (openness), respect for tradition (conservation), and 
self-discipline (conservation; e.g., not eating something as an example for self-
discipline).
- Support is relevant for family-security (conservation) as well as loyalty (self-
transcendence).
- Work in the sense of work place is relevant for success and ambition (self-
enhancement) as well as creativity (openness). 
Some other examples of overlap were found in the Brazilian sample.  In 
particular, typical instantiations of wealth in this sample were quite idealistic and less 
materialistic, often focusing on a good family life.  In addition, Brazilian participants 
understood social power more as social responsibility. 
Discussion
Study 4 explored concrete examples (i.e., instantiations) associated with values 
across 23 values and 3 countries.  This was done to test the hypothesis that values on a 
concrete level differ between countries.  This hypothesis was not supported: Almost no 
differences, as defined in this thesis, were found.  This was mainly due to large 
individual variability of the responses within countries.  This can be explained with the 
value as truism hypothesis (Maio & Olson, 1998).  People usually do not think often 
enough about their values and discuss them to develop a shared understanding of the 
meaning of values.  If, for example, students would discuss whether freedom is 
important, they would presumably develop a more shared understanding of values.  
The only exceptions were differences were found pertained to the value of 
protecting the environment and creativity.  However, often the similarities were not 
perfect.  This can easily be attributed to contextual differences.  For example, a typical 
instantiation of success for Brazilian participants was passing the entrance test, which is 
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highly competitive, but promises a well-paid and prestigious job with a permanent 
contract.  Indian participants mentioned castes or castism, a social system that does not 
exist in Brazil and the UK, although prejudice based on social class is similar.  These 
examples show that the examples given depend on the social environment in which 
people live (cf. Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1).  
Another aim of Study 4 was to find, based on the classical difference approach 
(e.g., chi-square tests), instantiations that are more frequent in one but not the other 
countries in order to select these for further, confirmatory studies. This aim is important 
because there are a number of findings that suggest the presence or absence of 
instantiations in participants’ responses to the open-ended questions used in this research 
are not suitable as the sole criteria for selecting typical instantiations.  Specifically, the 
presence of the same examples across values is a complicating factor.  There were many 
instances of the same context being referenced for different values.  In some instances, 
the same example was used for motivationally similar values, but countries varied with 
respect to which value generated the example (e.g., meeting new people used for 
broadmindedness in the UK, but used for a varied life in Brazil).  This suggests that 
small shifts in understanding the meaning of the values may affect which examples are 
given.
Even more problematic, it is likely that participants’ open-ended responses 
occasionally miss typical instantiations that they take for granted and, therefore, may 
neglect to mention.  For instance, prior research has identified Blacks and women as two 
groups that are often used to instantiate the value of equality in the UK (Maio, Hahn, et 
al., 2009).  Yet, these groups were mentioned in Brazil, but not in the UK.  
Conversational norms apply to the information that participants might chose to identify, 
and one important norm is not offering information already mutually understood (the so-
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called Gricean norm; Grice, 1975).  This might cause people to occasionally neglect to 
report common instantiations that are not salient.  Another possibility is that 
participants’ responses are somewhat ego-centric.  That is, treating students and job 
applicants equally is something that affects the British participants directly, whereas 
equal treatment of Black people does not (assuming that most participants are 
Caucasian).  Note that both of the normative and egocentric explanations are speculative 
and post hoc. Regardless of whether one or both is correct, they show that reliance on 
open-ended measures of concept mapping, as done here and in past research, is likely to 
be unreliable as the sole measure of the typicality of an exemplar.  
Another issue is that some of the differences in instantiations are clearly relevant 
to the context, while others are more difficult to explain.  Examples of the easily 
attributable instantiations included castism in the Indian sample and the association of 
electric fences with family security among Brazilian participants, because castism does 
not exist in Brazil and the UK, and both India and the UK are safer than Brazil (Office 
for National Statistics, 2014).  A difference that is more difficult to explain is in the use 
of saving water for the environment.  Although it seems obvious why saving water was 
mentioned often in the rather dry north-east of Brazil, but not in the rainy Wales, it is 
less clear why saving water was barely mentioned by the Indian participants.  Water 
conservation is an aspect of daily life in the region where this research was conducted 
(Karnataka), making it highly relevant to the residents.  However, they did not think of 
this behaviour with respect of the environment.  This may be another situation wherein 
an instantiation is taken for granted, making it less salient to the respondents.  
Alternatively, it may be the case that water conservation is encoded more as a basic 
necessity than as an optional means to protect the environment.  Indian participants may 
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have perceived water scarcity as their own personal problems and not as relevant for 
protecting the environment.  
Most instantiations were mentioned by less than half of the participants in one 
country, indicating within-country variation.  A relatively large proportion of 
instantiations mentioned by at least five participants in one country were mentioned by 
one or no participants in another country.  Unfortunately, our sample was too small to 
analyse within-country moderators, such as gender or socio-economic status.  
However, small sample sizes are known to provide fickle results (Halsey, 
Curran-Everett, Vowler, & Drummond, 2015); in addition to the complexities noted 
above, there are a number of other reasons why more studies should be conducted to 
follow up these results.  First, it is possible that I overlooked relevant synonyms. I 
attempted to reduce this risk by reading all the instantiations before conducting the 
frequency analysis and by working closely with our collaborators from Paraiba (Brazil) 
and Karnataka (India).  However, any mistakes would cause an underestimation of the 
number of typical instantiations or the degree of typicality.  
Second, because most participants were students in specific regions of each 
nation, the results should be treated with caution if trying to generalize to the population 
of each country (see Appendix B for an empirical discussion of whether students are an 
accurate estimate of the general public).  For example, although entrance exams are 
required for Brazilians and were mentioned as examples of success by them, these are 
also required for certain positions in India and the UK, but Indian and UK participants 
did not mention these instantiations.  It could be the case that the specific samples of 
respondents in the UK were less likely to be students pursuing these professions.  
Different samples in these two nations might have been more likely to mention the 
relevant exams. 
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Finally, the answers in the Indian data were more heterogeneous (i.e., fewer 
typical instantiations) and grammatically challenging.  Most of the Indian participants 
did not have English as a first language, despite having classes and seminars in English 
both in school and at university.  As a result, English proficiency varied substantially 
between participants.  Another possible explanation for the perceived heterogeneity is 
that Indian participants responded in a way following a line of thought that was too 
unique for me to follow.  This is sometimes a problem in anthropological research 
(Barley, 1986).  However, I tried to ameliorate this problem by working closely together 
with our Indian collaborator. 
Overall, Study 4 revealed that most examples that are spontaneously attached to 
values are more similar than different across countries.  Nevertheless, many of the 
instances for which between-country differences were found can be linked to contextual 
factors.  However, most of these differences are considered small even in the common 
frequentist framework. 
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Study 5: Matching instantiations to values
In Study 4 I found that, although few instantiations were mentioned by more 
than 50 percent of the participants in each country, some were mentioned more 
frequently by participants in one country than one or both of the other countries.  Of 
importance, these instantiations were produced spontaneously as examples of the value 
concepts.  It remains to be seen whether they were valid examples of the value concepts.  
If they are valid examples, then people should be able to identify the value that elicited 
the example.  The aim of Study 5 was to test whether instantiations can be reliably 
matched to the values from which they were derived. 
Method
Participants in Brazil.  In Brazil, 427 under- and postgraduate students (mainly 
in psychology), from João Pessoa participated (Mage = 23.42, SDage = 6.96, 64.60% 
women).  Participants were not compensated.  
Participants in the UK.  British participants were 250 psychology undergraduate 
students (Mage = 19.32, SDage = 2.25, 89.00% women) from Cardiff University.  They 
received course credits in exchange for their participation. Prior to any data analysis, 42 
non-British participants were excluded.  Eleven participants failed to pass the 
instructional manipulation check (IMC; Oppenheimer et al., 2009), but were not 
excluded because no IMC was used in the Brazilian sample.  Excluding them did not 
change the pattern of results.  
Material and Procedure. First, all participants completed a short version of the 
Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), consisting of the 23 values used in 
Study 4.  Participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how much each of 23 
values is an important guiding principle in their life.  Examples include “FREEDOM 
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(freedom of action and thought)” and “FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)”.  
The SVS was not analysed for the present study.  
Next, 138 instantiations were chosen for matching them with values, six for each 
of the 23 values.  The instantiations were chosen mainly based on the results of Study 4, 
but also for exploratory purposes.  The instantiations used were a priori categorized as 
either typical (i.e., mentioned) in the United Kingdom, typical in both countries, typical 
in Brazil, or not typical in either country.  The latter were instantiations that I generated 
for exploratory purposes, based on perceived relevance to the present research and also 
based on previous studies.  These were used when there were fewer than six 
instantiations that seemed suitable in the first three categories.  For example, Maio, 
Hahn, et al. (2009) found that discrimination against left-handed people is an atypical 
instantiation for equality for British participants (cf. Chapter 1).  Nevertheless, 
discrimination against left-handed people was considered as highly unacceptable.  Thus, 
I expected that this atypical instantiation would be recognized as being promoted by 
equality by British participants and also, presumably, by Brazilian participants.  
The instantiations selected from Study 4 were chosen based on the frequency 
with which they were mentioned in each country, while balancing the instantiations that 
were mentioned in both countries with those mentioned in only one country but not the 
other.  Typical instantiations for protecting the environment, for example, were (1) 
“Putting certain rubbish in recycle bins rather than general waste”, (2) “Making sure the 
lights are off”, (3) “Walk instead of using car for short distances”, (4) “Throwing 
garbage in the bin”, (5) “Saving water”, and (6) “Installing heat insulation in the house”.  
The first three instantiations were considered as more typical by British than Brazilian 
participants (Study 4), whereas the fifth instantiation was considered more typical by 
Brazilian participants.  The fourth instantiation was frequently mentioned by participants 
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in both countries, and the sixth instantiation was added for exploratory purposes.  Given 
the temperature differences between João Pessoa and Cardiff, I expected this last 
instantiation to be more reliably matched to the value protecting the environment by 
British than Brazilian participants. A list of all 138 (137 in the UK) instantiations can be 
found in Table A12 (Appendix A), including the values they were derived from and 
whether they were mentioned by participants in both countries, just one, or were added 
by me. (Due to a copy and paste error, one instantiation of honesty, “Borrowing money 
and giving it back”, was presented twice (to different participants) in the British sample, 
while “Returning money which you have found or wrongly received” was not 
presented.)
The instruction for the participants was “Your task in this study is simple: You 
will be given a specific situation and you are asked to choose the most suitable value in 
this situation."  This was followed by an example: “Leisure time is promoted most by 
valuing” followed by six values (success, equality, ambition, wisdom, enjoyment, and 
respect for tradition), including a seventh option “don’t know” and the solution “A 
possible answer is the value enjoyment: Leisure time is more related to the value 
enjoyment than to any other value in this set.”  For this example, I intentionally chose a 
value that is not part of Schwartz’s value model.  Both the ordinal position of the 
‘correct value’7 among the response alternatives and the five alternative values were 
chosen randomly.  The five alternative values were a subset of the 23 values out of 
Schwartz’s 56 values listed in Study 4.  Within the six instantiations of one value both 
the order and the alternatives were kept constant.  The five alternative values were kept 
constant across both countries.  All participants then completed further scales, unrelated 
7 “Correct” is meant in a relative sense, based on the findings of Study 4 and my theoretical 
reasoning. Of course, there are no de facto right and wrong answers in tasks like this.
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to the present study. On average, each instantiation was matched with values by 71 
Brazilian and 41 British respondents.  
Brazilian participants completed a paper version of the survey in classroom 
settings of 10 to 40 people.  British participants completed the survey online.  To reduce 
fatigue, each participant completed only one-sixth of the items; each participant 
responded to one instantiation per value.  
Results
To perform the principal analyses, I first counted how often each value was 
thought to be promoted by an instantiation, separately for each country (Table A12).  
Next, I compared for each instantiation and country whether the most frequently chosen 
response option (value or don’t know) was chosen significantly more often than the 
second-most common option, using -tests.  This is a conservative approach, which at 
least partly takes the research design (multiple choice) and the influence of the response 
alternatives into account.  For example, if the correct value was chosen by 20 out of 40 
British participants, another value by 12, and a third by 8 participants, I would not count 
it as correctly matched, because the difference between 20 and 12 is not significant, 
= 2.00, p = .16.
Overall, in both countries, most instantiations were correctly matched with the 
value from which they were derived (Table A12).  Out of the 138 (137 in the UK) 
instantiations, 94 were correctly matched by the Brazilian participants and 110 by the 
British participants.  This difference (94 vs. 110) did not reach statistical significance, 
= 1.25, p = .26.  Again, the similarities were much larger: Participants in both 
countries chose the same value 86 out of 137 times.  For another 12 instantiations, no 
value was chosen significantly more often than the second most frequent value in both 
countries.  
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For example, the instantiation “Putting certain rubbish in recycle bins rather than 
general waste” was correctly identified in both countries by the majority of participants 
as being promoted by the value protecting the environment (54 out of 67 Brazilian 
participants did so and 42 out of 43 British participants).  In the Brazilian sample, the 
number of participants who chose protecting the environment differed significantly from 
the number of participants that chose the second-most frequently chosen value, 
helpfulness (54 vs. 9, = 32.14, p < .001).  Overall, Brazilian participants correctly 
matched 5 out of the 6 instantiations for protecting the environment, and British 
participants correctly matched all 6 instantiations to protecting the environment.  As can 
be seen in Table 3.3, participants from both countries were approximately equally likely 
to match instantiations that had been mentioned in both countries (columns 3 and 8), in 
Brazil, and in the exploratory instantiations (i.e., those made up by me).  Brazilian 
participants had somewhat more difficulty in matching British instantiations compared 
to British participants, 34 vs 45, albeit this difference did not reach statistical 
significance, = 1.53, p = .22.  
Table 3.3
Frequencies of correctly matched instantiations for all values combined and depending 
on the origin of the instantiation
Brazilian responses British responses
UK All Brazil None Sum UK All Brazil None Sum
Unity with nature 
(UN)
2/2 3/3 0/1 5 2/2 3/3 1/1 6
Wisdom (UN) 2/2 1/1 2/3 5 2/2 1/1 1/3 4
World of Beauty 
(UN)
2/2 0/3 1/1 3 2/2 0/3 1/1 3
Social Justice (UN) 2/2 3/3 1/1 6 2/2 3/3 1/1 6
Broad-mindedness 
(UN)
0/1 1/3 2/2 3 1/1 1/3 1/2 3
Protecting the 
environment (UN)
3/3 1/1 1/1 0/1 5 3/3 1/1 1/1 1/1 6
Equality (UN) 1/3 2/2 0/1 3 3/3 2/2 0/1 5
Freedom (SD) 2/2 1/3 1/1 4 2/2 3/3 1/1 6
Creativity (SD) 2/2 1/2 0/2 3 2/2 2/2 1/2 5
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Brazilian responses British responses
UK All Brazil None Sum UK All Brazil None Sum
A varied life (ST) 0/2 0/1 0/3 0 2/2 1/1 1/3 4
Daring (ST) 2/2 2/2 1/2 5 2/2 2/2 2/2 6
Pleasure (HE) 2/2 2/2 1/2 5 2/2 1/2 2/2 5
Success (AC) 2/3 3/3 5 3/3 2/3 5
Ambition (AC) 2/3 2/3 4 3/3 2/3 5
Wealth (PO) 1/2 0/1 0/2 0/1 1 1/2 0/1 0/2 1/1 2
Social Power (PO) 2/2 3/3 1/1 6 2/2 1/3 1/1 4
Family Security 
(SE)
1/3 1/3 2 3/3 2/3 5
Respect for 
Tradition (TR)
1/2 3/3 0/1 4 2/2 2/3 0/1 4
Self-discipline (CO) 2/3 1/1 1/1 1/1 5 3/3 1/1 1/1 0/1 5
Obedience (CO) 2/3 2/3 4 3/3 2/3 5
Helpfulness (BE) 0/1 2/2 2/2 0/1 4 1/1 2/2 2/2 0/1 5
Loyalty (BE) 3/3 1/1 2/2 6 3/3 1/1 2/2 6
Honesty (BE) 1/1 1/1 2/2 2/2 6 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/2 5
Sum (max. 138) 34/46 13/18 37/57 10/17 94/138 45/46 16/18 37/56 12/17 110/137
Note. Value type is in brackets. UN = Universalism, SD = Self-direction, ST = Stimulation, HE = 
Hedonism, AC = Achievement, PO = Power, SE = Security, TR = Tradition, CO = Conformity, BE = 
Benevolence. UK: Absolute frequency of typical British instantiations (and how often these were 
correctly matched; All: Frequency of instantiations typical in both countries; Brazil: Frequency of typical 
Brazilian instantiations; None: Instantiations that were neither typical in Brazil nor the UK (i.e., those 
generated by me).
In a final step, I computed how often differences occurred based on the 
taxonomy proposed in Chapter 2, while taking the unequal sample sizes into account.  I 
compared all values that were mentioned by at least half of the participants in one 
country with the percentage of the same value in the other country.  I called it a 
difference when one option was chosen by at least 50 percent more of the participants in 
one group than the other.  Fifty percent was chosen as a cut-off value to be consistent 
with the taxonomy proposed in Chapter 2.  For example, if 20 percent of the Brazilian 
participants reported that they thought that a specific instantiation is best promoted by 
wealth, at least 70 percent of the British participants needed to choose wealth before I 
would call it a difference.  
Differences were found for 5 instantiations (Table A12): “Travelling” was 
considered to be best promoted by the value of pleasure in the Brazilian sample and by 
freedom in the British sample (84% of the Brazilian participants chose pleasure vs 25% 
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of the British participants and 13% of the Brazilian participants chose freedom vs 75% 
in the British sample; cf. Table A12).  “Maintaining a good work life balance” was 
considered to be promoted by success in the Brazilian, but not in the British sample 
(73% vs. 12%), whereas British participants correctly matched this instantiation to a 
varied life more often than Brazilian participants did (79% vs. 6%).  “Being able to buy 
organic food” was considered to be promoted by wealth, but only for British, and not 
Brazilian participants (61% vs. 6%).  “Living your own life and not following the 
crowd” was considered to be promoted by self-discipline by Brazilian, but not British 
participants (84% vs. 13%), and vice-versa for freedom (1% vs. 83%).  This is an 
interesting finding because freedom and self-discipline are thought to be motivationally 
incongruent (Schwartz, 1992), but appear to be related within the Brazilian respondents’ 
views of their social relationships.  “Customer service” was thought to be promoted by 
social justice by Brazilian participants (61% vs. 7%), but was correctly matched to 
helpfulness by British participants (83% vs. 21%).
Discussion
The aim of Study 5 was to test the extent to which the instantiations obtained in 
Study 4 could be recognized as being promoted by the specific value that elicited the 
translation.  Most instantiations were correctly matched in both countries, indicating a 
relatively similar understanding of which instantiations are related to which values.  
Interestingly, participants were often able to correctly match instantiations that 
participants in their nation had not mentioned in the ‘free recall’ design of Study 4.  For 
example, although British participants in Study 4 did not mention saving water as often 
as Brazilian participants did when asked to identify behaviours that protect the 
environment, most participants in both countries were able to correctly match saving 
water to protection of the environment.  Thus, the findings in Study 4 and 5 converge 
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with evidence from cognitive psychology indicating that almost everyone is able to 
recognize instances of a category, even when the instances are atypical; for example, 
people can label an ostrich or a penguin as a bird, even though these birds are seldom 
the first examples that come to mind when participants were asked to name birds (e.g., 
Mervis & Rosch, 1981).  Hence, the instantiations that have been correctly matched can 
be regarded as valid instantiations, but are potentially atypical when they were not 
spontaneously generated in Study 4 (notwithstanding the issues that aforementioned 
issues discussed in the previous chapter).  
Interestingly, less than half of the participants in each country indicated that the 
instantiation “Discrimination against left-handed people” was promoted by equality.  
This result may indicate that this instantiation is very atypical (cf. Maio, Hahn, et al., 
2009).  Alternatively, this could be because discrimination is not promoted by equality, 
but thwarted.  In other words, the phrasing of this item was probably not meaningful and 
the results are consequently not interpretable.  This could explain why in both countries 
the most frequent response options for this particular instantiation was “Don’t know”.
Whereas in Study 4 the type of sample (i.e., students) had a clear influence on 
the responses and therefore decreases generalizability, in Study 5 this may be less of a 
problem.  The matching procedure relies, in my opinion, more strongly on semantic 
memory than personal experiences, as the matching method is more about recognizing 
than free recall.
One obvious limitation of Study 5 is the use of fixed response alternatives.  
These included the six values which could be selected as best promoting a specific 
instantiation.  Although five of the six values were chosen randomly (with the other 
value being the one related to the instantiation), they were the same across participants 
and countries for all six instantiations of each value.  Consequently, we can compare 
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findings between participants and regions, but not between value instantiations and 
values.  If the five alternative values had been selected out of all values (e.g., 
Schwartz’s, 1992, 57 values), a much larger sample would have been required to 
achieve adequate power.  In other words, conclusions such as “instantiation A was more 
reliably matched to value X than instantiation B to value Y” are not justified, because 
these comparisons also depend on the response alternatives.  On the other hand, 
between-country conclusions such as “instantiation A was more often ‘correctly’ 
matched to value X in Brazil than the UK” are justified by the fact that participants in 
both countries were given the same response alternatives.  However, between-country 
comparisons may also be moderated by the choice of response alternatives. It might be 
the case that the nature of the differences between regions depends on which response 
options are offered.  Nonetheless, given that these options were chosen randomly, there 
is no reason to suspect a systematic effect of the options on the between-country 
comparisons.  
Study 6: The Importance of Instantiations
The aim of Study 6 was to explore whether typical instantiations are more 
emotive.  Do we experience stronger emotional reactions to instantiations that are 
central to our mental representations of values than peripheral in these representations?  
This question is relevant to Nussbaum’s (2004) argument that emotions are concerned 
with valuing.  If someone or something is not important to us, we usually do not feel 
many emotions towards this person or a specific behaviour.  If a situation strongly 
connects to a value (i.e., because it is typical), then it should elicit strong emotions.  This 
view is supported by Frijda’s (1988) law of concern: “Emotions arise in response to 
events that are important to the individual’s goals, motives, or concerns” (p. 351).
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In this Study, I asked participants to think about emotions that they would be 
most likely feel if an instantiation is (a) promoted or (b) violated.  This rationale is based 
on the assumption that typicality and importance are at least partly related.  I assumed 
that the promotion of typical instantiations elicits more positive emotions, whereas their 
violation elicits more negative emotions.  Consequently, I expected an interaction 
between the framing of the instantiation (positive vs negative) and the country in which 
participants responded.  For an instantiation that is considered typical in Brazil, the 
difference between the positive and negative versions of the instantiation should be 
larger in Brazil than for most emotions than in the UK.  
Furthermore, the larger the difference between positive (and negative, 
respectively) emotions if the instantiation is promoted rather than violated, the more 
important an instantiation should be on average for either Brazilian or British 
participants (cf. Nussbaum, 2004).
Method
Participants. Participants in both countries were psychology students.  In Brazil, 
154 students from João Pessoa participated (Mage = 24.31, SD = 6.84, 73.40 percent 
being female). In the UK, 96 students from Cardiff participated (Mage = 19.48, SD = 
0.73, 85.40 percent being female).  Because Studies 5 and 6 were presented together to 
these samples (with Study 6 following Study 5), all participants in Study 6 also 
participated in Study 5.  After completion of Study 6, participants participated in one or 
two other studies, unrelated to Study 6.
Procedure and materials.  Participants took part using a pen-and-paper 
questionnaire in Brazil and a computer in the UK.  The opening instructions stated, “In 
this study, you will be given a short description of an act. Please rate how you would 
feel if someone close to you acted in this way.” Each instantiation was preceded by 
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“Please rate how you would feel if someone close to you …” Participants then rated the 
extent to which they would feel each of seven emotions: happy, surprised, sad, 
embarrassed, angry, nervous, and proud.  Responses were given on a 7-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (not at all), 4 (neither nor), to 7 (very). Another person was chosen
rather than the self (i.e., the participant) as the focus in the instructions to reduce effects 
of social desirability. This is because most selected typical instantiations are social 
desirable (e.g., saving water, recycling), which could influence participants’ ratings.
Using another person instead should reduce effects of social desirability, because this 
approach is thought as a less direct way of assessing the importance of instantiations.
I selected 10 instantiations from Study 4 that were mentioned often in one but 
not the other country.  I included two additional instantiations from Study 5 for 
exploratory purposes.  Beginning with the latter two, the instantiations were “installs 
heat insulation in the house”, “lives in a house with a smoke detector”, “is able to buy 
organic food”, “recycles rubbish”, “saves water”, “thinks of new artistic painting styles”, 
“complies with the law”, “buys luxurious things”, “has many good friends”, “installs 
electric fences around the house”, “is able to keep secrets”, and “completes an exam 
without cheating”.  Next, a negated version of each instantiation was created (e.g., 
“wasting water” for “saving water” or “does not recycle rubbish” for “recycles rubbish”; 
see Table A13).  
The procedure was the same as in Study 5 and the debriefing of Study 6 was 
presented together with the debriefings of the other studies at the end.  
Design. The study utilized a 2x2-between-subjects design: 2 (Country: Brazil vs. 
UK) x 2 (Type of instantiation: promoted vs. violated).  That is, participants judged how 
they would feel if a specific instantiation was either promoted or violated by someone 
close to them.  The design was counterbalanced such that every participant responded to 
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an equal number of promoted and violated instantiations.  In other words, each 
participant made 12x7 = 84 responses.
Results
First, I report the results of the within- and between-country comparisons (i.e., 
ANOVAs), before I turn to the correlations between the emotions and value importance 
ratings. Because I had a specific hypothesis for each interaction, no corrections for 
multiple comparisons were conducted, as this would have decreased power (e.g., 
Perneger, 1998).
ANOVAs. The analyses of variance were conducted with the R package “ez” 
(Lawrence, 2015).  Generalized eta squares are reported as effect sizes, because they 
are better for comparisons across studies than partial eta squares and omega squared, 
among other effect sizes (Olejnik & Algina, 2003).
Overall, I computed 84 between-subjects ANOVAs. Descriptive statistics and 
effect sizes can be found in Table A13 (Appendix A).  For example, analysis of the 
exploratory instantiation “installing heat insulation in the house” revealed that British 
participants were on average happier after contemplating this item, F(1,230) = 5.95, p = 
.02, = .03, and the promoting frame resulted in more happiness, F(1,230) = 94.70, p < 
.001, = .29, but the predicted significant interaction was not significant, F(1,230) = 
3.16, p = .08, = .01.  Thus, participants in both countries were approximately equally 
happier if someone close to them installed heat insulation in the house than if they did 
not.  The mean difference between installing vs not installing heat insulation in the 
house (i.e., the two framing conditions) was 1.83 in the Brazilian sample, and 2.50 in the 
British sample (columns 4 and 5 of Table A13).  
Further within-country comparison revealed that participants in both countries 
responded differently to the promoting and negating version of each instantiation.  On 
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average, the mean (absolute value) of all 84 Cohen’s ds representing the difference 
between the versions was 1.07 (SD = 0.95) in the Brazilian sample and 1.50 (SD = 1.12) 
in the British sample.  This indicates that many of the chosen behaviours were 
considered emotionally relevant; otherwise the promoting and negating frame would 
have not elicited any emotions, yielding no effects.
In total, 43 of the 84 interactions reached statistical significance, and 21 of these 
were in the predicted directions.  That is, the difference between the two versions of the 
instantiation was larger in the country where the instantiation was considered to be 
typical.  For example, although both Brazilian and British respondents were happier if 
someone close to them saved water than wasted water, the mean difference was larger in 
the Brazilian than the British sample (Mdiff = 5.27 vs 3.26).
However, 14 interactions were in the opposite direction to the one predicted.  
That is, the mean difference between the two framing condition was smaller in the 
country in which the instantiation was assumed to be typical. 
In addition, another six interactions were significant for the instantiation 
“complying with the law” which was typical in both countries and therefore no 
prediction has been made.  The remaining two interactions appeared for the instantiation 
“completing an exam without cheating” for which no predictions were made. In a next 
step, I focused only on the eight instantiations with at least a medium effect size of ≥ 
.13 for the interaction (Bakeman, 2005; Cohen, 1988).  Of those, six were in the 
predicted directions.  Thus, focusing on larger effects yielded better support for the 
hypothesis.
Finally, a series of pairwise comparisons between the responses given by 
Brazilian and British participants revealed that British participants reported a higher 
level of perceived emotions (Md = -0.25) across all seven emotions and 2x12 
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instantiations.  Although this indicated a large degree of similarity (MPCR = 90), in nine 
of the pairwise comparisons (5.36%), the PCR was below 50.  Most of these cases 
concerned either installing electric fences around the house or living in a house without 
a smoke detector (Table A13).  
Correlations. Positive emotions (e.g., happy) should be positively correlated 
with the importance of the value when an instantiation of the value is promoted and 
negatively when the instantiation is negated and vice-versa for negative emotions.  For 
example, people who value more protecting the environment should report feeling 
happier when recycling is promoted and less happy when recycling is negated.  If these 
effects are stronger for typical than atypical instantiations, then these relations would 
only be expected in the British, not the Brazilian sample, as recycling was a typical 
instantiation only in the UK (cf. Study 4).  To test this reasoning, I correlated the 
emotion ratings for each version of the instantiation with the personal value priorities, 
separately for each nation.  
Results indicated that most of the correlations were unsystematic.  Out of the 84 
(7 emotions x 12 instantiations) pairwise correlation comparisons, only three showed the 
predicted pattern.  First, the personal importance of creativity correlated with less 
surprise from the instantiation “thinking of new artistic painting styles” (r(43) = -.33, p 
= .03) and more surprise from the negated instantiation (r(47) = .35, p = .02).  As 
predicted, this pattern was only found in the British, not the Brazilian sample.  In the 
Brazilian sample, the personal importance of creativity correlated almost equally with 
both versions (i.e., promoting and negating) of the instantiations (rs = .20 and .16, ps > 
.05, for surprise).  Second, the personal importance of wealth correlated with more 
happiness from the instantiation “buying luxurious things” (r(44) = .40, p = .006) and 
with less happiness from the negated instantiation (r(47) = -.29, p = .04).  As predicted, 
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this pattern was only found in the British, not the Brazilian sample (r(66) = .34, p = 
.005, and r(60) = .06, p = .67, respectively).  Third, the personal importance of loyalty 
correlated with less anger from the instantiation “being able to keep secrets” (r(47) = -
.30, p = .04) and with more anger from the negated instantiation (r(43) = .31, p = .04).  
As predicted, this pattern was only found in the British, not the Brazilian sample (r(54) 
= .16, p = .24, and r(66) = -.01, p = .95, respectively).  For a fourth instantiation, 
“completing an exam without cheating”, which was added for exploratory purposes, 
there was a difference in happiness ratings in the British (r(44) = .33, p = .02 with the 
promoted instantiation, and r[48] = -.28, p = .047 with negated instantiation), but not the 
Brazilian sample (r[67] = -.01, p = .92 with the promoted instantiation, and r[55] = .07, 
p = .61 with negated instantiation).  Overall, then, the majority of the emotions were 
unrelated to more than a handful of value importance ratings.  This was also the case for 
within-country comparisons: There were only a few positive correlations of the value 
importance ratings with the promoted behaviours and a few negative correlations with 
the negated behaviours.  However, the correlations were unsystematic both across 
behaviours and emotions and vanished after correction for multiple comparisons. In a 
final step, the three nature value items (protecting the environment, unity with nature, 
world of beauty) were combined, to increase the reliability (α = .63 in the Brazilian 
sample, α = .76 in the British sample).  However, the pattern of results with the
instantiations of protecting the environment remained the same.
Discussion
This study tested the prediction that participants experience more self-reported 
emotions when a typical instantiation is promoted or negated, compared to a non-typical 
one.  Following Frijda’s (1988) law of concern, I postulated that typical instantiations 
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are more central to mental representations of a value, are therefore more important and 
should consequently elicit a stronger emotional difference when promoted vs negated.  
Out of 70 interactions relevant to this prediction, 35 reached statistical 
significance, suggesting that the influence of the instantiations on the emotion ratings 
was not the same across countries.  However, they varied only partly because of 
typicality, because only 21 (60 percent) of these interactions were in the predicted 
direction, with a larger difference between the two versions of the instantiations in the 
country where the instantiation was considered typical than in the country where the 
instantiation was considered atypical.  The remaining 14 significant interactions pointed 
in the opposite direction (with a stronger difference for the atypical instantiation).  
It remains unclear why this hypothesis was so poorly supported.  The remarkable 
aspect of these findings is that half of the patterns were reliable, but in opposing 
directions. This suggests that there may be a moderator of whether the typical or 
atypical instantiations exert a strong emotional effect.  However, examining the 
instantiations and the emotions for which an interaction occurred, I was unable to find 
such a moderator.  
Surprisingly, the value importance ratings barely correlated with the emotion 
measure.  Future studies are needed to explore whether the emotions measure taps a kind 
of importance which is not measured by the value importance ratings or whether the 
jump to concrete value instantiations (rather than focusing only on the abstract values; 
see, e.g., Maio & Olson, 1998) makes the emotional consequences less predictable from 
the importance of the abstract values.  Study 6 can be regarded as a provocative first 
study in a new project investigating the extent to which the emotions linked to abstract 
values filter down to the behaviours related to these values.  
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Notwithstanding this issue, Study 6 at least helped to advance the study of 
instantiations that are typical in one country but not another.  Instantiations for which all 
the significant interactions were in the predicted directions were “installing heat 
insulation in the house”, “living in a house with a smoke detector”, “saving water”, and 
“keeping secrets”.  The ability of these instantiations to appear in Study 4, survive the 
matching test in Study 5, and show the predicted emotional differences in Study 6 makes 
them ideal candidates for Study 7, the final study of this chapter.
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Study 7: Instantiations and Theory of Planned Behaviour
Suppose that you would like to test how well the value of respect for tradition 
predicts relevant behaviours.  You might start by thinking of the behaviours that are 
relevant to this value.  Attending church services would presumably be an appropriate 
behaviour for a Christian sample, whereas behaving in accordance with the caste system 
would be more appropriate in a Hindi sample.  Switching the behaviours to the other 
sample type would probably result in very low relations between the value and 
behaviour, presumably caused by floor effects (e.g., because most Hindi do not attend 
church services, independent of how much they value traditions).
This example illustrates one of the difficulties in choosing the right behaviour.  
Any given behaviour can be related to numerous different values.  Thus, it is important 
to know beforehand which behaviours are typical exemplars of the target value.  A 
related approach was used by Bardi and Schwartz (2003; cf. General Introduction, this 
thesis).  They asked participants to generate behaviours that express each of the ten 
value types of Schwartz’s (1992) value model.  These behaviours were found to be 
strongly correlated with the values from which they were derived.  However, different 
results emerged when Pozzebon and Ashton (2009) used Bardi and Schwartz's (2003)
measure of value-relevant behaviours, which had been developed in Israel, in Canada.  
Pozzebon and Ashton found lower correlation coefficients than those that had been 
obtained by Bardi and Schwartz.  Although this trend could be attributable to diverse 
factors (e.g., sample characteristics, respondent conscientiousness), one possibility is 
that the behaviours assessed by Bardi and Schwartz were less typical of the values in the 
Canadian context than in the Israeli one.  
The aim of Study 7 was to investigate systematically whether and how typicality 
can influence the value-behaviour (intention) relation.  I did this by selecting two 
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instantiations that had been found to be typical in one country but not the other 
countries, yielding six instantiations in total.  These were examined using the framework 
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB).  The TPB predicts that attitudes toward the 
behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behaviour control influence the intention to 
perform the behaviour, which in turn influences the behaviour itself (Ajzen, 1991).  The 
TPB has received strong empirical support across many meta-analyses examining cross-
sectional relations between the components of the TPB (Armitage & Conner, 2001; 
Cooke, Dahdah, Norman, & French, 2016).  In contrast, the longitudinal and 
experimental evidence is equivocal (Sniehotta, Presseau, & Araújo-Soares, 2014), and 
many authors have found that additional variables explain variance in behaviour beyond 
the four core elements.  Examples include moral norm, anticipated regret (e.g., Parker, 
Manstead, & Stradling, 1995; Rivis, Sheeran, & Armitage, 2009), or values (Hrubes, 
Ajzen, & Daigle, 2001).  The conclusion I draw from these findings is that the TPB is a
useful framework, but it is not comprehensive in describing the predictors of behaviour 
and not sufficient as a causal model.
The aforementioned evidence is consistent with the possibility that values may 
be an additional important factor.  Their role in moral judgment is consistent with the 
role of moral norms, and the role of values in emotion (as documented in Study 6) aligns 
with the evidence regarding anticipated regret.  Indeed, prior evidence indicates that 
values can predict behaviour and behavioural intentions independently of other factors 
in the TPB when attitudes toward the behaviour are strongly value-expressive (Maio & 
Olson, 2000).  Thus, values may be another predictor of behavioural intentions (Figure 
3.2).
An unanswered question is whether this independent role is more likely when the 
behaviours are typical instantiations of the value than atypical instantiations.  This issue 
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is theoretically important because it points to different ways in which typicality might 
affect the role of values in behaviour.  This consideration is based on attitude 
representation theory (ART; Lord & Lepper, 1999) and the model of how instantiations 
link values and behaviour (Figure 1.5), both described in Chapter 1.  The ART 
postulates, based on previous findings of the authors (e.g., Lord et al., 1984), that 
attitude-behaviour consistency is moderated by typicality.  The model displayed in 
Figure 1.5 assumes that both personal experiences and social-contextual factors 
influence the extent to which a behaviour is a prominent instantiation of values.  This, in 
turn, leads to the activation of one or more values that influence which behaviour is 
chosen in a specific situation (cf. the representation postulate of the ART).  Taking both 
models together, I postulate that it is not only the attitude-behaviour link that is 
moderated by typicality, but also the value-behaviour link: If an instantiation (here: 
behaviour or behavioural intention) is more closely linked to a value, the two are more 
strongly associated.  It is important to know whether typicality matters, because it allows 
us (a) to better predict when values are correlated with behaviour and (b) to explain 
failed replications.
Given these theoretical considerations, I expected positive relations of the target 
value (e.g., recycling for protecting the environment) with attitudes, subjective norm, 
perceived behavioural control, and behavioural intention when the instantiation (e.g., 
recycling) was typical (here: for the British participants).  However, when the 
instantiation was not typical, I expected the target value to be less strongly related with 
the four elements of the TPB (for Brazilian and Indian participants).  The correlations 
within the core elements of TPB were expected to be positive for both typical and 
typical instantiations.  The predictions are shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Predicted pattern of correlations for a typical and atypical 
instantiation.  The expected correlation signs (++ and +) are displayed along the lines 
connecting two nodes: The expected sign for typical instantiations is on top (++), the 
expected sign for atypical instantiations below (+ and ++).
These predictions focused on behavioural intentions and were not extended to 
actual behaviour.  The reason for this focus was pragmatic.  It was not possible to 
examine actual behaviour for the instantiations I examined (e.g., installing electric 
fences around houses) for the participant population (who were unlikely to be 
homeowners).  Nonetheless, the extant evidence described above has found that the link 
between intentions and behaviour is strong and therefore factors influencing intentions 
have a better chance of altering behaviour than factors that do not alter intentions.  For 
this reason, numerous past studies have adopted the same focus on behavioural 
intentions, at least in the initial stages of investigation.  
Nevertheless, this focus on intentions posed one difficulty: By thinking about 
their intentions, the participants deliberated about their responses.  This means that the 
intention measure does not tap the spontaneous processes that are relevant to the 
typicality of value instantiations.  Recall from earlier in the chapter and in Chapter 1 that 
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the spontaneous associations between typical instantiations and their related concepts 
are theoretically stronger than the link between atypical instantiations and the concepts, 
but this does not mean that people fail to see, upon reflection, connections between 
atypical instantiations and their associated concepts.  In this context, people might easily 
work backwards from an atypical instantiation of a value to the value itself if they are 
thinking about the atypical instantiation (e.g., saving water promotes the environment).  
Indeed, earlier in this chapter I considered evidence that this backtranslation to values 
does occur.  Thus, any effect of typicality in the measure of behavioural intentions 
would have to occur despite this ability to link most of the instantiations to the actions.  
The selected instantiations for the Brazil-UK comparisons were all correctly matched
(cf. Study 5).
Such an effect of typicality would indicate that the typical instantiations are more 
predictive because of a feature of typical instantiations other than their spontaneous 
connection to values (e.g., greater personal importance, fit to ideal). This would provide 
a basis for looking more closely at these varied features of the instantiations.  Also, if 
this finding emerges, it would have important ramifications for research using self-
report measures of value-behaviour relations.
Method
Participants. Across all three countries, 749 participants were included in the 
analysis.  A summary of their descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.4.  The 
Brazilian and Indian participants were undergraduate and postgraduate students and 
were not compensated. The Brazilian participants were from north-east Brazil, and all 
Indian participants were students from a major university in the state of Karnataka.  The 
British participants were recruited from two samples.  Sample 1 consisted of psychology 
undergraduate students who received course credits.  Sample 2 comprised 133 
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participants from Prolific (similar to mturk) who were compensated with £1, 31 
psychology undergraduate students who received course credits, and 27 university 
members (both students and staff) who were given the opportunity to participate in a 
raffle for two £40 cash prizes.  
Prior to any data analysis, 37 Brazilian, 11 Indian, and 24 (sample 1) and 34 
(sample 2) British participants were excluded because they either failed twice to respond 
to the instructional manipulation check (IMC; Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or were not a 
citizen of the country in which they completed the questionnaire.  The latter was only an 
issue in the UK, with around 10 percent of foreigners in each of the two samples.  I also 
tested whether it was justified to exclude participants by comparing the reliabilities of a 
few random selected scales among participants who failed the IMC twice with those 
who did not.  Cronbach’s α was often higher for the participants who did not fail the 
IMC twice.  For example, in the Brazilian sample, 34 participants failed the IMC twice, 
while 152 did not.  For those who failed twice, the reliability of the four attitudinal items 
relating to saving water was α = .24, whereas for those who did not fail, α = .72.  
Although such a dramatic drop was not found in the British samples, I also excluded 
British participants who failed the IMC twice, in order to be consistent.
Table 3.4
Demographics and descriptive statistics Study 7
Brazil India UK
(sample 1, sample 2)
n (%female) 152 (71.50) 221 (57.00) 185 (91.30), 191 (56.00)
Age (SD) 24.97 (8.53) 22.35 (1.65) 19.77 (3.22), 23.48 (5.24)
Protecting the environment 5.40 (1.49) 5.84 (1.67) 3.68 (1.79), 4.28 (1.83)
Loyalty 5.38 (1.54) 5.92 (1.34) 5.95 (1.08), 5.38 (1.32)
Family security 6.45 (0.91) 6.25 (1.24) 6.03 (1.24), 5.74 (1.36)
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Brazil India UK
(sample 1, sample 2)
Ambitious 6.40 (0.97) 5.76 (1.65) 5.32 (1.33), 4.50 (1.85)
Respect for tradition 3.26 (2.11) 5.28 (1.70) 2.33 (1.86), 2.44 (1.85)
A: Saving water 6.76 (0.57, .72) 6.57 (0.74, .69) 6.56 (0.72, .86)
SN: Saving water 6.54 (0.83, .80) 6.12 (1.08, .70) 5.89 (1.06, .88)
PBC: Saving water 5.92 (1.32, .71) 5.00 (1.29, .43) 5.67 (1.02, .69)
Int: Saving water 6.09 (1.44, .95) 6.23 (1.15, .84) 5.54 (1.34, .94)
A: Recycling 6.78 (0.50, .72) 6.21 (0.92, .80) 6.55 (0.63, .80)
SN: Recycling 5.64 (1.45, .86) 5.72 (1.16, .75) 6.05 (1.05, .90)
PBC: Recycling 5.04 (1.47, .77) 4.91 (1.34, .62) 5.73 (1.22, .81)
Int: Recycling 4.16 (1.92, .93) 5.92 (1.23, .88) 6.39 (0.96, .93)
A: Keeping secrets 5.64 (1.40, .92) 3.94 (1.48, .93)
SN: Keeping secrets 5.25 (1.92, .93) 3.70 (1.83, .94)
PBC: Keeping secrets 5.99 (1.10, .57) 5.42 (1.15, .77)
Int: Keeping secrets 5.21 (1.87, .93) 3.81 (1.92, .96)
A: Electric fences 5.49 (1.64, .91) 2.80 (1.28, .92)
SN: Electric fences 5.70 (1.51, .93) 2.32 (1.24, .91)
PBC: Electric fences 4.45 (1.87, .84) 5.51 (1.44, .88)
Int: Electric fences 3.70 (2.12, .96) 1.46 (1.09, .99)
A: Education 6.40 (0.82, .82) 6.50 (0.77, .85)
SN: Education 6.10 (1.08, .84) 6.39 (0.80, .79)
PBC: Education 5.45 (1.17, .49) 5.73 (1.06, .74)
Int: Education 6.09 (1.13, .88) 6.01 (1.32, .95)
A: Traditional clothing 5.97 (1.06, .87) 4.42 (1.07, .89)
SN: Traditional clothing 5.22 (1.48, .86) 3.64 (1.11, .72)
PBC: Traditional clothing 5.43 (1.23, .57) 6.24 (1.04, .81)
Int: Traditional clothing 5.49 (1.45, .90) 2.96 (1.74, .99)
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Note. SES is socioeconomic status (Sharma et al., 2012), A stands for attitude, SN for subjective 
norm, PBC for perceived behaviour control, and Int for intention. Numbers in brackets stand for SD and, 
if available, Cronbach’s α.
Procedure. Brazilian and British participants completed the survey online, while 
Indian participants completed a pen-and-paper version in classroom settings of around 
10 to 50 people.  Brazilian participants were invited to participate mainly via Facebook 
groups of universities in the north-west of Brazil.  The location was restricted because I 
aimed for participants from dry regions, thereby resembling the sample that generated 
‘saving water’ as a typical instantiation of protecting the environment in Study 4. 
Materials. All participants first completed the 23-item version of Schwartz’s 
value survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), as in Studies 5 and 6. The TPB (Ajzen, 1991) was 
assessed with a modified version of the measure used by Armitage, Armitage, Conner, 
Loach, and Willetts (1999), replacing their target behaviour with our behaviours: Saving 
water, recycling, keeping secrets, installing electric fences around the house (assuming 
that you have just bought one without electric fences), working hard to complete 
education with good marks, and wearing traditional clothing.  
Armitage et al. (1999) assessed attitudes with four items, and subjective norm, 
perceived behavioural control, and behavioural intention with three items.  Attitudes were 
assessed with “<behaviour> is in general”.  Responses were given on a 7-point bipolar 
scale ranging from 1 (bad, unfavourable, negative, unsatisfactory) to 7 (good, 
favourable, positive, satisfactory).  Subjective norms were assessed with “People who 
are important to me think I … <behaviour>”, “People who are important to me would … 
<behaviour>”, and “People who are important to me want me to <behaviour>”.  
Responses were given on a 7-point bipolar scale ranging from 1 (should not, disapprove, 
unlikely) to 7 (should, approve, likely).  Perceived behavioural control was assessed 
with “Whether or not I <behaviour> is entirely up to me”, “How much personal control 
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do you feel you have over <behaviour>?”, and “How much do you feel that 
<behaviour> is beyond your control?”.  Responses were given on a 7-point bipolar scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree, very little control, very much) to 7 (strongly agree, 
complete control, not at all).  Behavioural intentions were assessed with “I intend to 
<behaviour> <time>”, “I plan to <behaviour> <time>”, and “I want to <behaviour> 
<time>”.  Responses were given on a 7-point bipolar scale ranging from 1 (definitely do 
not) to 7 (definitely do).  The selected timeframe was adapted in a way that to be more 
meaningful to the participants.  For “wearing traditional clothing” the timeframe was “at 
the next opportunities”.  For the two behaviours “working hard to complete my 
education with good marks” and “installing electric fences around the house” the 
timeframe was “within the next couple of years”.  For the remaining three behaviours, 
“recycling”, “saving water”, and “keeping secrets”, the time frame was “today or 
tomorrow”.
Finally, participants completed a socioeconomic scale (Sharma et al., 2012), and 
were asked to indicate their age, gender, and nationality before being debriefed and 
thanked.  However, because the socioeconomic scale calculates the socioeconomic 
status (SES) as the sum of three items (education, occupation, and income), missing 
values affect the overall score.  Because the number of missing values was not 
uniformly distributed across countries, the SES was not included in the analyses.  
The items in Brazil were translated into Portuguese.  Although the quality of the 
translation of all items into Portuguese was ensured through back-translation, one item 
assessing perceived behavioural control, “How much do you feel that <behaviour> is 
beyond your control?” was mistakenly translated into “How much do you feel that 
<behaviour> is under your control?” (emphasis added).  Hence, this item was recoded 
for the Brazilian sample.
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The main criterion for selecting instantiations was that they should be typical in 
one but not the other two countries.  However, the instantiation should not be completely 
atypical in the other two countries, because this could result in floor effects or random 
responses (see the introduction of this study for examples).  To ensure this, the typical 
instantiations had to be successfully matched in Study 5 (for Brazil and the UK, because 
no data were available for India).  More generally, correctly matching the instantiations to 
the valueswas a condition for seeing the instantiation as a valid exemplar of the value.
Saving water was selected because (1) it was spontaneously associated with 
protecting the environment in the Brazilian, but not the British sample (Study 4), (2) the 
effects of this instantiation on emotion in Study 6 were in the predicted direction, 
indicating that Brazilians feel more positive and less negative emotions when someone 
close to them saved (vs wasted) water compared to British participants (Study 6, Table 
A13), and (3) because the countryside of Paraiba, the state in Brazil where most of the 
Brazilian participants are from, has up to 90 percent less annual precipitation compared to 
Wales where the precipitation is also more uniformly distributed (source: 
http://www.worldweatheronline.com).  
Installing electric fences around the house (assuming that you have just bought one 
without electric fences), was selected because (1) it was only mentioned as a typical 
instantiation for family security in the Brazilian, but not the British sample, in Study 4, (2) 
Brazilian participants reported more positive and less negative emotions to the promoted 
version of this instantiation in Study 6 (Table A13), and (3) because João Pessoa, where 
most of the Brazilian participants were living, is a more dangerous city than any city in the 
UK in terms of homicides (Office for National Statistics, 2014; Statista, 2014).  
Recycling was selected because (1) it was mentioned more often in the British 
than Brazilian sample as a typical instantiation for protecting the environment (Study 4) 
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and (2) because the recycling rate is around 28 percent in the UK, whereas only 1 
percent in Brazil (source: http://www.atlas.d-waste.com/).  
Keeping secrets was selected because (1) it was mentioned more often in the 
British than Brazilian sample as a typical instantiation for loyalty (Study 4) and (2) for 
several emotions the predicted interaction was found (Study 6, Table A13).  
Working hard to complete education with good marks (ambition) and wearing 
traditional clothing (respect for tradition) were the two instantiations I considered to be 
typical in the Indian, but not British sample (Study 4). Because no data from India were 
collected for Studies 5 and 6, Study 4 provided my only empirical basis for selecting these 
instantiations.
Design.  I used a nested design: All instantiations considered typical in the UK 
were used in both Brazil and India, and vice-versa.  The typical instantiations in India 
(Brazil) were not used in the Brazilian (Indian) sample.  Hence, the focus of the analyses 
and discussion lies on the comparison Brazil-UK and India-UK, but not on Brazil-India.  
British participants in Sample 1 completed the same scales as the Brazilian participants, 
while British participants in Sample 2 the same scales as Indian participants.
Results
First, I tested the fit of the data to my proposed model using structure equation 
modeling.  Next, I tested for measurement equivalence between all three countries.  
Finally, I tested whether the target value correlated more strongly with the four elements
of the TPB when the behaviour was more typical.  Note that the fit of an SEM can be 
evaluated even without established measurement equivalence, because all fit indices 
(e.g., CFI, RMSEA) are comparing the data with the same hypothetical model (e.g., 
baseline model or optimal fitting model).
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Structure equation modeling. In total, 14 SEMs were computed, using the R 
packages “latent variable analysis” (lavaan, version 0.5-20; Rosseel, 2012) and 
“semTools” (version 0.4-11; Pornprasertmanit, Miller, Schoemann, & Rosseel, 2016).  
As described below, four SEMs were conducted for the Brazilian and Indian samples, 
respectively, and six SEMs for the two British samples.  Results were partly double-
checked with AMOS.  Because the χ2 statistic is sensitive to sample size (e.g., Cheung & 
Rensvold, 2002), I focus on other common fit indices: Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR).
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the model fit for 13 out of the 14 models was 
adequate (CFI/TLI > .90 and RMSEA < .08) or better (CFI/TLI > .95 and RMSEA < 
.05; Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012).  This indicates that the proposed model (Figure 3.2) 
fits the data well.
Table 3.5 
Fit indices of all 14 SEMs.
χ2 p CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR
Saving 
water 
(B/I/U)
177.09/130.66/176.04 all < .001 .87/.93/.94 .83/.90/.93 .11/.07/.09 .09/.09/.11
Recycling 
(B/I/U)
94.00/178.02/164.30 .04/<.001/<.001 .97/.91/.94 .97/.89/.93 .05/.09/.09 .07/.09/.09
Keeping 
secrets 
(B/U)
108.23/122.23 .003/<.001 .97/.98 .96/.97 .06/.06 .06/.07
Electric 
fences 
(B/U)
100.98/97.19 .01/.02 .98/.99 .97/.99 .06/.05 .07/.06
Good 
marks 
(I/U)
144.51/116.07 <.001/.001 .94/.97 .92/.96 .07/.06 .07/.06
Traditional 
clothing 
(I/U)
155.69/120.54 <.001/<.001 .94/.98 .92/.97 .08/.06 .08/.08
Note. All dfs = 71, B/I/U: Results for Brazilian, Indian, and British samples (in this order), df: degrees of 
freedom, CFI: Comparative Fit Index, TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index, RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation, SRMR: Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
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The standardized path coefficients were also computed (Table 3.6), although 
they were not central to the hypotheses.  For example, the intention to save water was 
significantly predicted in the Indian sample by attitudes towards saving water (β = .50) 
and the value protecting the environment (β = .28) but not by subjective norm (β = -
.00ns) or perceived behavioural control (β = .25ns).  As shown in the table, all of the 
four predictors were reliable predictors of intentions in at least four analyses, but none of 
the four predictors of intention was consistently significant across countries and 
instantiations. 
Table 3.6 
Path coefficients of predictors of intention
Attitude Subjective 
norm
Behaviour 
control
Value
Saving water (B/I/U) .16/.503/.11 .241/-.00/.363 .232/.25/.252 .05/.283/.202
Recycling (B/I/U) .03/-.03/.212 .433/.373/.313 .06/.403/.15 .03/.233/.07
Keeping secrets (B/U) .342/.281 .241/.342 .09/.04 .07/-.08
Electric fences (B/U) .252/.12 .231/.432 .242/-.09 -.03/-.172
Good marks (I/U) .351/.271 .13/.09 .06/.04 .263/.192
Traditional clothing 
(I/U)
.312/.07 .20/.663 .11/-.06 .05/-.02
Note. B/I/U: Results for Brazilian, Indian, and British samples (in this order). All paths 
coefficients are standardized. 1: p < .05, 2: p < .01, 3: p < .001
Measurement equivalence. To make meaningful comparisons across groups 
(e.g., comparison of correlation coefficients), a high level of measurement equivalence 
or measurement invariance needs to be established, depending on the planned analyses 
(e.g., Davidov, Meuleman, Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014; Hirschfeld & von 
Brachel, 2014; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000; Wu, Li, & Zumbo, 2007).  Establishing 
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measurement equivalence is especially necessary if we compare naturally occurring 
groups, such as people from different countries who may understand items in different 
ways.  Without establishing measurement equivalence, we may end up comparing 
“chopsticks with forks” (Chen, 2008).  The levels of equivalence are often considered 
hierarchically: Testing for a stricter level of invariance is usually only meaningful if 
previous levels have been established.  The first and lowest level, configural 
equivalence, tests whether the number of latent variables is the same across groups 
through “constraining the number of factor(s) and the pattern of the free and fixed 
loadings to be the same across groups” (Wu et al., 2007, p. 7).  Configural invariance is 
needed to establish that the same constructs were measured.  Metric or weak 
equivalence, the second level, tests for equivalence in factor loadings by testing whether 
one unit change in an item score creates an equal change in the latent variable score in 
all groups.  With metric equivalence established, unstandardized regression coefficients 
can be compared across groups, as the slope of the regression lines will be similar.  The 
third level, scalar or strong equivalence, tests whether the intercepts of the items are 
similar across groups.  Without scalar equivalence, means of latent variables cannot be 
meaningfully compared between groups.  However, Wu et al. (2007) have argued that 
not only scalar, but also strict invariance, the fourth level of measurement equivalence, 
must be met to compare means.  Strict invariance tests for equivalence of residual 
variances.  However, there is still disagreement about the necessity of establishing strict 
invariance (Davidov et al., 2014; Hirschfeld & von Brachel, 2014).  There are at least 
three more levels of equivalence, the so-called structural equivalence, that can be tested 
across groups, including invariant path coefficients (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  
However, establishing the first three levels or equivalence, configural, metric, and scalar 
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equivalence, are sufficient for the purpose of the present comparison of correlation 
coefficients.  
Although there are several recommendations for the cut-off criteria between the 
models (Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), I followed the recommendation of 
Cheung and Rensvold.  They indicate that equivalence is established if the difference 
between two models remains CFI ≤ .01.  Table 3.7 displays the results of all ten 
measurement equivalence tests.  As can be seen in column 5, strong measurement 
equivalence is not established for the first four models (ΔCFI > .01), but it is established 
for the remaining six.  Strict invariance (i.e., constraining the residuals) was not 
supported in any of the models tested. 
Table 3.7
Results of all ten measurement equivalence tests
CFI RMSEA ΔCFI ΔRMSEA
Saving water 
(Brazil –
UK)
configural 0.921 0.098 NA NA
weak 0.897 0.109 0.024 0.010
strong 0.894 0.107 0.003 0.002
strict 0.795 0.144 0.099 0.037
Saving water 
(India – UK)
configural 0.938 0.078 NA NA
weak 0.934 0.078 0.005 0
strong 0.923 0.082 0.011 0.004
strict 0.702 0.155 0.221 0.073
Recycling 
(Brazil –
UK)
configural 0.953 0.073 NA NA
weak 0.939 0.081 0.014 0.008
strong 0.929 0.084 0.009 0.003
strict 0.843 0.121 0.087 0.037
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CFI RMSEA ΔCFI ΔRMSEA
Recycling 
(India – UK)
configural 0.929 0.085 NA NA
weak 0.92 0.087 0.009 0.003
strong 0.904 0.093 0.016 0.006
strict 0.723 0.152 0.181 0.059
Keeping 
secrets 
(Brazil –
UK)
configural 0.974 0.064 NA NA
weak 0.968 0.068 0.005 0.004
strong 0.968 0.066 0 0.002
strict 0.928 0.095 0.040 0.029
Electric 
fences 
(Brazil –
UK)
configural 0.986 0.051 NA NA
weak 0.981 0.058 0.005 0.007
strong 0.976 0.063 0.005 0.005
strict 0.788 0.18 0.188 0.117
Good marks 
(India – UK)
configural 0.956 0.065 NA NA
weak 0.952 0.066 0.004 0.001
strong 0.949 0.066 0.003 0
strict 0.863 0.104 0.086 0.038
Traditional 
clothing 
(India – UK)
configural 0.963 0.069 NA NA
weak 0.959 0.07 0.004 0.001
strong 0.951 0.074 0.008 0.004
strict 0.808 0.142 0.144 0.068
Note. CFI is confirmatory fit index, RMSEA is root mean square of error approximation, Δ represents the 
differences between the current and the previous model.
If measurement equivalence is not established, an alternative approach is to 
unconstrain (free) one or more items based on the modification indices (Byrne, 
Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989).  If this leads to a ΔCFI < .01, partial measurement 
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equivalence is established. I followed this approach for the four models for which 
strong measurement equivalence was not established.  I decided to let no more than 3 
out of the 13 items freely vary to improve the fit, as freeing more items would have 
undermined the purpose of the tests for measurement equivalence.  After freeing one to 
three items (either the loadings or intercepts), three models were partially equivalent.  
This means that correlations and means can be compared across groups.  Only the 
comparison of the model between Brazil and the UK for saving water did not reach 
scalar equivalence (Table 3.8), because ΔCFI between the model with free loadings to 
free intercepts was > .01.  Hence, the correlations between the variables in the model for 
saving water cannot be meaningfully compared between Brazil and the UK.
Table 3.8
Results of partial measurement equivalence tests
CFI RMSEA ΔCFI ΔRMSEA
Saving water 
(Brazil –
UK) – 3 
items freed
configural 0.922 0.098 NA NA
weak 0.916 0.099 0.006 0.001
strong 0.898 0.107 0.018 0.008
strict 0.796 0.145 0.104 0.038
Saving water 
(India – UK) 
– 2 items 
freed
configural 0.938 0.078 NA NA
weak 0.934 0.078 0.005 0
strong 0.930 0.079 0.004 0.001
strict 0.744 0.145 0.186 0.066
Recycling 
(Brazil –
UK) – 3 
items freed
configural 0.953 0.073 NA NA
weak 0.948 0.074 0.005 0.001
strong 0.936 0.081 0.012 0.007
strict 0.856 0.116 0.080 0.035
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Recycling 
(India – UK) 
– 1 item
configural 0.929 0.085 NA NA
weak 0.920 0.087 0.009 0.003
strong 0.911 0.090 0.009 0.003
strict 0.729 0.151 0.182 0.061
Note. Δ represents the differences between the current and the previous model.
Comparing correlations. All computed correlation coefficients can be found in 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, including the results of the comparisons between independent 
correlations (omitted when non-significant).  The correlations between two elements of 
the model are displayed in a 4x2 correlation matrix along the paths connecting them.  
The first column displays the correlations for the Brazilian (Figure 3.3) or Indian sample 
(Figure 3.4), the second for the British sample (both figures).  The first row of this 
matrix displays the correlations between each of the elements for the instantiation saving 
water and the value protecting the environment.  The first row in all correlation matrices 
in Figure 3.3 is in grey, because the correlations cannot be meaningfully compared 
across Brazil and the UK because of a lack of strong measurement equivalence.
Consider the results shown in Figure 3.3.  Here, protecting the environment 
correlated .06 (p = .51) with the intention to recycle with in the Brazilian sample, and 
.22 (p = .003) in the British sample.  This difference did not reach statistical significance 
(z = -1.42, p = .16).  The only predicted differences in correlations between a value and 
the core elements of the TPB were found for correlations between the importance of 
family security, on the one hand, and attitudes, subjective norms, and intention in 
relation to installing an electric fence around the house.  For example, the correlation 
between family security and subjective norm was positive in in the Brazilian sample, but 
negative in the British sample.  The correlations within the core elements of the TPB 
were similar in size to the ones found in meta-analyses of the TPB (Armitage & Conner, 
2001; Rivis et al., 2009).  Overall, these findings were influenced by an unexpected lack 
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of strong correlations between the values and the TPB constructs in the Brazilian data.
Therefore, to increase the reliability, I combined the three nature value items (protecting 
the environment, unity with nature, and world of beauty). The reliabilities were
satisfactory to good (Brazil: α = .58, India: α = .64, UK: α = .80). However, the
correlational patterns did not change.
Figure 3.3. Correlation coefficients for the Brazilian and British participants 
(first and second columns) between elements of the model. Norm is subjective norm, 
PBC is perceived behaviour control, z is the z statistic of the comparison between two 
independent correlation coefficients (omitted when non-significant).  Correlations for 
saving water are in light grey because the scales are not invariant (see above) and 
therefore comparisons are not meaningful.
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001
Turning to results shown in Figure 3.4, the pattern is markedly different. The 
samples in India and the UK both exhibited reliable correlations between values and the 
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TPB constructs.  In fact, the correlations were very similar in size and did not reliably 
differ between the nations. Again, combining the three nature value items to increase 
reliability did not change the pattern of results.  These results support a role of values in 
all of the behavioural instantiations, without any differences according to the degree to 
which the behaviour was typical or atypical of the value.
Figure 3.4. Correlation coefficients for the Indian and British participants (first 
and second column) between all elements of the model.  Norm is subjective norm, PBC 
is perceived behaviour control, z is the z statistic of the comparison between two 
independent correlation coefficients (omitted when non-significant). 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001
Discussion
The aim of Study 7 was to test whether typicality influences the relations 
between values and attitudes, subjective norms, PBC, and intentions.  This hypothesis 
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received only limited support.  The correlations between values and the TPB 
components were similar across countries, and only three differences across a total of 28 
correlations were reliable.  Specifically, the correlations between family security and 
attitudes and intentions for installing electric fences around houses differed between the 
Brazilian and British samples.  These differences were partly driven by negative 
relations between family security and, for example, the intention to install electric fences 
in the British sample; in this sample, electric fences may be perceived as a risk for 
family security. To some extent, the mixed results may be due to the unexpected, weak 
correlations between values and all of the TPB constructs in the Brazilian sample.  
However, there were stronger correlations between these variables in the Indian sample, 
and no evidence differences between the correlations in the Indian sample and the UK 
sample.  Therefore, it is important to consider other explanations for the weak pattern.
One methodological possibility is that the predicted pattern of differences 
between correlations did not appear for the remaining seven instantiations because they 
were not atypical enough in the countries from which they have not been derived.  For 
example, although saving water was found to be more typical in the Brazilian than the 
British sample in Study 4, calls for saving water do occur in the UK (albeit not as 
commonly as calls to recycle, for example).  Of all the instantiations used, installing 
electric fences is probably the least typical exemplar in the British sample.  This 
reasoning is in line with Maio, Hahn, et al. (2009) who found that participants engaged 
more in egalitarian behaviour after contemplating about a typical example of equality 
(e.g., discrimination against women) compared to an atypical example (e.g., 
discrimination against left-handers).  As I argued in Chapter 1 and found in Study 5, 
discrimination against left-handers is relatively atypical for equality.  In other words, if 
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Maio, Hahn, et al. had used a somewhat more typical instantiation of equality, they 
would probably not found this effect.  
This possible explanation is given more support from past evidence that personal 
past experiences moderate the impact of instantiations.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
Lord et al. (1991) found that the correlation between attitudes and behaviour was more 
dependent on typicality when participants were less experienced and less skilled 
regarding the social category.  The same could apply here: Most of the tested 
instantiations refer to behaviours in which participants are likely to be somewhat 
experienced (e.g., saving water or working hard for good grades).  The only exception is 
building electric fences around the house.  Here, as argued earlier, Brazilians are likely 
to be more experienced than Britons and this was also the only instantiation where a 
typicality effect was found.  The lack of experience in Britain may render the typicality 
effect stronger by virtue of a larger difference in typicality between the two nations.
In summary, it may be worth replicating Study 7 using instantiations that are less 
typical in the countries where the instantiation is not derived, but not so atypical that any 
resulting effect becomes trivial.  Instantiations for such a conceptual replication study 
should be based not on the results of Study 4 and 6, which is what I did in Study 7, but 
on the results of Study 5.  In particular, I would suggest focusing on the five 
instantiations, which were differently matched to the values in both countries, rather than 
matched to the same degree.  If people do not match the instantiations to the values to 
the same extent in the countries being compared, then it should be harder to use those 
values in deciding intentions related to the instantiations.  
A different approach is to try and examine spontaneous behaviour, rather than 
thoughtfully produced behavioural intentions.  In addition, participants in all countries 
presumably differ in the extent to which they consider an instantiation to be typical for a 
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value.  A follow-up study should assess typicality on an individual basis by directly 
asking the participants about how typical they consider the instantiation for each value 
to be and then to control for these typicality ratings8. 
Overall, Study 7 demonstrates that values are associated with behavioural 
intentions independently of context and typicality.  Furthermore, values can be 
independent predictors of behavioural intentions within the TPB framework, 
emphasizing the importance of values in guiding our behavioural intentions.  
Nonetheless, typicality did not systematically influence the relation of values to 
intentions. 
8 I am grateful to Ronald Fischer for this suggestion.
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Chapter 4: Is There a Bias against Science in Lay-Conceptions of Creativity? 
A Cross-Cultural Comparison
The thesis to this point has succeeded in documenting more similarities between 
nations in values than differences.  However, one provocative difference did emerge in 
Study 4: Art was more strongly associated with the value of creativity in the British 
sample than the Brazilian one, whereas science was barely mentioned in either of the 
two countries.  This finding is the focus of the present chapter. In Studies 9 and 10, I 
will explore whether this specific difference in value instantiation can be replicated 
using different methods.  Given that the similarities between countries have been found 
to be in most cases much larger than differences, it is interesting to explore examples 
where differences are actually larger, to see if the differences hold.  A further aim of this 
chapter is to explore whether there is a bias against science in lay conceptions of 
creativity.  
Creativity and Science
It is an all-too familiar scene. I am at a party and meet a couple. “What do you do?” 
they ask. “I’m a scientist.” I can already see the first sign of panic and disengagement. 
“What kind?” they ask politely. “I’m a molecular biologist. I study how information in 
my genes is used to make proteins.” “Oh, that sounds fascinating and terribly clever. 
I’m afraid I was never very good at science or maths. I know nothing at all about it.” 
(…) Now imagine the reverse. Suppose I had said: “Oh I really know nothing about 
literature or arts or music.” The same people who proudly proclaim their ignorance 
about science and maths would consider me an uncivilised boor. – Venki Ramakrishnan 
in The Guardian, 28 February 2016.
This example, provided by the President of the Royal Society and Nobel 
laureate, is consistent with negative stereotypes about scientists.  Although scientists are 
usually considered to be helpful and wise, they are also perceived by urban students and 
high school students as old, frightening, and colourless (McNarry & O’Farrell, 1971).  
The work of a scientist is sometimes even considered as dull and tedious (Ahlgren & 
Walberg, 1973; Kind, Jones, & Barmby, 2007; Mead & Métraux, 1957).  These results 
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are also mirrored in research on lay conceptions of creativity, in which artists were 
judged to be more creative compared to scientists (Glăveanu, 2014).  Improving the way 
in which science is perceived is important, because this may impact the economic future 
of a country (Osborne, Simon, & Collins, 2003).
In the course of three studies conducted in two countries I investigated the extent 
to which scientists and the products of natural sciences are perceived as creative and 
whether the mode of presentation influences the lay-conception.  Below I first outline 
why the lay conception of creativity is important for sciences, before I discuss previous 
research and the importance of conducting replications outside of Western countries.
Adding creativity to the large body of research about attitudes towards science 
(e.g., Osborne et al., 2003) is important because creativity is generally considered as a 
positive construct that can lead to significant progress in every aspect of the life, 
including art, everyday life, and sciences (Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010).  
Therefore, I assume that any profession or product will be evaluated more positively 
when it is considered to be creative.  By contrast, if science is not perceived as creative, 
this will result in science being evaluated as less attractive.  This potential effect has 
implications for investment in science and for attracting young people into scientific 
careers.  
Before considering lay conceptions of creativity, it is useful to consider issues in 
the generalizability of psychological findings.  Because more than 90% of participants in 
psychological studies reside in Western countries, with most living in the USA (Arnett, 
2008), concerns have been raised about the generalizability of psychological findings.  
For example, it has been argued that many psychological phenomena cannot easily be 
generalized from participants of “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic (WEIRD) societies” to the rest of the world (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 61).  It 
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follows that studies should be replicated outside of WEIRD-countries to address this 
issue of generalizability.  
This claim has been echoed in the emerging study of the cultural psychology of 
creativity (Glăveanu, 2010a, 2010b).  This cultural framework is as an extension of the 
social psychology of creativity (Glăveanu, 2010a), in which situational causes of 
(perceived) creativity are emphasized, rather than the internal dispositions that are 
typically studied (Kasof, 1995).  In a cultural framework, creativity can be defined as a 
“complex socio-cultural-psychological process that, by working with ‘culturally-
impregnated’ materials within an intersubjective space, leads to the generation of 
artifacts that are evaluated as new and signi¿cant by one or more persons or 
communities at a given time” (Glăveanu, 2010a, p. 87).  In other words, creativity and 
the tradition of a culture interact; what is innovative needs to be judged in the context of 
cultural customs and habits.  Consequently, Western understanding of and biases 
towards creativity should also be examined outside of Western countries, because 
creativity is socially constructed (Glăveanu, 2010a).  In this chapter, I illustrate the 
importance of this view by comparing the lay-conception of creativity in a typical 
WEIRD nation, the United Kingdom, with one of the so-called emerging nations: Brazil.  
In past research, artistic professions have been found to be perceived as more 
creative compared to professions from other domains, including scientific domains 
(Glăveanu, 2014).  This phenomenon is called the art bias and refers to “the 
misunderstanding of creativity that equates it with artistic talent” (Runco, 2007, p. 384).  
The art bias can be explained by the romantic vision of a divinely inspired artist, an idea 
that can be traced back to ancient Greece (Glăveanu, 2014; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).  
This implicit theory of creativity has important implications.  For example, parents may 
think of their children as creative when they are artistic.  If a child cannot draw, parents 
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may not regard them as creative (Runco, 2007), which may result in the ‘golem effect’ 
(Babad, Inbar, & Rosenthal, 1982), a form of self-fulfilling prophecy whereby low 
expectations result in low achievement.  This highlights why it is important to study lay 
conceptions of creativity: People usually do not rely on formal definitions and theories 
of creativity when making their judgments, and their own definitions may be quite 
different from the formal ones (Lim & Plucker, 2001).  
In studies exploring the art bias, comparisons have been made between objects 
relevant to art and objects not relevant to art.  For example, Glăveanu (2011) found that 
participants predominantly chose an art-related depiction when asked to select a symbol 
that represents creativity.  In a more recent study, Glăveanu (2014) found that 
participants considered creativity to be a key requirement for professions in the art 
domain (e.g., painter, writer) to a greater extent than for professions in the natural 
sciences (e.g., mathematician, engineer), social sciences and humanities (e.g., 
philosopher, lawyer), and everyday life (e.g., gardener, hairdresser).  
However, both of Glăveanu’s studies used participants in WEIRD-countries 
(mainly UK and USA) and Poland.  Investigating the lay-conception of creativity in 
Brazil would permit further insights into the potential universality of the art bias.  Brazil 
is particularly interesting because Jeitinho, the ‘Brazilian way’ of problem solving, is 
closely linked to creativity (Ferreira, Fischer, Porto, Pilati, & Milfont, 2012).  Jeitinho
may have its origins in an interaction between aftermaths of colonization, corruption, 
and a hierarchical society (Ferreira et al., 2012).  The aim is “to overcome bureaucracy 
but also to break laws and norms to attain a certain objective” (p. 332) through the use 
of “creativity, deception, interpersonal empathy, and cordiality” (p. 333).  Ferreira et al. 
identified three components of Jeitinho: corruption, creativity, and social norm breaking.  
Examples include bribing a police officer, coming up with an idea for a birthday present 
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despite being penniless, and inviting a grandmother to go shopping in order to be able to 
use one of the parking spots close to a shopping mall that are reserved for the elderly. 
It can be argued that both art and Jeitinho are strongly related to creativity, 
because both are related to divergent thinking, an important aspect of creativity (Runco, 
2007).  Divergent thinking, as opposed to convergent thinking, explores multiple
possible solutions for a problem.  For example, there are multiple ways to make a 
painting or sculpture (examples of art), just as there are multiple ways to create a 
birthday present despite not having any money (example of Jeitinho; Ferreira et al., 
2012).  However, both the means and the ends differ for art and Jeitinho:  Art involves 
creating something aesthetically pleasing or emotionally arousing but not necessarily 
useful (e.g., “art for art’s sake”), whereas Jeitinho is more specific, mostly related to 
solving everyday problems.  Furthermore, as noted above, judgment of what is creative 
depends on traditions that may differ between Brazil and the UK.  Moreover, the 
Brazilian conception of creativity is likely to have been influenced by the notions of 
ingenuity and resourcefulness inherent in Jeitinho.  Consequently, I expect the art bias to 
be more strongly evident among British participants, whereas Brazilian participants are 
expected to judge professions, objects, and actions related to solving everyday problems 
as more creative than professions, objects, and actions related to art.
Overview of the Present Studies
I followed the two-step design of previous studies that has been described as the 
gold standard (Glăveanu, 2014): First, qualitative, open-ended data were collected.  
Second, the results were used to create quantitative response scales (cf. Runco, 2007).  
In Study 8, which is a subset of Study 4, I have used a qualitative-exploratory design 
similar to that used in previous studies (e.g., Glăveanu, 2014).9 Based on the results, I 
9 Studies 8 and 9 were designed and the data were collected between February and September 2014.  Only 
later did I become aware of Glăveanu’s (2014) conceptually related study.  
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developed subsequent studies in which I asked participants how much creativity is 
needed for several professions (Study 9), and how much creativity is needed to come up 
with an idea or to create various objects (Study 10). 
Because I was interested in the comparison between Brazil and the UK, I 
excluded all participants who were not from one of these two countries prior to any data 
analysis.  The studies were conducted in Brazilian Portuguese for Brazilian participants.  
All material was successfully back-translated from Brazilian Portuguese to English.
Study 8: Associations of Creativity
Creativity can be operationalized not only as an ability or disposition, but also as 
a human value, as in the human value model of Schwartz (1992).  He and other 
researchers define values as abstract ideals that are important guiding principles in one’s
life (Maio, 2010). In Schwartz’s (1992) original model and in a more recent revision 
(Schwartz et al., 2012), creativity is one of six values that form the value type self-
direction, which expresses independent thoughts and actions.  
In Study 8, I used this value-based approach because of recent research 
describing how the effects of values on behaviour depend on the concrete actions and 
issues that people see as typical examples of the values (Hanel et al., in press; Maio, 
2010; Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009).  This led me to begin to document differences in the 
examples people use for diverse values across cultures, and creativity is one of the 
values I examined.  Specifically, as shown in the present study, I have utilized a 
qualitative exploratory design with open-ended questions about the examples people 
associate with creativity as an important ideal.  This approach complements previous 
approaches using other methods (e.g., Glăveanu, 2014), allowing me to add convergent 
validity to the qualitative art bias research and directly examine a potential bias against 
science.  The study described below reports a more detailed analysis of the data 
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described in Study 4.  Specifically, Study 8 focuses on how often participants have 
mentioned specific words, independent of their frequencies.  The 
Method
Participants. The sample included 34 Brazilian (Mage = 26.18, SD = 6.50, 22 
females) and 33 British (Mage = 22.94, SD = 10.41, 25 females) participants.  Brazilian 
participants were not compensated; British participants were given the option to 
participate in a prize draw of three cash prizes.  
Material and procedure. To measure socioeconomic status, the “Kuppuswamy 
Socioeconomic Scale” (Sharma et al., 2012) was used, which consists of three items, 
which are summed up to one score: Education, Occupation and Family Income per 
month.  In order to adjust the income classes, the official income distribution from both 
countries were used.  Socio-economic status (SES) did not differ between Brazil (M = 
17.74, SD = 4.97) and the UK (M = 17.42, SD = 6.22, t[60.48] = 0.82, p = .82).  As the 
SES scale ranges from 3 to 29, participants in both countries had on average a mid-range 
SES.  
Participants were asked to list typical situations in which they considered 
creativity as important (among other values not considered in this chapter). They were 
also asked to include a “short description of the people in the situation and what they 
do”. Next, two examples were given for two ideals that are not in the Schwartz’s (1992)
model of values: For example, the value ‘enjoyment’ could be relevant during leisure 
time.  Relevant people in the situation can be friends and the family.  They could spend 
time together at the beach or playing games at home.  Participants were asked to list at 
least two to three different situations and up to seven in total.  Subsequently, they 
completed socio-demographic items.  The average length of the response was 
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approximately the same in Brazil and the UK: 69 words vs 56 words, = 1.35, p = .24.  
All participants completed the survey online. 
Results
To test whether British and Brazilian participants associated creativity less with 
science and more with art, I counted how often participants in both countries mentioned 
the words science or scientist (ciência/cientista in Portuguese), and art or artist 
(arte/artista).  I also counted how often branches of natural sciences, problem 
(problema), new (novo), and Jeitinho were mentioned.  Counting the frequency was 
possible because neither negations (e.g., “not doing art”) nor periphrases (e.g., “creating 
something that did not exist before” for “new”) for the terms were used.  “Science” and 
“scientist” were mentioned by 1 Brazilian participant once and by 4 British participants 
6 times.  Neither the former difference (1 vs. 4), nor the latter (1 vs. 6) reached 
significance ( = 1.80, p = .18, and = 3.57, p = .06, respectively).  Next, I looked at 
the following more specific terms: “physics” and “physicist”, “chemistry” and 
“chemist”, “biology” and “biologist”, “engineering” and “engineer”, and “mathematics” 
and “mathematician”.  Overall, these terms were mentioned by 2 Brazilian participants 3 
times and by 2 British participants twice.
“Art” and “artist” were mentioned by 4 Brazilian participants in total 6 times and 
by 23 British participants 46 times.  Both ways of counting (i.e., number of participants 
or number of instances) revealed a significant difference between the two groups: = 
13.37, p < .001 and = 30.77, p < .001, respectively.  “Problem” was mentioned by 2 
Brazilian participants 4 times and by 7 British participants 12 times.  The former 
difference (2 vs. 7) did not reach significance ( = 2.78, p = .10), while the latter (4 vs 
12) did ( = 4.00, p = .046).  “New” was mentioned by 8 Brazilian participants 12 
times and by 12 British participants 27 times.  The former difference (8 vs. 12) did not 
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reach significance ( = 0.80, p = .37), while the latter did ( = 5.77, p = .02).  Jeitinho
was not mentioned at all. 
Discussion
In this qualitative study, I found evidence of a bias against science and support 
for the existence of the art bias.  In both countries less than 10% of the participants 
thought about science or its branches when thinking about typical situations in which 
creativity is relevant or about people in those situations.  The art bias was only found in 
the British sample, where the term “art” was mentioned by 70% of the participants when 
asked what situations and persons they consider typical for creativity.  In contrast, only 
12% of Brazilian participants thought about art when asked what situations and persons 
they consider typical for creativity.  The findings from the British sample stand in 
contrast with Glăveanu (2014).  He found that art-related questions were rarely phrased, 
using a mixed British and US-American sample of participants who were asked to 
generate questions to determine whether an object is creative.  This indicates that a 
relatively small change of methodology has an influence on whether or not evidence of 
the art bias is found and that the art bias is not as reliable as it was previously assumed 
(Runco, 2007). 
Findings relating to the concepts of ‘problem’ and ‘new’ were mixed.  In both 
cases, only the absolute frequency with which a term was used was significant, but the 
number of participants was not.  Surprisingly, Brazilian participants did not mention 
Jeitinho at all, even in the form of paraphrase, despite creativity being one of its three 
factors (Ferreira et al., 2012).  Nonetheless, as in Chapter 3, this result should be 
considered in light of the limitations in relying solely on spontaneous open-ended 
measures to form concept maps.
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Study 9: Creativity of Various Professions
Study 9 aimed to conceptually replicate Study 8’s finding that (a) science is less 
strongly associated with creativity compared to art, and (b) that British participants 
consider art as more typical for creativity than Brazilian participants, but this time using 
a procedure that asked participants to rate how much creativity is needed for each of 12 
professions.  The professions were selected from the art domain, from domains for 
which I considered problem solving to be relevant (everyday life domain), and from the 
science domain.  Of importance, this procedure asked participants to reflect on links 
between creativity and these domains, instead of assessing spontaneous links between 
creativity and the domains, as had been done in Study 8.  I expected that participants 
from both countries would easily recognize creativity in art, once this question was 
posed, relative to the other professions.  At the same time, however, they should differ in 
perceptions of the degree of creativity needed for art versus the other professions.  With 
regard to between-country comparisons, I expected Brazilian participants to evaluate 
professions related to the everyday life domain as more creative compared to British 
participants.  I did not have any hypothesis relating to scientists, because their work can, 
in my understanding, involve both convergent and divergent thinking (i.e., both problem 
solving and artistic aspects).
Method
Power analysis. Based on the results of Study 8, I expected medium to large 
effects.  For the power analysis, I chose the rather conservative effect size of d = .5 and a 
power of .9, which resulted in a minimum sample size of 86 participants per country.
Participants.  Brazilian participants were 154 undergraduate psychology students 
at the Federal University of Paraiba, in João Pessoa, Brazil (113 females, 39 males, 2 did 
not report their gender).  Their mean age was 24.15 years (SD = 7.09, range = 17-58).  
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All participated on a voluntary basis during class.  British participants were 96 
undergraduate psychology students from Cardiff University, United Kingdom (81 
females, 11 males, 4 did not report their gender).  Their mean age was 19.48 years (SD = 
0.73, range = 18-22).  All of them participated for course credit.
Material and procedure. In total, I examined 12 professions.  Six were selected 
from the art domain (craftsman, landscaper, painter, sculptor, singer, and writer), three 
from the science domain (mathematician, philosopher, and scientist), and three from the 
everyday life domain (builder, mechanic, and physician).  Participants were asked to rate 
“How much creativity is needed for each of the following professions”, followed by a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (no creativity) to 7 (very much creativity) with 4 
(moderate amount) as the midpoint.  Brazilian participants completed the study with pen 
and paper in a classroom of approximately 30 students.  The British participants 
completed the survey online.  
Results
The generalized eta square is reported as the effect size for the ANOVA 
designs because of its comparability across a variety of research designs (Olejnik & 
Algina, 2003).  Further, Welch’s t-tests were computed, which are considered to be 
more reliable even if the assumption of variance homogeneity is met (Ruxton, 2006).  
Consistent with previous studies of this thesis, I also reported the PCR and AE as an 
estimator of the similarities between groups. 
Ratings of creativity. I computed a mixed-model ANOVA with country as the 
between-participants factor and the three domains of professions as the within-
participants factor.  The main effect for country was significant, F(1, 248) = 29.19, p < 
.001, = .07, as was the effect for domain, F(2, 496) = 337.89, p < .001, = .36, and 
the interaction, F(2, 496) = 14.75, p < .001, = .02.
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As predicted, Brazilians judged professions from the everyday life domain as 
more creative (M = 4.88, SD = 1.35) compared to British participants (M = 3.94, SD = 
1.01), t(240.04) = 6.31, p < .001, d = 0.77, PCR = 70, AE = .16.  Brazilians also tended 
to judge professions from the art domain as more creative (M = 6.39, SD = 0.73) 
compared to British participants (M = 6.27, SD = 0.51), although this difference did not 
reach statistical significance, t(245.07) = 1.57, p = .12, d = 0.19, PCR = 92, AE = .02.  
Finally, Brazilians judged professions from the science domain as more creative (M = 
5.08, SD = 1.34) compared to British participants (M = 4.39, SD = 1.07), t(233.93) = 
4.46, p < .001, d = 0.55, PCR = 78, AE = .12.  Controlling for age and gender did not 
change the pattern of results. 
Because the pattern of results was not consistent in each domain, Table 4.1 
reports the results separately for each profession.  For example, mathematicians were 
considered as relatively least creative in both countries (M = 4.26 and M = 2.96).  No 
correction for multiple comparisons was used because I had specific hypotheses for 9 of 
the 12 professions and I did not want to lose power (Perneger, 1998).  
Paired within-country t-tests revealed that both in Brazil and the UK creativity 
was considered to be more important for professions from the art domain compared to 
professions from the science domain (ds = 1.21 and 2.25, ps < .001, PCRs = 55 and 26, 
AEs = .22 and .31) and everyday life domain (ds = 1.39 and 2.92, ps < .001, PCRs = 49 
and 14, AEs = .25 and .39).  The within-country differences between the science domain 
and the everyday life domain were small (ds = .14 and .44, ps = .04 and < .001, PCRs = 
94 and 83, AEs = .03 and .08).
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Table 4.3
Comparing the subjective amount of creativity needed for each profession 
between Brazil and the UK.
Brazil UK
Profession M SD M SD df t d 95% CI of d PCR AE
Ev
er
yd
ay
 L
ife
Builder 5.69 1.32 4.49 1.34 205.40 6.85 *** 0.90 0.63, 1.17 65 .20
Mechanic 4.27 1.70 3.82 1.38 235.15 2.24 * 0.28 0.02, 0.54 89 .08
Physician 4.65 1.83 3.50 1.44 240.12 5.54 *** 0.68 0.42, 0.95 73 .19
A
rt
Craftsman 6.75 0.64 6.18 0.89 161.07 5.42 *** 0.76 0.49, 1.03 70 .10
Landscaper 6.46 0.98 6.33 0.85 222.67 1.04 0.13 -0.13, 0.39 95 .02
Painter 6.06 1.34 6.65 0.68 228.80 -4.53 *** -0.53 -0.79, -0.26 79 .10
Sculptor 6.63 0.84 6.60 0.86 200.84 0.26 0.03 -0.23, 0.30 99 .01
Singer 5.77 1.62 5.08 1.45 224.44 3.44 *** 0.44 0.18, 0.70 83 .12
Writer 6.68 0.90 6.75 0.54 247.53 -0.72 -0.08 -0.34, 0.17 97 .01
Sc
ie
nc
e
Mathematician 4.26 1.75 2.96 1.44 231.83 6.33 *** 0.80 0.53, 1.07 69 .22
Philosopher 5.01 1.86 5.70 1.19 244.96 -3.52 *** -0.42 -0.68, -0.16 83 .12
Scientist 5.92 1.57 4.57 1.46 218.47 6.91 *** 0.89 0.62, 1.16 66 .23
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Discussion
Study 9 revealed a hierarchy of professions in terms of the amount of creativity 
perceived to be needed for each of them, revealing a strong art bias.  Participants in both 
countries judged professions from the art domain as needing more creativity compared 
to professions from the other two domains.  More importantly, Brazilians judged 
creativity as more relevant to professions from the everyday life domain (for which I 
considered problem solving to be relevant) and as less relevant to professions from the 
art domain, compared to British participants.  
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Within the British sample, I replicated the findings for the four professions also 
used by Glăveanu (2014): Writers were perceived as most creative, followed by 
painters, philosophers, and mathematicians, who were perceived as least creative.  
Interestingly, within both the art and the science domains, some professions were 
perceived as needing more creativity by Brazilian participants, whereas other 
professions were seen as needing more creativity by British participants.  For example, 
Brazilian participants perceived craftsmen as needing more creativity, whereas British 
participants perceived painters as needing more creativity.  A possible explanation 
relates to the typicality of the disciplines for the category of art.  For example, painter, 
the profession for which I found the strongest effect, may be considered the most typical 
art profession, whereas craftsman and singer are the least typical.  In other words, there 
may be cultural differences in the perceived typicality of the professions.  This is in line 
with findings from cognitive psychology, indicating that more typical members are 
learned and categorized faster (e.g., Medin & Smith, 1984).  
From a similarity perspective, similarities between countries were again larger 
than differences.  The smallest amount of similarity was found for builder, the largest 
for sculptor.  This indicates that Brazilian and British participants had a broadly similar 
understanding of how creative various professions are.  Within the typical mean-
difference framework this finding would have gone unnoticed.  
The within-country comparisons revealed an absolute difference for three out of 
the six comparisons, based on the PCR.  This indicates that the distributions of the art 
and science as well as everyday life domains overlapped less than 50 percent.  However, 
because the AE was in all cases below .50, it cannot be decided whether differences or 
similarities are larger for these within-group comparisons.
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Unlike Study 8, Study 9 found larger similarities between Brazilian and British 
respondents.  However, this might be due to the specific method used.  Another method 
might reveal again larger differences between Brazilians and Britons. I explored this 
possibility in Study 10, using pictures depicting objects related to art, engineering, or 
mathematics.
Study 10: Creativity Needed for Creation of Various Objects
In Study 10, I tested whether presenting pictures depicting objects would result 
in larger differences between Brazilian and British respondents (like Study 8), or would 
result in larger similarities (like Study 9). Further, I was interested whether this method 
would still reveal the art bias in lay conceptions of creativity.  The objects were related 
to art, engineering, or mathematics (e.g., impressionist painting, a steam engine, and 
mathematical formulae or proofs).  Based on the findings of Study 8 and 9, I again 
expected to find that objects related to art would be perceived as more creative, followed 
by engineering and mathematical objects.  I further expected this effect to be stronger in 
Brazil than in the UK.  
Method
Power analysis.  I again assumed an effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.50, resulting in 
a target sample of 86 participants per country with a power of .90.
Participants. Participants were 81 from Brazil with a mean age of 24.50 (SD = 
7.60, 57% female, 11% missing values) and 90 from the UK with a mean age of 18.83 
(SD = 1.02, 91% female, 1% missing).  Brazilian participants were not compensated for 
their participation, and British participants received course credit.
Procedure.  Brazilian participants were recruited via Facebook.  I targeted 
psychology students by posting a short advertisement for the study in psychological 
groups in and around João Pessoa, where data for Studies 8 and 9 were collected.  
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British participants were undergraduate psychology students from Cardiff University.  
All participants completed the survey online.
Material. I selected 26 pictures displaying various objects. Twenty-two were 
chosen to be related to art, engineering, or mathematics.  The remaining 4 pictures were 
included as ‘filler’-pictures, because they were thought to depict low-creativity objects.  
The 22 pictures were categorized by a graduate student of art history.  She categorized 
10 pictures as art related and 12 as related to problem solving or engineering, on the 
grounds that the objects they depict fulfil a specific purpose and consequently solve a 
specific problem.  In a next step, I moved three pictures from the engineering category 
to a separate mathematics category, namely Einstein’s formula E = mc2 written on a 
chalkboard, a mathematical proof, and the chemical formula for vitamin B12.  The 
remaining pictures depicting objects related to engineering were a clamp, a gramophone, 
the structural features of a house, a large and complex traffic junction, a light bulb, a 
plane, many water slides in a swimming pool, a very early steam engine, and a Roman 
aqueduct.  Although engineering is often not perceived as science, it is clearly based on 
physics, mathematics, and chemistry.  The art related objects were 6 paintings 
(Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian man, a Chinese painting, an impressionist painting, a 
modern painting, a large scale painting on the street, and a graffiti by Banksy), 3 
sculptures (Michelangelo’s David, a steel horse, and an African sculpture), and a large 
hedge maze.  The low creativity objects were a buttered slice of toast, a wooden pile, a 
simple wooden bridge made of a few planks, and a campfire.  All pictures can be found 
in Appendix A.
The instructions were “You are going to see different objects that were all 
created by humans. You will be asked to rate the amount of creativity that was needed to 
come up with the idea for the object and the creation of the object.” The item below 
171
each picture used the same wording: “Amount of creativity needed to come up with the 
idea for and the creation of this object”.  Responses were given on a slider ranging from 
0 to 100.  Reliabilities for all three scales (art, engineering/science, and mathematics) 
were ≥ .75 in both countries (Table 4.2).
Results
To test whether the participants understood and followed the instructions, I first 
compared the low creativity pictures with the art related, engineering, and mathematical 
pictures.  Both in Brazil and the UK, the four low creativity items were judged to be 
lower in creativity (ds = 0.97 – 1.84, ps < .001, PCRs = 63 – 36, AEs = .23 – .34, see 
Table 4.2). 
Next, a mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with type of picture (art, 
engineering, and mathematics) as the within-participants factor and country (Brazil vs 
UK) as the between-participants factor.  The main effect for country was significant, 
F(1, 162) = 34.07, p < .001, = .12, as was the effect for domain, F(2, 324) = 13.99, p 
< .001, = .03.  The interaction did not reach significance, F(2, 324) = 0.86, p = .43, 
= .002.
The results of independent sample Welch’s t-tests can be found in Table 4.2.  As 
expected, Brazilian participants rated objects related to engineering as more creative 
than British participants, but surprisingly also did so for the other two categories of 
picture.  
Because the interaction was not significant, the four categories were compared 
using within-participants t-tests across both countries.  All categories differed 
significantly from each other at p < .001, except art and mathematics (p = .93).  Again, 
no corrections for multiple comparisons were used for the reasons stated above (doing 
so would not have changed the pattern of results).
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Table 4.4
Comparison of objects across countries
Brazil UK
M SD α M SD α df t d 95% CI of d PCR AE
Art (10) 72.91 14.57 .84 61.39 12.49 .81 152.68 5.46*** 0.86 0.53, 1.18 67 .12
Engineering (9) 81.53 12.77 .84 66.40 15.00 .85 163.96 7.02*** 1.08 0.75, 1.41 59 .15
Mathematics (3) 73.17 23.37 .75 61.25 22.97 .83 156.37 3.28** 0.51 0.20, 0.83 80 .12
Low creativity (4) 49.67 25.02 .69 32.53 21.30 .68 146.26 4.61*** 0.74 0.42, 1.07 71 .17
Note. Number of items/pictures are in brackets. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Discussion
In Study 10, I found that objects related to engineering were perceived as more 
creative compared to the other three categories.  Furthermore, art and mathematical 
objects were perceived as equally creative.  From a similarity perspective, all between-
and within-country comparisons revealed clearly higher levels of similarity, replicating 
the Study 9 findings that Brazilians and British participants gave relatively similar 
responses.  
Most important, the pattern of results is different from the one observed in Study 
9, where art related professions were judged to be more creative.  This difference 
between studies indicates that the type of stimuli used (names of professions vs. 
pictures) may determine the perceptions of creativity, which raises doubts about the 
generalizability of art bias.  If I had compared only the low creativity objects with the art 
objects, I would have found clear evidence for the art bias in both countries.  It is 
possible that other factors have influenced participants’ ratings, such as the ‘wow-factor’ 
or novelty.  For example, a large-scale painting on the street, displaying a three 
dimensional crevasse (see Appendix A), was rated as most creative of all objects, both 
in Brazil and the UK.  However, if the streets in Brazil and the UK were full of such 
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large-scale paintings, participants would likely have rated the painting in my study as 
less creative. 
This issue calls for more research using a within-study comparison of different 
types of stimuli.  It is not a trivial issue whether inferences about a value like creativity 
depend on whether people imagine an abstract profession or concrete outputs of the 
profession.  In cognition more generally, it is not assumed that processing of exemplars 
will map cleanly from one level or form of representation to another (e.g., from 
linguistic to pictorial).  From a practical perspective, this difference may matter if people 
draw on their inferences about professions when choosing a career as opposed to 
drawing on their inferences about visual depictions of the outputs of these professions.
General Discussion
Across three studies I explored whether (1) there is a bias against science, and 
(2) there is a bias towards art in lay conception of creativity, and (3) the findings can be 
replicated in a non-Western country.  Study 8 revealed a spontaneous association of art 
with creativity, but only in the British sample and not the Brazilian one.  Science or 
scientists were barely spontaneously associated with creativity by participants in either 
country.  In Study 9, both Brazilian and British participants considered professions in 
the art domain as needing more creativity compared to professions in the everyday life 
and science domains.  However, this effect was stronger in the UK than in Brazil.  In 
contrast, in Study 10, I found that in both countries objects related to engineering were 
rated as needing more creativity than were objects related to art.  Further, one of the 
primary outcomes of mathematics, formulae and proofs, were rated as needing the same 
amount of creativity as art objects. 
The results are interesting from a similarity perspective as well.  In Study 8, I 
found that art was spontaneously associated more often with creativity in a British than 
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in a Brazilian sample, revealing an absolute difference.  However, in none of the 
subsequent 16 between-group comparisons was I able to replicate this finding.  Because 
this absolute difference found in Study 8 was based on a relatively small sample (N = 
67) a replication would be desirable before drawing strong conclusions.  
Taken together, these findings support the claim of Henrich et al. (2010) that 
findings need to be replicated outside of Western countries, in that results in all three 
studies differed significantly between Brazil and the UK within the classical difference 
framework (i.e., mean comparison).  This, together with the finding that Brazilians 
judged all objects as requiring more creativity than British participants did, supports the 
claim made by Glăveanu (2010a, 2010b) that perceptions of creativity differ between 
countries.  This finding that Brazilians rated in Study 9 and 10 everything on average as 
more creative can potentially be explained if the material used was more new to 
Brazilians than Britons.  In particular, the objects used in Study 10 are mainly centred 
around Europe (e.g., Michelangelo, steam engine).  Further, there is evidence that 
Brazilians assign higher arousal ratings to emotional photographs compared to US-
Americans (Ribeiro, Pompéia, & Bueno, 2005), which raises the possibility that 
Brazilians may be more easily aroused and impressed than Britons and rated therefore 
the professions and objects as more creative.  
Consequently, findings concerning lay conceptions of creativity should not be 
generalized from one country to another.  This point is also supported in a recent study 
which found some differences between Chinese and US-American participants 
regarding which cues are indicators of creativity: breakthrough, surprise, and potential 
were indicators in both countries, but easy-to-use, feasible, and for-a-mass-market were 
only seen as cues in China (Loewenstein & Mueller, 2016).  
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The current findings also imply that the art bias is not universal and that it 
depends on the method (cf. Glăveanu, 2014).  The art bias was stronger in the UK, 
stronger when the creativity of professions from different domains was rated, and was 
absent when pictures displaying objects from various domains were used.
This leads to an important implication.  If policy makers, companies, and 
teachers want to improve the image of science (Ahlgren & Walberg, 1973; Kind et al., 
2007; Mead & Métraux, 1957), they should display the outcomes of sciences in a 
concrete way.  One possible way to do this would be to utilize the finding that creativity 
is usually perceived as positive (Cropley et al., 2010) and to emphasize that creativity is 
also an important element within science by displaying the outcome of science.  This 
may be especially relevant for students with a lower socioeconomic status, given that 
they are likely to have, almost by definition, a more vague impression of science.  This 
also points to an important limitation of my studies: The participants were mainly 
university students.  Further studies are needed to test whether the findings can be 
replicated in a school student sample and whether they can be used to change attitudes 
towards sciences.  
From a theoretical point of view, the present research raises the question of the 
definition of creativity, because creativity is differently conceived across countries, 
unlike scientific definitions of creativity.  This is in line with previous research which 
has found differences between Chinese and US-American lay conceptions of creativity 
and therefore suggested a need to differentiate between ‘folk creativity’ and the 
scientific study of creativity (cf. Loewenstein & Mueller, 2016).  Differentiating 
between a scientific and lay person understanding of creativity is also important because 
the lay conception of creativity was found to influence how much specific products are 
desired (Paletz & Peng, 2008).
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In summary, results indicate that there are both differences and similarities in 
what is thought of as creative in two countries.  In two studies, I found a bias against 
science – scientists were less strongly associated with creativity compared to art, and I 
also demonstrated in Study 10 how this effect can be reversed.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
Across ten studies, I found considerable similarities across countries and various 
other social categories such as age, education, or religious denominations, supporting 
the moderate universalism claim in cross-cultural research (Berry et al., 2011).  This 
finding applied to both quantitative and qualitative data.  Further, even when differences 
were found, they were not replicated in subsequent studies using different methods. 
A second aim of this thesis was to explore – within the predominant mean 
difference framework – whether the country of origin of people has an influence on how 
human values are instantiated and some potential implications of this results.  Findings 
indicate that the context partly influences on how people instantiate values, but there 
were far more similarities in value instantiation than differences.  
Finally, I tested some implications of differences of value instantiations across 
Brazil, India, and the UK.  Contrary to my expectations, specific differences in 
spontaneous value instantiations were not replicated with the use of more deliberative 
measures, and typicality did not moderate the value-behaviour instantiation link.  
Nevertheless, these studies have important implications, which have been discussed in 
the previous two chapters.  In the following sections, I summarize and discuss the 
implications of all results in a broader context, before suggesting an alternative approach 
to understanding culture.  
Discussion of Chapter 2
The aim of Chapter 2 was threefold: first, to introduce two new effect size 
measures for estimating similarities across groups; second, to test whether similarities 
across groups of various categories are larger than differences; and third, to test whether 
presenting similarity statistics leads to more accurate perceptions of effects in lay 
reading of reports. 
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Summary of Studies 1-3.  In Study 1, I investigated the extent of similarities 
across six categories (countries, religious denominations, age, gender, income, and 
education) and 22 variables in a large dataset, containing data from 60 countries in all 
five inhabited continents.  The average amount of similarity was above 90 percent, with 
countries being least similar (average similarity was 80 percent) in comparison to the 
other categories (e.g., gender).  Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 with another 
large dataset, containing data from 29 European countries.  Finally, Study 3 revealed 
that presenting research by superimposing two normal distributions leads to a more 
accurate estimate of similarities, compared to presenting two columns with confidence 
intervals.  Further, Cohen’s d was judged to be less clear and informative compared to 
the two proposed similarity effect sizes PCR and PCS.
Implications and future directions. Taken together, the results of Studies 1 
and 2 indicate that, to put it provocatively, the findings from previous research have 
been oversold.  Based on significant mean differences, people incorrectly see two or 
more groups as more different than they are (for a similar critique of correlational 
designs, see Gardner & Neufeld, 2013).  This does not mean that mean differences, even 
small ones, are unimportant.  Small effects can still be impressive (Prentice & Miller, 
1992).  For example, cultural values – aggregated value scores on a country-level – are, 
despite the fact that country explains less than 10 percent of the variance (Fischer & 
Schwartz, 2011), still very strong predictors of national indices such as the Human 
Developmental Index, Freedom of Press, or the Global Peace Index (Basabe & Valencia, 
2007; Fischer & Hanke, 2009; Hanel et al., 2016; Schwartz, 2006).  Nonetheless, 
scientists presenting such findings should balance their presentation of mean differences 
with appropriate information about similarity, to avoid leading consumers to have 
exaggerated perceptions of differences.
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Instead of dismissing small effects, I prefer to emphasize the importance of 
transparency in statistical reporting.  In recent years, many calls have been made to 
increase openness and transparency in scientific research (e.g., Morey, Chambers, et al., 
2016; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  However, these calls have focused on 
preregistration, openness, and transparency relating to methodological and general 
statistical issues, such as reporting all variables and conditions, and making the raw data 
and statistical analysis scripts publicly available.  There is still no standard transparent 
way in which statistical findings are reported, even within the classical difference 
framework.  Common effect sizes such as Cohen’s d or those related to the amount of 
explained variance (e.g., R2, , ICC[1]) are often undiscussed or difficult to interpret 
(cf. Sharpe, 2013).  Reporting similarity statistics should increase transparency, because 
they are easily understood in terms of one of the most basic statistical units: percentages.  
The finding that similarities across groups are usually far larger than differences 
has further implications for the interpretation of previous research, which may help us to 
understand the replication crisis better.  To foreshadow, I assume that neither ‘culture’ 
nor most experimental manipulations or interventions have an equivalent impact on all 
participants.  Instead, the influence is mostly limited to a subset of participants.  
Consequently, the predominant approach to reporting psychological findings as an effect 
that either does or does not exist is an oversimplification.  Instead, to increase 
transparency of statistical reporting, the number of participants who differ between 
groups should be estimated.  Just to give two examples: How many Germans have a 
higher trust in science compared to Brazilians? And what is the percentage of 
participants for whom an intervention or experimental manipulation had an effect?  As 
illustrated in Chapter 2, none of the common statistical values (e.g., t and p, Bayes 
factor, Cohen’s d) address these issues.  Reporting similarity effect sizes such as the 
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ones suggested in Chapter 2 should help to put empirical findings into context and lead 
people to evaluate them more appropriately.  If the similarity is 81 percent (d = .48), this 
indicates that the percentage of participants for whom a difference emerged is likely to 
be around 19 percent or smaller.10 Of course, it may also be useful to replace or 
supplement commonly used effect sizes with alternative effect size measures, such as 
the probability of superiority (Ruscio, 2008).  In the current example, 81% similarity 
means that there is a 63% chance that a person drawn at random from the group with the
larger mean will have a higher score a person randomly drawn from the group with the 
smaller mean.  
No longer looking at the results of studies in a dichotomous way – an effect 
either does or does not exist – also fits the fact that effect sizes and p-values vary a lot, 
especially with smaller sample sizes (Halsey et al., 2015; Klein et al., 2014): Group 
affiliations such as being Brazilian or German may only affect a relatively small number 
of participants (e.g., those who are highly identified with their nationality).  Similarly, 
being in an experimental vs. control group may affect only those who are highly 
attentive to the experimental instructions.  If this small number of participants is not in 
the sample, the means will no longer differ significantly.  Consequently, a failure to 
replicate a previous finding can be due not only to dubious research practices (e.g., p-
hacking, selective reporting), but also to the fact that the researchers’ sample of 
participants did not include those individuals (or contexts) for whom the effect occurs.  
Especially in small samples, adding or removing just a few participants can determine 
whether or not an effect is significant.  
10 This is only an estimate, because it is also possible that all participants in one group score 
slightly higher than participants in another group.  However, this interpretation is unlikely, as usually the 
maximum and minimum observed values (e.g., on a Likert scale) are very similar in two groups (see also 
the discussion of the many lab replication project below, Klein et al., 2014).
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Depending on the research question, the focus of a paper could rely more on the 
estimated amount of similarity or on the estimated amount of participants for whom an 
effect worked.  Take the “many labs” replication project as an example (Klein et al., 
2014).  Here, 13 classic and contemporary effects (e.g., anchoring or priming studies) 
were replicated within 36 samples.  For all effects, the effect sizes varied greatly, within 
both US and non-US-samples (i.e., there was large sampling variance).  This indicates 
that a given experimental manipulation (e.g., priming) did not have the same effect in all 
samples.  This can be explained in terms of the effect being stronger for some 
participants than for others.  In the samples with the largest effect sizes, there were more 
participants for whom priming had an effect. 
There is a need for more studies exploring how scientific findings can be best 
communicated, both to scientists and to the general public.  Study 3 supports this 
argument by providing preliminary evidence that the current way of reporting the results 
of scientific studies can lead – at least for some participants – to an overestimation of 
differences: Presenting research by superimposing two normal distributions leads to a 
more accurate estimate of similarities compared to the more common way of presenting 
two columns with confidence intervals.  Also, results further indicate that presenting 
results using Cohen’s d is less clear and informative compared to PCR and PCS.  This 
finding was independent of participants’ educational level and statistical expertise, 
which indicates that even statistical experts would benefit if results were presented using 
similarity effect sizes.
To reduce the likelihood of any negative consequences of portraying research 
findings in a more balanced and transparent way, additional studies could explore which 
effect sizes are most easily understood.  For example, future studies could compare more 
commonly used effect sizes, including the amount of explained variance (e.g., ), the 
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probability of superiority, or even Bayes factors or p-values.  This can be done using the 
types of items used in Study 3 or real world examples, including studies investigating 
which ways of presenting data lead to changes in attitudinal variables, such as attitudes 
towards immigrants.  Furthermore, increased transparency might increase trust in 
science (cf. Rawlins, 2008).  The changes required to report and discuss statistical 
results more transparently could be implemented within the ongoing changes of how to 
increase openness and transparency in data collection and analyses (e.g., Morey, 
Chambers, et al., 2016; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, 
Maas, & Kievit, 2012).  
Discussion of Chapter 3
The studies described in Chapter 3 had two main aims. The first was to explore 
whether people instantiate values differently within and between countries.  The second 
aim was to explore whether differences in how people instantiate values predict different 
associations of values with behaviour intention across countries.  In this subsection, I 
briefly summarize the methods and key findings of each study described in Chapter 3, 
before discussing the implications and future research directions.  An in-depth 
discussion of each study can be found in Chapter 3.
Summary of Studies 4-7.  Study 4 used a qualitative approach to explore 
whether values are differently instantiated across people and countries.  Participants 
were mainly students from Brazil, India, and the UK.  Although the results show some 
differences across countries, the within country differences were larger, replicating 
findings for values on an abstract level (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011).  Results further 
supported the hypothesis that instantiations are partly shaped by contextual factors.
In Study 5, Brazilian and British participants were asked to choose the value that 
best promoted a given instantiation.  In general, participants from both countries 
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selected the value from which the instantiation was originally derived.  For only 5 out of 
138 items, Brazilian and British participants identified different values as promoting a 
specific instantiation, indicating a high degree of shared understanding about the 
associations between various values and behaviours.
The main assumption underlying Study 6 was that people feel more positive 
emotion when value-promoting instantiations are enacted, and more negative emotion 
when value-promoting instantiations are not enacted.  I also assumed that typical 
instantiations are more important, because things that are more important are, I assumed, 
more likely to be mentioned in response to questions about typicality.  However, these 
assumptions were only partly supported by the data from Brazil and the UK.  Only 60 
percent of the significant cases were in the predicted directions, in the sense that 
participants reported a larger difference in self-reported emotions between the promoted 
and negated version of an instantiation when the instantiation was typical.  In the 
remaining 40 percent the pattern was in the opposite direction.  The emotions attached to 
the instantiations in both countries were more similar than different and only varied to a 
limited extent as a function of typicality.  
Study 7 tested whether typicality influences the relations between values and 
behavioural intentions across three countries: Brazil, India, and the UK.  Results 
indicated that the patterns of correlations across countries were more similar than 
different.  However, within the framework of the TPB, values were sometimes 
independent predictors of behavioural intentions.  Typicality did not consistently 
influence value-behaviour relations within the TPB.
Implications and future directions. Chapter 3 showed strong links between the 
value instantiations identified in Study 4 and the values.  That is, the instantiations were 
successfully matched into the values, had partly significant value-congruent emotional 
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impacts, and significant links to behavioural intentions.  At the same time, however, 
these relations were not consistently moderated by the observed typicality of the 
exemplars recorded in Study 4.  That is, people were able to connect even the relatively 
atypical actions to the values.  
Chapter 3 discussed how this pattern may arise under conditions that allow 
people to thoughtfully reflect on the value instantiations.  Aside from this speculation, it 
is possible to draw other implications from these findings.  For instance, Study 4 
demonstrated that people may spontaneously associate different behaviours with each 
abstract value.  This supports Wittgenstein’s (1922) claim that many (philosophical) 
problems can be explained through linguistic misunderstandings.  Take the value of 
protecting the environment, for example.  If a Brazilian, an Indian, and a British person 
were to talk about the importance of protecting the environment, they might easily talk 
past each other, because they could have partially different understandings of it.  For 
example, the Briton might refer to protecting the environment as entailing the reduction 
of carbon emissions, whereas the Brazilian and Indian individuals might refer to putting 
rubbish into a bin.  (Of course, this difference is important even if other aforementioned 
factors, such as conversational norms, make the spontaneous elicitation of instantiations 
an imperfect way of mapping concepts.)
One conclusion from Study 4 is therefore that debate, discussion, and 
behavioural change interventions may be more constructive if they link the abstract 
values being considered with their more concrete exemplars.  Linking actions to abstract 
values carries a prescriptive, motivational impetus, which can predict behaviour 
independently of attitudes, norms, and other constructs often used to predict behaviour 
(Maio & Olson, 2000; Schwartz & Tessler, 1972).  By making values’ connections to an 
action explicit, people can reason through their relevant attitudes and intentions to 
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achieve better fit with their values. This approach would support intervention programs, 
which must deal with the fact that several behaviours are closely linked to values.  For 
example, protecting the environment is usually considered to be an important value 
(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), but can be linked to a variety of behaviours.  Nonetheless, 
some behaviours are more damaging to the environment than others.  For example, it 
may be more beneficial to alert participants to the fact that avoiding short distance 
flights or installing good heat insulation are effective ways of protecting the 
environment, instead of simply reminding people that protecting the environment is 
important.  Most people already agree that this value is important, and they might 
imagine less impactful behaviours (e.g., recycling) as showing their support for the
value.  Highlighting particular important behaviours in connection with the value may 
help to change the motivational impetus attached to the important actions and their 
perceived typicality with respect to the value.  
The findings of Study 4 further demonstrate that value instantiations are partly 
influenced by the context in which participants live (e.g., country).  This finding can 
potentially contribute to our understanding of the genesis of human values (cf. Joas, 
2000).  Although values are very similar across countries (see Studies 1 & 2), the 
relatively small differences are, as stated above, still surprisingly strongly related on a 
national level to national indices, such as economic development (Schwartz, 2006).  
This indicates that personal experiences can shape the self-rated importance of values,
albeit to a small degree.  Figure 5.1 presents a model of how personal experiences come 
to shape human values and importance ratings.  The basic premise of this model is that 
children do not ‘possess’ values at an abstract level (cf. Döring, Blauensteiner, Aryus, 
Drögekamp, & Bilsky, 2010); instead, they have personal experiences which are later 
combined into abstract values.  For example, they may celebrate religious festivals 
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annually or bake the same cake every time they visit their grandparents.  At some point, 
children learn that these experiences are related to respecting traditions.  If they are, 
perhaps when they are university students, and asked to think about the importance of 
their values, they may evaluate how much they like the experiences they associate with 
each of the values.  If the experiences associated with a specific value are judged to be 
positive and relevant, participants are more likely to rate this value as high in 
importance.  Which behaviours and experiences are associated with values differs across 
participants, as the results of Study 4 indicate.
Figure 5.1. A model of the genesis of abstract values and importance ratings.  PE 
stands for personal experiences.
This model has two main implications.  First, when participants rate how 
important a value is to them, they are not actually rating the value itself (e.g., respect for 
tradition or equality), but rather the personal experiences that they associate with the 
value.  Second, personal experiences and how they are evaluated differ across countries 
and this could account for differences in value importance ratings.  For example, in 
societies that value tradition, people are more likely, by definition, to have many 
traditions that are personally experienced.  This influence of the society on the person 
may in turn contribute to the higher importance attached to tradition, as the experiences 
shape the common endorsement of the value (Hanel, Easterbrook, et al., 2016; Schwartz, 
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2006).  Presumably, many of the instantiations mentioned by the participants in Study 4 
are personal experiences, which, although the design of Study 4 suggests otherwise, may 
be encountered before the values developed on an abstract level.  In theory, this 
reciprocal relationship between the person and his or her social environment has a 
powerful effect on the commonalities in mental representations of values.
This process leads to an intriguing question: Do different instantiations cause 
differences in importance ratings of values?  For example, are people who value security 
more likely to think about the benefits (e.g., lower crime rate) arising from instantiations 
that promote this value, whereas those who do not value security highly think more 
about the potential risks (e.g., loss of freedom) arising from instantiations that promote 
this value when completing a value survey?  This reasoning is in line with the finding of 
Asch (1940).  He found that participants who ranked politicians as more likeable had 
more popular politicians in mind compared to those who ranked politicians as less 
likeable.  This further implies that priming some value instantiations may lead to greater 
endorsement of the values than other (equally applicable) value instantiations. To my 
knowledge, this effect of value instantiations remains to be explored (but see Seligman 
& Katz, 1996, for a related design).
Discussion of Chapter 4
Chapter 4 further explored two findings from Study 4: (1) neither Brazilian nor 
British participants associated science with creativity, and (2) British participants more 
often spontaneously associated art with creativity than did Brazilian participants.  
Summary of Studies 8 to 10
Study 8 found that art was more spontaneously associated with creativity among 
British than Brazilian participants.  Science and scientists were not spontaneously 
associated with creativity, both in Brazil and in the UK.  In Study 9, I found that artistic 
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professions were perceived to be more creative compared to professions from everyday 
life and science domains.  This effect was stronger in the British than in the Brazilian 
sample.  However, when actual objects were displayed, this effect reversed in both 
countries (Study 10).  Objects related to engineering – but not mathematics – were 
perceived as more creative compared to art-related objects. This is an interesting case 
where novel, somewhat atypical exemplars of a value actually lead to stronger 
inferences about the value, and it invites further exploration in future research.
Implications and future directions.  Notwithstanding the theoretical questions 
raised in Chapter 4, there are interesting applied implications.  Chapter 4 considered 
how the positive image of creativity (Cropley et al., 2010) could be used to improve the 
perception of science.  If concrete outcomes of scientific research are displayed (e.g., 
steam engine) and the amount of creativity needed to come up with the idea for the 
product is emphasized, spill-over effects from the positive image of creativity to science 
could be created.  
This assumption is based on two underlying mechanisms.  First, in creativity 
research a fixed mindset is distinguished from the growth mindset – these are differently 
related to problem solving.  For example, a fixed mindset was found to be negatively 
related to problem solving (Karwowski, 2014).  Second, this distinction can be used to 
reduce the influence of stereotype threat:  Seeing intelligence as malleable rather than 
fixed resulted in a lower influence of the stereotype threat and higher enjoyment of the 
academic process (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002).  As noted in the introduction to 
Chapter 4, equating creativity with artistic talent may result in the ‘golem effect’ (Babad 
et al., 1982), a form of self-fulfilling prophecy whereby low expectations result in low 
achievement.  This might arise because, for example, parents may think of their children 
as creative when they are artistic.  If a child cannot draw, parents may not regard the 
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child as creative (Runco, 2007).  Hence, this process is very similar to the one described 
in the stereotype threat literature (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  Thus, equating creativity 
with skills other than artistic talent might result in seeing creativity as more malleable 
and, consequently, reduce the golem effect (Aronson et al., 2002).  My findings suggest 
this may be particularly important in the UK and less so in Brazil, where the link 
between creativity and art is weaker. 
Rethinking the Concept of Culture
Culture is the most often used construct in cross-cultural research.  It has been 
defined in various ways, for example by Hofstede (2001) as the “the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
people from another” (p. 9).  Culture further determines “the uniqueness of a human 
group in the same way personality determines the uniqueness of an individual” (p. 10).  
This definition of Hofstede has been challenged, because the assumption that there exist 
both “substantial within-group agreement and between-group differences” (Schwartz, 
2014b, p. 6) has been empirically rebutted.  For both personality traits and values, 
within-country variability has been found to be 9 to 15 times larger than between-
country variability (Allik, 2005; Berry et al., 2011; Fischer & Schwartz, 2011).  Based 
on these and other similar findings (see Chapter 1), it has been argued that larger 
differences can be found between groups with a different socioeconomic background 
(Greenfield, 2014) or across variables other than values (Morris, 2014).  
However, both Greenfield (2014) and Morris (2014), as well as most other 
researchers who claimed to have found large differences across countries (cf. Chapter 
1), based their conclusions on comparisons between means and the rules of thumb 
proposed by Cohen (1992) concerning when an effect size should be called small, 
medium, or large.  In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that equating mean differences with 
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group differences is mostly unjustified because even “highly significant” differences 
between means usually involve large similarities between the groups in question.  In 
fact, the average similarity found in Studies 1 and 2 across various categories and 
variables was above 90 percent.  Also, the within-country variability in how values are 
instantiated is substantially larger than the between-country variability (Chapter 3) and 
such differences were not replicated when another method was used (Studies 9 and 10).  
Nevertheless, in Studies 1 and 2 some differences between countries were found for 
variables such as moral attitudes towards personal-sexual issues.  Further, as stated in 
the Discussion of Chapter 2, studying other variables or participant groups might have 
resulted in smaller similarities, and perhaps even stronger evidence of differences.  
Based on these findings and reflections, I propose a more flexible view of 
culture: Individuals or groups of individuals belong to different cultures if they are more 
different than similar on a specific variable, following the taxonomy proposed in 
Chapter 2.  If all or most members of two groups differ from each other on a specific 
variable, they belong to different cultures.  For example, in Study 1, I found that 
Pakistanis, on the one hand, and Dutch and Swedish participants, on the other, displayed 
medium-sized differences in their moral attitudes towards personal-sexual issues such as 
abortion or homosexuality.  However, for many other variables (cf. Table A1), the 
similarities between these groups were again larger than the differences.  This means 
that the majority of Pakistani and Dutch/Swedish participants belong to different 
cultures, but only with regard of moral attitudes towards personal-sexual issues.  For 
many other variables, they are culturally the same.  
In a similar manner, the UK and most European countries belong to both similar 
and different cultures.  They belong to different cultures with regard to the side of the 
road on which people drive, currency, language, and the size of university tuition fees.  
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However, with regard to many other societal, political, and psychological variables, they 
belong to the same culture (see also www.oecd.org).  To phrase it more broadly: If two 
groups of people differ along variable X, they belong to two cultures on X.  There is 
little empirical support for the default approach in cross-cultural research, which is to 
ascribe people living in one country a lot of attributes simply because this country 
differs from other countries in terms of mean scores on an abstract dimension.  In 
Chapter 1, I cited several studies in which researchers failed to find differences between 
so-called individualistic and collectivistic countries, despite the fact that differences 
were or could have been expected based on differences in the individualism-collectivism 
dimension (e.g., Berry et al., 2011; A. P. Fiske, 2002; Georgas et al., 2006; Lee & 
Johnson-Laird, 2006; Nisbett, 2004).  In other words, people should be distinguished 
directly on psychological variables, rather than using demographic ones (e.g., country of 
origin) to infer psychological differences.
This view of culture as variable dependent can stimulate more empirically driven 
research.  For example, the large similarities found between Eastern and Western 
countries on individualism (e.g., self-direction) and collectivism (e.g., tradition values) 
also indicate that approximately half of the participants in a Western country (e.g., USA) 
score higher on individualism than half of the participants of an Eastern country (e.g., 
Japan) – and vice versa.  A large cluster-analysis could be used to explore what 
distinguishes those scoring high on individualism from those scoring low on it (e.g., 
type of profession).  This could also be done across many categories and variables to 
find groups of people who differ on one or more variables.  
Limitations
Before drawing some general conclusions, I want to acknowledge two general 
limitations.  Firstly, when I claim that similarities are larger than differences, I actually 
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mean “similarities between the groups of people investigated here (e.g., Brazilians and
Indians or low vs. higher educated people from 60 countries) and the around 60 
variables used across the 10 studies.”  That is, knowing the country of origin or the 
education level of an individual does not say much about his or her attitudes or about 
how he or she instantiates values.  It does not mean that people are similar to each other 
or that countries are similar on all variables.  
This aside, it could be argued that those findings do not matter.  A person might 
therefore ask why should it matter if various groups of people hold the same human 
values or have a similar degree of trust in science.  Instead, it could be argued that it 
matters more to distinguish between individuals who differ on other variables such as 
advocating the capital punishment or flying short-distances instead of relying on public 
transportation.  Furthermore, a focus on similarities is not possible if people are 
separated into two distinct, non-overlapping groups defined by the variable of interest.  
Nevertheless, people and scientists use group categories to makes sense of patterns in 
variables.  Thus, for most variables used in psychology and the social and medical 
sciences, a focus on similarities is meaningful and increases transparency in the 
reporting of statistical analyses regarding groups.
Another limitation is that Studies 4 to 10 relied on student samples.  The extent 
to which the quantitative Studies 4 to 9 can be generalised to the public is unclear.  
Therefore, I conducted another study addressing whether the results from student 
samples can be generalised to the general public across a range of variables. The 
resulting paper is currently under revision (Hanel & Vione, 2016) and can be found in 
Appendix B.  There, I use the mean-difference framework to test whether differences 
between student samples and the general public exist and, if so, whether the differences 
are systematic.  Across 59 countries and 12 personality (Big-5) and attitudinal variables, 
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I found that differences between students and general public were quite substantial, with 
the differences contradicting previous findings.  The differences between the students 
and general public could not, contrary to my expectations, be explained by two 
frequently used cultural variables, embeddedness and intellectual autonomy (Schwartz, 
2006). 
In summary, the results indicate that generalising from students to the general 
public is problematic when personality and attitudinal variables are used, because 
students differ from the general public in ways that are not systematic.  Consequently, 
the findings of Studies 4 to 10 need to be replicated with more general samples.  That is, 
when students of countries A and B differ statistically significantly from each other, this 
does not mean that the general public of countries A and B also differ significantly from 
each other (see the example in discussion section of Appendix B).  
Finally, another limitation is that the similarity statistics described here are only 
applicable to group comparisons.  Continuous variables (e.g., age) had to be grouped in 
a reasoned but somewhat arbitrary manner in order to facilitate the comparisons.  Future 
studies are also needed to develop similarity statistics for advanced correlational designs 
(e.g., multiple regression).  One possibility could be to reframe the amount of explained 
variance in terms of the degree of similarity between variables.
Final Conclusions 
Throughout history, people have thought of foreigners as being different.  For 
example, the ancient Greeks tended to consider all foreign people to be barbarians, and 
inferior to themselves, and the Chinese of the Han dynasty regarded foreigners as 
illiterate nomads (Harrison, 2002).  Even today people from other countries are 
perceived as different and as inferior but threatening.  These prejudicial views may 
ironically be supported in part by the scientific obsession with difference (Fanelli, 2010; 
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Open Science Collaboration, 2015), even in cross-cultural research (Brouwers et al., 
2004).  Researchers usually compare group means and, if they are different, they tend to 
conclude that the groups themselves are also different.  However, the differences are 
often tiny in magnitude in comparison to the similarities, as I demonstrated mainly in 
Chapter 2 but also in other chapters.  For a more balanced portrayal of research findings, 
similarities between groups should be reported and discussed alongside the differences.  
Emphasizing similarities when communicating with the general public would 
arguably make it harder to discriminate against others.  This strategy is already 
commonly used by newspapers, the police, and politicians who seek to dismiss claims 
that foreigners or refugees engage in more criminal activity than the indigenous 
population (Bell, Machin, & Fasani, 2010; Townsend, 2013).  Extending this practice to 
values, attitudes, and other psychological variables is likely to benefit tolerance and 
social integration and can be achieved quite easily. 
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Appendix A – Material and Tables
Table of Contents
- Materials for Chapters 2
- Tables of Detailed Results – Chapter 2
- Tables of Detailed Results – Chapter 3
- Pictures used in Study 10
Materials for Chapter 2
Wordings of the items of the different factors as reported in the official SPSS datasets 
of the World Values Survey (Study 1) and European Social Survey (Study 2).  The exact 
wordings and positions in the questionnaire can be found on the webpages of the two surveys 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp and 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6) 
Measures in Study 1
Items used in WVS-factors
Trust in people you know: (1) How much you trust: Your family; (2) How much you 
trust: Your neighbourhood; (3) How much you trust: People you know personally
Trust in strangers: (1) How much you trust: People you meet for the first time; (2) 
How much you trust: People of another religion; (3) How much you trust: People of another 
nationality.
Understanding of democracy: Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the 
poor; (2) Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections; (3) Democracy: People 
receive state aid for unemployment; (4) Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty from 
state oppression; (5) Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal; (6) Democracy: 
Women have the same rights as men.
Confidence in political institutions: (1) [How much] Confidence [do you have in]: 
The police; (2) Confidence: The courts; (3) Confidence: The government (in your nation’s 
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capital); (4) Confidence: Political Parties; (5) Confidence: Parliament; (6) Confidence: The 
civil service.
Perceived respect of the own society towards elderly: (1) People over 70: are seen as 
friendly [by own society]; (2) People over 70: are seen as competent [by own society]; (3) 
People over 70: viewed with respect [by own society].
Ageism: (1) Older people get more than their fair share from the government; (2) 
Older people are a burden on society; (3) Companies that employ young people perform 
better than those that employ people of different ages; (4) Old people have too much political 
influence.
Trust in Science: (1) Science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier, 
and more comfortable; (2) Because of science and technology, there will be more 
opportunities for the next generation; (3) The world is better off, or worse off, because of 
science and technology.
Science skepticism: (1) We depend too much on science and not enough on faith; (2) 
One of the bad effects of science is that it breaks down people’s ideas of right and wrong; (3) 
It is not important for me to know about science in my daily life.
Attitudes towards personal-sexual issues: (1) [Do you think it is] Justifiable: 
Homosexuality; (2) Justifiable: Prostitution; (3) Justifiable: Abortion; (4) Justifiable: 
Divorce; (5) Justifiable: Sex before marriage; (6) Justifiable: Suicide; (7) Justifiable: 
Euthanasia.
Attitudes towards dishonest-illegal issues: (1) Justifiable: Claiming government 
benefits to which you are not entitled; (2) Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public transport; (3) 
Justifiable: Stealing property; (4) Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance; (5) 
Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.
197
Attitudes towards (domestic) violence: (1) Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife; (2) 
Justifiable: Parents beating children; (3) Justifiable: Violence against other people.
Political attitudes.  Self-positioning in political scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right).
Measures in Study 2
To facilitate the computation of our factors, I report below the SPSS labels as 
provided in the data file of the ESS.
Political activities.  (1) Contacted politician or government official last 12 months; (2) 
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months; (3) Worked in another organization 
or association last 12 months; (4) Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months; 
(5) Signed petition last 12 months; (6) Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 
months.
Attitudes towards immigrants.  (1) Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic 
group as majority; (2) Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from 
majority; (3) Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe; (4) 
Immigration bad or good for country's economy; (5) Country's cultural life undermined or 
enriched by immigrants; (6) Immigrants make country worse or better place to live.
Feeling depressed.  (1) Felt depressed, how often past week; (2) Felt everything did as 
effort, how often past week; (3) Sleep was restless, how often past week; (4) Felt lonely, how 
often past week; (5) Felt sad, how often past week; (6) Could not get going, how often past 
week; (7) Felt anxious, how often past week.
Subjective happiness.  (1) Were happy, how often past week; (2) Enjoyed life, how 
often past week; (3) Had lot of energy, how often past week; (4) Felt calm and peaceful, how 
often past week.
Feeling optimistic.  (1) Always optimistic about my future; (2) In general feel very 
positive about myself; (3) Free to decide how to live my life; (4) Feel accomplishment from 
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what I do; (5) There are a lot of things I am good at; (6) Feel what I do in life is valuable and 
worthwhile.  
Pessimistic worldview.  (1) Little chance to show how capable I am; (2) When things 
go wrong in my life it takes a long time to get back to normal; (3) Hard to be hopeful about 
the future of the world; (4) For most people in country life is getting worse.
Trust in other people (bipolar scale).  (1) Most people can be trusted or you can't be 
too careful; (2) Most people try to take advantage of you or try to be fair; (3) Most of the time 
people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves.
Trust in political institutions.  (1) Trust in the country's parliament; (2) Trust in the 
legal system; (3) Trust in the police; (4) Trust in politicians; (5) Trust in political parties; (6) 
Trust in the European Parliament; (7) Trust in the United Nations.
Relationships with neighbours.  (1) Feel people in local area help one another; (2) 
Feel people treat you with respect; (3) Feel close to the people in local area.
Relationships with other people.  (1) Feel appreciated by people you are close to; (2) 
Receive help and support from people you are close to; (3) Provide help and support to 
people you are close to.
Trust in democratic rights.  (1) Citizens have the final say on political issues by 
voting directly in referendums; (2) The courts treat everyone the same; (3) The courts are 
able to stop the government acting beyond its authority; (4) Governing parties are punished in 
elections when they have done a bad job; (5) The government protects all citizens against 
poverty; (6) The government explains its decisions to voters; (7) The government takes 
measures to reduce differences in income levels.
Trust in democratic processes.  (1) National elections are free and fair; (2) Voters 
discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote; (3) Different political 
parties offer clear alternatives to one another; (4) Opposition parties are free to criticise the 
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government; (5) The media are free to criticise the government; (6) The media provide 
citizens with reliable information to judge the government.
Political attitudes.  Placement on a political left right scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
Religiosity.  (1) Belonging to a particular religion or denomination; (2) How religious 
are you? (3) How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions? (4) 
How often do you pray apart from religious services?
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Tables of Detailed Results, Chapter 2
The following tables provide detailed results for each category, variable, and statistic.  
Tables A1 to A6 provide results for Study 1, A7 to A12 results for Study 2.
Tables Study 1
Table A1
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 12 other variables between countries
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .37 1.76 85 36 19 38 80 17 3 31 .20 .40
Tradition (25) .41 2.65 84 31 16 19 79 12 2 15 .20 .60
Conformity (4) .32 2.03 87 40 20 31 82 15 1 26 .20 .60
Benevolence (2) .35 2.42 86 35 18 23 80 16 2 19 .20 .60
Universalism .32 1.87 87 40 21 35 82 18 2 28 .20 .40
Self-direction (1) .29 1.74 88 43 23 38 82 14 1 37 .20 .60
Stimulation (8) .32 2.05 87 39 20 31 80 10 1 27 .20 .60
Hedonism (32) .45 1.98 82 29 15 32 78 10 1 36 .20 .60
Achievement (33) .41 2.63 84 31 15 19 78 12 1 20 .20 .80
Power (46) .50 2.40 80 26 13 23 76 7 .5 24 .20 .60
Trust in known people .34 1.83 86 37 19 36 82 23 6 40 0 .33
Trust in strangers (2) .41 2.22 84 34 17 27 80 13 1 28 .11 .56
Understanding of 
democracy
.39 1.98 84 35 18 32 80 16 3 25 .09 .39
Confidence in political 
institutions (46)
.51 3.09 80 26 12 12 76 10 1 16 .11 .64
Perceived respect for 
elderly
.31 2.19 88 41 23 27 83 23 4 31 .08 .50
Ageism .47 1.85 82 27 15 36 78 13 2 31 .08 .33
Trust in science .31 1.60 88 40 23 42 83 22 3 39 .07 .37
Skepticism towards 
science
.36 1.81 86 37 19 36 82 18 2 35 .07 .37
Morality: attitudes 
towards personal-
sexual issues (75)
.73 3.79 71 19 9 6 67 14 4 12 .17 .67
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Morality: attitudes 
towards dishonest-
illegal issues
.36 1.87 86 36 18 35 87 38 16 31 .07 .33
Morality: attitudes 
towards (domestic) 
violence
.44 3.42 83 32 17 9 82 31 14 11 .07 .41
Left-right attitude .25 1.43 90 50 30 47 80 9 .07 43 .11 .33
Average .39 2.21 84 35 18 29 80 16 3 29 .14 .50
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of countries that differ significantly 
(absolute difference).
Table A2
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 12 other variables between religious denominations 
across 56 countries
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .22 .57 91 57 29 78 87 43 14 70 0 0
Tradition .30 .68 88 46 18 73 86 32 0 68 0 .20
Conformity .25 .73 90 50 18 72 87 46 11 67 0 .20
Benevolence .23 .76 91 50 18 70 87 43 7 67 0 .20
Universalism .19 .52 92 71 39 80 90 54 11 75 0 .20
Self-direction .15 .49 94 71 46 80 90 50 14 78 0 .20
Stimulation .25 .68 90 50 21 73 88 36 4 72 .20 .40
Hedonism .30 .81 88 43 21 69 86 39 7 66 0 .40
Achievement .24 .78 90 50 21 70 88 43 7 67 .20 .20
Power .32 .74 87 39 21 71 86 25 0 71 .20 .40
Trust in known people .19 .61 92 57 25 76 89 43 14 72 0 .11
Trust in strangers .26 .74 90 50 21 71 88 43 0 72 .11 .22
Understanding of 
democracy
.25 .88 90 50 29 66 90 46 7 66 .07 .20
Confidence in 
political institutions 
.31 .77 88 43 29 70 86 25 4 68 .08 .17
Perceived respect for 
elderly
.14 .32 94 86 43 87 93 68 29 84 .08 .08
Ageism .37 1.02 85 32 21 61 85 25 11 60 .08 .17
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Trust in science .29 1.04 89 39 21 60 87 32 7 54 .08 .26
Skepticism towards 
science
.11 .30 96 93 54 88 92 64 21 82 .04 .07
Morality: attitudes 
towards personal-
sexual issues 
.38 1.37 85 32 18 49 82 21 7 47 .11 .29
Morality: attitudes 
towards dishonest-
illegal issues
.14 .92 94 71 43 64 94 75 43 61 .04 .24
Morality: attitudes 
towards (domestic) 
violence
.29 1.17 89 43 18 56 87 39 14 63 .07 .22
Left-right attitude .16 .51 94 68 36 80 86 32 0 75 0 .22
Average .24 .75 90 54 28 71 88 42 10 68 .06 .21
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Table A3
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 12 other variables between different income classes
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .03 .11 99 100 100 96 96 93 60 88 0 0
Tradition .05 .18 98 100 91 93 95 69 56 85 0 0
Conformity .04 .12 99 100 100 95 97 80 62 86 0 0
Benevolence .08 .27 97 98 73 89 95 82 49 83 0 0
Universalism .05 .17 98 100 76 93 96 82 60 87 0 0
Self-direction .15 .37 94 69 38 85 91 56 18 83 .20 .20
Stimulation .18 .41 93 67 38 84 91 53 18 82 .20 .20
Hedonism .15 .36 94 73 40 86 91 69 18 84 0 0
Achievement .14 .35 94 71 38 86 91 58 20 83 0 .20
Power .20 .50 92 58 27 80 89 47 13 77 .20 .40
Trust in known 
people
.08 .25 97 100 69 90 94 93 40 89 0 0
Trust in strangers .13 .38 95 87 49 85 93 80 27 82 0 .11
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Understanding of 
democracy
.11 .27 96 98 60 89 92 78 27 83 .02 .06
Confidence in 
political institutions 
.19 .47 93 64 33 81 92 62 22 81 .06 .14
Perceived respect for 
elderly
.08 .22 97 100 78 91 94 73 40 85 0 .08
Ageism .09 .29 97 87 58 88 95 84 56 86 0 0
Trust in science .19 .46 92 67 36 82 91 60 22 79 .04 .11
Skepticism towards 
science
.06 .15 97 100 84 94 92 69 36 80 .04 .04
Morality: attitudes 
towards personal-
sexual issues 
.06 .27 98 98 78 89 94 98 49 88 .02 .06
Morality: attitudes 
towards dishonest-
illegal issues
.09 .33 96 91 64 87 96 100 64 90 .02 .04
Morality: attitudes 
towards (domestic) 
violence
.09 .18 97 100 69 93 95 100 51 90 .04 .08
Left-right attitude .17 .55 93 67 33 78 84 33 13 71 .11 .22
Average .11 .30 96 86 61 88 93 73 37 84 .04 .09
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Table A4
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 12 other variables between educational groups
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .06 .21 98 100 83 92 96 86 58 87 0 0
Tradition .15 .39 94 81 42 84 93 67 31 80 0 0
Conformity .06 .17 98 100 94 93 96 92 64 88 0 0
Benevolence .07 .21 97 100 86 92 96 97 67 88 0 0
Universalism .05 .14 98 100 94 94 96 97 56 89 0 0
Self-direction .13 .40 95 92 50 84 94 83 31 85 .10 .20
Stimulation .13 .28 95 92 47 89 92 75 31 86 0 .20
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Hedonism .07 .29 97 97 69 88 95 94 42 86 0 0
Achievement .04 .11 98 100 100 96 96 100 78 92 0 0
Power .06 .16 97 100 86 94 94 92 42 88 0 0
Trust in known 
people
.07 .24 97 100 67 90 95 78 44 86 0 0
Trust in strangers .15 .42 94 81 42 83 93 75 25 82 0 .11
Understanding of 
democracy
.07 .21 97 100 81 92 95 94 50 88 .02 .04
Confidence in 
political institutions 
.04 .12 98 100 100 95 96 97 58 89 .06 .06
Perceived respect for 
elderly
.04 .15 98 100 97 94 96 100 64 90 0 .08
Ageism .13 .48 95 83 47 81 94 81 39 82 0 .11
Trust in science .14 .39 95 89 47 85 95 89 47 86 .04 .07
Skepticism towards 
science
.12 .36 95 86 56 86 95 83 56 85 .04 .07
Morality: attitudes 
towards personal-
sexual issues 
.23 .67 91 52 25 74 90 50 17 68 .06 .19
Morality: attitudes 
towards dishonest-
illegal issues
.08 .21 97 100 86 92 97 100 89 92 .02 .03
Morality: attitudes 
towards (domestic) 
violence
.12 .46 95 83 61 82 95 78 50 79 .04 .11
Left-right attitude .05 .18 98 100 89 93 95 94 44 90 0 .11
Average .09 .28 96 93 70 89 95 86 49 86 .02 .06
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Table A5
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 12 other variables between gender
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .08 97 96 0
Tradition .06 98 97 0
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Conformity .04 98 98 0
Benevolence .01 100 98 0
Universalism .04 98 98 0
Self-direction .11 95 95 .20
Stimulation .25 90 89 .20
Hedonism .08 97 97 0
Achievement .14 95 95 0
Power .14 94 94 0
Trust in known people .04 98 99 0
Trust in strangers .04 98 98 0
Understanding of democracy .07 97 97 .02
Confidence in political 
institutions 
.03 99 99 .02
Perceived respect for elderly .01 100 99 0
Ageism .10 96 95 0
Trust in science .05 98 98 .04
Skepticism towards science .06 98 97 .04
Morality: attitudes towards 
personal-sexual issues 
.00 100 99 0
Morality: attitudes towards 
dishonest-illegal issues
.06 . 98 98 .02
Morality: attitudes towards 
(domestic) violence
.12 95 95 .04
Left-right attitude .01 99 96 0
Average .07 97 97 .03
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Table A65  
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 12 other variables between age cohorts
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .05 .12 98 100 100 95 97 100 93 94 0 0
Tradition .05 .13 98 100 98 95 98 100 93 94 0 0
Conformity .03 .10 99 100 100 96 98 100 100 96 0 0
Benevolence .05 .17 98 100 93 93 97 100 91 93 0 0
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Universalism .03 .07 99 100 100 97 98 100 100 96 0 0
Self-direction .18 .52 93 71 36 80 92 64 31 78 .20 .20
Stimulation .30 .90 88 42 18 65 87 38 16 64 .20 .40
Hedonism .21 .73 91 56 29 71 91 56 27 72 .20 .40
Achievement .25 .75 90 49 22 71 90 51 20 71 0 .20
Power .26 .75 90 49 20 71 90 53 18 70 .20 .40
Trust in known people .09 .30 97 93 69 88 97 98 73 90 0 0
Trust in strangers .07 .23 97 100 78 91 97 100 73 90 0 0
Understanding of 
democracy
.08 .25 97 100 73 90 97 100 71 90 .02 .06
Confidence in political 
institutions 
.03 .12 99 100 100 95 98 100 84 93 0 .06
Perceived respect for 
elderly
.03 .08 99 100 100 97 98 100 100 97 0 0
Ageism .15 .49 94 71 42 81 93 64 31 77 0 .08
Trust in science .04 .15 98 100 93 94 97 100 91 93 0 .04
Skepticism towards science .02 .09 99 100 100 96 98 100 100 95 0 .04
Morality: attitudes towards 
personal-sexual issues 
.05 .15 98 100 98 94 97 100 80 94 .02 .04
Morality: attitudes towards 
dishonest-illegal issues
.14 .46 94 76 40 82 94 78 44 83 .02 .09
Morality: attitudes towards 
(domestic) violence
.16 .46 94 76 40 82 93 67 36 81 .04 .11
Left-right attitude .03 .07 99 100 100 97 98 100 100 96 0 .11
Average .10 .32 96 86 70 87 95 85 67 87 .04 .10
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Tables Study 2
Table A7 
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 14 other variables between countries
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .41 1.62 84 32 16 42 82 20 4 38 .10 .40
Tradition .34 1.27 86 38 19 53 84 27 6 54 .10 .20
Conformity .28 1.28 89 46 23 52 87 34 7 52 .10 .30
Benevolence .31 1.50 88 42 21 45 84 29 5 47 .10 .30
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Universalism .30 1.37 88 44 23 49 87 34 11 54 .07 .27
Self-direction .24 .95 90 50 25 64 88 38 8 61 .10 .20
Stimulation .15 .68 94 74 42 73 91 54 8 74 .10 .20
Hedonism .33 .98 87 40 19 62 85 24 3 61 .10 .30
Achievement .40 1.64 84 34 17 41 83 26 2 37 .10 .40
Power .40 1.47 84 33 18 46 83 26 4 48 .10 .40
Political activities .36 1.91 86 36 19 34 90 49 25 48 0 .33
Attitudes towards 
immigrants
.41 2.06 84 33 16 30 82 17 3 36 .09 .42
Feeling depressed .33 1.48 87 37 17 46 84 30 10 36 .05 .24
Subjective happiness .24 .89 91 52 27 66 87 31 3 64 .08 .17
Feeling optimistic .26 .83 90 49 24 68 87 34 9 65 .04 .13
Pessimistic world view .49 2.00 81 26 13 32 81 22 6 38 .06 .38
Trust in other people .52 1.81 80 25 11 37 78 19 3 38 .10 .33
Trust in political 
institutions
.55 2.28 78 25 12 25 77 18 3 28 .11 .44
Relationship to 
neighbors
.23 1.05 91 55 28 60 88 41 10 59 .06 .19
Relationship to other 
people
.23 .86 91 54 28 67 89 46 17 63 .03 .14
Trust in democratic 
rights
.26 1.34 90 48 23 50 88 40 11 56 .04 .19
Trust in democratic 
processes
.23 .91 91 52 30 65 88 42 14 64 .03 .15
Left-right scale .16 .95 94 68 39 64 85 21 3 58 0 .10
Religiosity (17) .53 2.44 79 27 16 22 74 10 0.5 22 .19 .72
Average .33 1.40 87 43 22 50 85 31 7 50 .08 .29
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, 
AE: absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 
90/95 percent.  Numbers in brackets indicate the number of countries where similarities are 
smaller than differences.
Table A8
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 14 other variables between gender
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
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Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .17 93 93 0
Tradition .14 95 95 0
Conformity .02 99 98 0
Benevolence .15 94 92 0
Universalism .12 95 95 0
Self-direction .12 95 94 .1
Stimulation .20 92 93 .1
Hedonism .17 93 94 0
Achievement .16 94 94 0
Power .18 93 93 0
Political activities .11 95 97 0
Attitudes towards 
immigrants
.03 99 99 .01
Feeling depressed .27 89 88 .05
Subjective happiness .17 93 94 .08
Feeling optimistic .11 96 96 0
Pessimistic world view .13 95 95 .06
Trust in other people .01 100 98 0
Trust in political 
institutions
.04 99 98 0
Relationship to 
neighbors
.03 99 97 0
Relationship to other 
people
.10 96 96 .02
Trust in democratic 
rights
.05 98 98 .01
Trust in democratic 
processes
.07 97 96 .02
Left-right scale .05 98 96 0
Religiosity .32 87 86 .12
Average .12 95 95 .02
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
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Table A9 
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 14 other variables between income groups
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .13 .38 95 87 49 85 94 78 38 84 0 .10
Tradition .19 .50 93 64 33 80 92 58 29 78 .10 .20
Conformity .11 .30 96 93 58 88 95 89 49 86 .10 .10
Benevolence .02 .06 99 100 100 98 97 100 89 94 0 0
Universalism .02 .07 99 100 100 97 97 100 87 93 0 0
Self-direction .12 .35 95 93 51 86 95 89 44 86 0 .10
Stimulation .12 .36 95 93 51 86 94 78 44 86 0 .10
Hedonism .13 .38 95 80 49 85 95 78 42 84 0 .10
Achievement .06 .29 97 98 73 88 96 98 60 89 0 .10
Power .07 .25 97 100 78 90 96 100 58 90 0 0
Political activities .16 .36 94 78 44 86 95 87 47 88 0 0
Attitudes towards 
immigrants
.19 .49 92 67 38 81 92 62 27 79 .04 .13
Feeling depressed .25 .82 90 51 20 68 89 44 18 65 .05 .14
Subjective happiness .18 .67 93 62 33 74 92 60 33 74 .08 .17
Feeling optimistic .18 .58 93 62 33 77 93 69 38 81 0 .04
Pessimistic world view .36 1.06 86 33 9 60 86 31 9 59 .06 .19
Trust in other people .20 .57 92 64 33 78 92 62 31 79 .03 .13
Trust in political 
institutions
.18 .48 93 69 36 81 92 56 29 79 .04 .12
Relationship to 
neighbors
.02 .12 99 100 100 95 96 100 73 91 0 .03
Relationship to other 
people
.13 .40 95 80 47 84 94 78 40 83 .02 .03
Trust in democratic 
rights
.04 .14 98 100 93 95 97 100 89 92 .01 .04
Trust in democratic 
processes
.08 .23 97 100 73 91 96 96 60 89 .02 .03
Left-right scale .08 .27 97 98 71 89 95 93 47 88 0 0
Religiosity .19 .47 92 60 33 82 92 60 27 80 .08 .20
Average .13 .40 95 81 54 84 94 78 46 83 .03 .09
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Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Table 6
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 14 other variables between education groups
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .12 .26 95 95 52 89 96 100 57 90 0 0
Tradition .19 .49 92 71 29 81 92 57 29 80 .1 .2
Conformity .10 .24 96 100 71 90 96 100 67 90 .1 .1
Benevolence .04 .19 98 100 76 93 97 100 67 92 0 0
Universalism .08 .19 97 100 67 92 96 100 76 93 0 0
Self-direction .23 .54 91 57 24 79 91 67 24 80 .1 .1
Stimulation .16 .55 94 67 48 79 94 71 38 79 .1 .2
Hedonism .14 .48 94 81 48 81 93 71 24 83 .1 .2
Achievement .19 .42 93 76 29 83 93 76 29 84 .1 .2
Power .12 .30 95 90 57 88 95 90 67 89 0 0
Political activities .28 .61 89 48 14 76 93 57 29 81 0 0
Attitudes towards 
immigrants
.35 .80 86 33 29 69 84 33 24 69 .09 .20
Feeling depressed .18 .59 93 52 29 77 92 62 33 76 .05 .10
Subjective happiness .12 .45 95 76 52 82 95 76 48 81 .08 .17
Feeling optimistic .19 .48 93 71 29 81 94 86 33 86 0 .04
Pessimistic world view .34 .87 87 38 19 66 87 38 19 67 .06 .19
Trust in other people .21 .48 92 62 33 81 91 57 33 81 .03 .13
Trust in political 
institutions
.15 .43 94 71 38 83 92 67 29 82 .04 .11
Relationship to 
neighbors
.07 .19 97 100 76 92 95 95 48 89 .03 .03
Relationship to other 
people
.13 .32 95 90 52 87 95 86 48 86 .01 .03
Trust in democratic 
rights
.03 .17 99 100 71 93 98 100 71 92 .01 .03
Trust in democratic 
processes
.18 .55 93 62 19 78 91 52 14 74 .03 .1
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Left-right scale .02 .05 99 100 100 98 96 100 57 91 0 0
Religiosity .12 .51 95 71 52 80 93 71 38 79 .05 .21
Average .16 .42 94 75 46 83 93 76 42 83 .05 .10
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
Table A11 
Comparisons of the 10 value types and 14 other variables between age groups
Cohen’s d PCR PCS AE
Med 
d
Max.  
d
Med >= .90 >= .95 Min Med >= 
90
>= .95 Min Med 
AE
Max 
AE
Security .08 .28 97 98 78 89 96 98 67 88 0 0
Tradition .23 .65 91 56 22 74 91 53 27 73 .10 .20
Conformity .16 .56 94 69 36 78 93 69 36 77 .10 .10
Benevolence .03 .08 99 100 100 97 98 100 98 95 0 0
Universalism .06 .26 98 98 80 90 97 100 78 91 0 .07
Self-direction .15 .47 94 78 44 81 94 76 38 81 .10 .10
Stimulation .41 1.29 84 31 9 52 84 27 11 56 .10 .30
Hedonism .34 1.07 86 38 13 59 87 38 18 59 .10 .30
Achievement .32 .90 87 38 16 65 89 36 18 65 .10 .20
Power .22 .62 91 58 24 76 92 62 27 77 .10 .20
Political activities .08 .31 97 89 69 88 97 100 82 91 0 0
Attitudes towards 
immigrants
.14 .48 95 78 44 81 93 71 40 80 .03 .12
Feeling depressed .15 .53 94 80 42 79 94 71 42 78 .05 .10
Subjective happiness .17 .53 93 73 40 79 93 73 36 79 .08 .08
Feeling optimistic .10 .38 96 89 60 85 96 93 64 88 0 .04
Pessimistic world view .16 .51 94 78 40 80 93 78 33 80 .06 .06
Trust in other people .03 .12 99 100 100 95 96 100 71 90 0 .03
Trust in political 
institutions
.05 .33 98 82 80 87 98 82 78 86 .01 .07
Relationship to 
neighbors
.11 .33 96 93 58 87 95 84 51 85 .03 .08
Relationship to other 
people
.05 .14 98 100 96 95 97 100 98 95 .01 .03
Trust in democratic 
rights
.07 .23 97 100 82 91 97 100 73 90 .01 .04
212
Trust in democratic 
processes
.06 .28 97 89 64 89 96 84 62 86 .02 .05
Left-right scale .05 .14 98 100 96 94 95 100 56 90 0 0
Religiosity .19 .61 93 64 38 76 91 60 27 74 .08 .24
Average .14 .46 94 78 55 82 94 77 51 81 .05 .10
Note.  PCR: Percentage of common responses, PCS: Percentage of common scores, AE: 
absolute effect.  Med: Median, >= 90/95: Percentage of pairs with a PCR or PCS above 90/95 
percent.
213
Tables and Figures of detailed results – Chapter 3
Detailed results of Study 4
Words which were mentioned at least 10 times were analysed.  Quotation marks indicate that 
a response of a participant is listed.  Numbers in brackets indicate how easy it was to discover 
the meaning of the specific word: 1: very much variance between the answers with the given 
keywords (no pattern among the responses is recognizable), 5: very little variance (i.e. the 
answers are all very similar in their meaning). Figures are based on the results from the UK.
Protecting the environment
Table 7
UK results of university sample for Protecting the environment
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family “family and friends” as relevant people (5) 30
friend “family and friends” as relevant people (5) 22
recycle “recycling”, “putting certain rubbish in recycle bins rather than 
general waste” (5) 18
work “cycling to and from work instead of driving” (3) 18
environment “protect the environment” (4) 17
car share the car, walk instead of using car for short distances (3) 16
person people who try to protect the environment (2) 16
rubbish “putting rubbish in the bin not the floor” (4) 16
litter “putting rubbish in the bin not the floor” (4) 16
walk “travelling to work etc. using public transport bikes or walking 
rather than using a car” (3) 15
light “making sure the lights are off” (4) 15
bin using bins (3) 15
waste “disposal of waste”, recycling waste (3) 13
protect “protect the environment” (4) 12
emission “reducing carbon emissions” (4) 11
reduce “reducing carbon emissions” (4) 11
animal “culling of animals”, “preserving animal habitats” (2) 10
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Table 8
Brazil results of university sample for Protecting the environment
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
garbage "Recyclables". "Garbage in bin" (5) 69
play "Throwing trash in the trash" (5) (subset of “garbage”) 39
environment "Environment" (5) 30
environment "Environment" 27
water "Save water" control water consumption (4) 20
street "Helping homeless animals." "Throwing garbage in the 
street" (3)
19
business "Companies that look after the environment" situations to 
punish companies that pollute (4) (but people do not think 
about this while shopping -> hypocritical)
18
population "People throw trash in the bin." "Population separating 
garbage" situations where the people throw trash enquiry  (5)
15
home "Decorate your home so you do not pollute" situations of 
water saving (4)
14
animal "Helping animals" (2) 13
protect "Protect the environment" (5) 13
all "All people" (1) 13
pollution "Pollution of rivers”. "Noise" (4) 12
use "Using water" situations of water use (5) 12
car "Riding car" (4) 10
avoid "Avoiding polluting the environment" (5) 10
plastic "Plastic bags" (3) 10
pollute "Polluting the environment" (4) 10
beach "Take the garbage thrown into the beach" (4) 10
projects "Public initiative projects of clean cities" situations where it 
asks for the development of projects to protect the 
environment (4)
10
river "Littering the rivers." "River sewage" (3) 10
trees "Cutting trees." "Toppling trees" (4) 10
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Table 9
India results of university sample for Protecting the environment
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person “people” (3) 28
clean “cleaning”, “keep clean” (4) 12
Equality
Figure 5. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for 'Equality' (UK only). Numbers 
indicate how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours 
indicate that words were mentioned together.
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Table 10
UK results of university sample Equality
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person (no pattern recognizable) 18
child “all children are allowed to use all equipment, given the same 
opportunities”; treating all children equally (4) 13
job “job application”, “job interview” (4) 13
teacher “teacher” as relevant person in the situation (4) 12
equal equal rights and equal opportunities (5) 11
student “students/pupils” as relevant people in the situation (3) 11
work “work place” as typical situation, “men and women should be 
treated equally in the work place” (4) 11
treat “treat all pupils equally” (3) 10
Table 11
Brazil results of university sample Equality
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
all "Everyone deserves an equal chance." 'Everyone is entitled to 
an opportunity "(4) 23
same "The opportunity is the same for both sexes." "Everyone being 
treated the same way regardless of the preference of sex" (4) 19
right "Claiming your rights." "A university should be an equal right 
for all people." "Same rights for everyone regardless of color" 
(5)
13
black "The common people in favor of mostly blacks" "abolish the 
black and white racism" (3) 13
woman "Rights for men and women." "That woman and man have no 
difference" (4) 11
quota "University quotas for blacks with Indians and mestizos." 
"Quota for disabled" 10
child "Children with mental problems." "Children and young people 
who are in a state of obesity" (4) 10
man "Men and women in work situations." "Law so that men and 
women have no difference" (3) 10
mother "Mother sharing food" (2) 10
public "entrance exames for public positions for all races" (3) 10
your "Right to pronounce your ideas." "Each performs its function" 
(3) 10
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Table 12
India results of university sample for Equality
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Person People from various casts, religious 
backgrounds, or socio-economic status (3) 38
Cast(ism)/categories/sc 
and st Discrimination based on cast (5) 17
Work working hard, equal work (3) 17
Friend Friends and family (3) 16
Student Students and castism (3) 16
Give Giving equal opportunities (4) 15
Treat Treat everyone equally (5) 12
Women Women equality (4) 12
Equal Treat people equal (4) 11
Time (no pattern recognizable) 10
Wisdom
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Figure 6. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for 'Wisdom' (UK only). Numbers 
indicate how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours 
indicate that words were mentioned together.
Table 13
UK results of university sample for Wisdom
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person (no pattern recognizable) 35
advice “giving advice” (4) 30
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friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 29
parent “parents teaching their children about life” and “parents” as 
relevant people (4) 25
student “giving students advice”, “students” as relevant people (4) 22
child give guidance/pass knowledge to children, teaching children (4) 20
make “making [important/serious] decisions” (4) 20
give “Giving advice” (older person, friend) (5) 19
family “family” as relevant people (5) 19
decision “making [important/serious] decisions” (4) 17
wisdom “passing on their wisdom”, “having wisdom” (3) 16
teach “teaching or explaining something” (3) 16
decide deciding about something important (4) 14
teacher “teacher” as relevant people (5) 13
experience “using past knowledge and experiences” (4) 13
knowledge using/sharing knowledge (3) 12
exam “exam” as typical situation in which wisdom is important (5) 12
work (no pattern recognizable) 10
thing (no pattern recognizable) 10
listen listening to other people (4) 10
life (no pattern recognizable) 10
Table 14
Brazil results of university sample for Wisdom
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend "Receiving advise from friends" (4) 17
wisdom "Wisdom to deal with conflicts" wisdom to solve conflicts (5) 16
know "How to deal with awkward situations" (4) 13
other "Talk to others" (3) 11
its "Wisdom" (3) 11
knowledge "Spread your knowledge" use knowledge to relate to other 
people
10
Table 15
India results of university sample for Wisdom
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Person (no pattern recognizable) 23
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Unity with nature
Figure 7. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Unity with Nature'. Numbers 
indicate how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours 
indicate that words were mentioned together.
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Table 16
UK results of university sample for Unity with nature
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family “family” as relevant people (5) 28
walk “walking the dog”, walking outside (5) 25
friend “friend” as relevant people (5) 20
nature “being in nature” (2) 12
garden being in the garden (5) 12
bird “bird watching”, “feeding birds” (5) 12
environment “looking after the environment” (3) 11
animal “observing animals”, “helping animals” (4) 11
person (no pattern recognizable) 10
Table 17
Brazil results of university sample for Unity with nature
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
nature "Preserve nature", "closer to nature" (5) 40
friend "Meet friends" meet with friends in places with nature (forests 
and beaches) (4)
28
animal "Animal care" (4) 23
all Refers to humans and animals (2) 23
plant "Plant Trees" planting trees with friends (5) 19
beach "Walking at the beach" walk along the beach with friends, 
family and boyfriends / girlfriends (4)
19
other "etc." idea of variety (2) 16
care "Animal care" (5) 15
garbage "Garbage disposal" In which situations it discards the trash 
Correctly (4)
14
same "Himself" myself (2) 11
environment "Do not pollute the environment" situations of environmental 
protection (5)
10
familiar "Weekend with relatives in the countryside" enjoy nature with 
family
10
yours "Taking care of the animals that are under your care" animal 
care (2)
10
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Table 18
India results of university sample for Unity with Nature
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Family (no pattern recognizable) 13
Friend (no pattern recognizable) 13
Nature (no pattern recognizable) 13
Person (no pattern recognizable) 13
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World of Beauty
Figure 8. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘World of Beauty'. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 19
UK results of university sample for World of Beauty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
beauty “beauty pageants” (3) 29
Family “family” as relevant people (5) 26
Friend “friend” as relevant people (5) 23
Person (no pattern recognizable) 23
Walk walking outside (4) 21
world (no pattern recognizable) 14
partner “partner” as relevant people (5) 13
holiday “holiday” as typical situation (4) 12
model “models celebrities” (4) 10
beach “beach” as typical place (4) 10
Table 20
Brazil results of university sample for World of Beauty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
be (no pattern recognizable) 29
beauty "Natural Beauties" (2) 25
my "My Family" (3) 23
world "Beautiful World". "World security". "Better world" (3) 18
friend "Friends enjoying." "Friends having fun." Friends talking "(5) 17
family "Playing family". "With my family enjoying life" (5) 15
all "All people" (3) 15
child "Working children" "needy children" (4) 13
woman "Beautiful women" pleasant situations with women (4) 12
care "Take care of his own body." be careful with the body and 
family (4)
10
its "Activities" (3) 10
life "Healthier life" (4) 10
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Table 21
India results of university sample for World of Beauty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Person (no pattern recognizable) 26
Nature Protect nature (3) 13
Beauty Beauty of nature (2) 12
Friend Friends and family (3) 11
Broad-mindedness
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Figure 9. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for 'Broad-mindedness'. Numbers 
indicate how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours 
indicate that words were mentioned together.
Table 22
UK results of university sample for Broad-mindedness
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person “meeting new people” (3) 34
friend “friend” as relevant people (2) 17
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meet “meeting new people” (4) 15
Table 23
Brazil results of university sample for Broad-mindedness
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend "Friends living the moment" situations of drug use, 
homosexual relationships and talking controversial topics (3)
20
new "New ideas". "New opportunities" (5) 18
all "All accepting". "Everyone debating" (4) 16
society "Society against homophobia". "Society against bullying" 
situations against prejudice (4)
15
its "Your life." "Ideas" (4) 13
son "Gay Son" situations against prejudice (5) 12
other "Another sexual orientation" (4) 12
life "Better life" (3) 11
father "Father and grandparents are dedicated to teaching" situations 
where parents accept the differences of the sounds (3)
10
its "Your Dream". "Their lifestyle" (2) 10
Table 24
India results of university sample for Broad-mindedness
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Person “helping people” (3) 24
Friend Family and friends (3) 17
Family Family and friends (3) 16
Help Helping (poor) people (4) 10
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Social Justice
Figure 10. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Social Justice’. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 25
UK results of university sample for Social Justice
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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ensure “ensuring that justice is applied equally to all” (4) 23
person (no pattern recognizable) 14
justice “making sure that people treated wrongly get justice over those that did them wrong” (3) 13
right “gay rights”, “disabled rights” (4) 13
education “ensuring that there is no barrier other than merit in access to higher education” (4) 11
job “applying for job” (2) 10
Table 26
Brazil results of university sample for Social Justice
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
right "Political rights" common related to health, education and 
security (5)
27
public "Public services". "Public schools" (5) 20
all "All people" (3) 20
government "Government social policies" situations where the 
government Should help the population, eg enforce the law 
and providing public services (4)
15
population "Working population". "People going to the streets" 15
political "Corrupt politicians" (5) 14
education "Education in schools". "Traffic education" (5) 13
teacher "Primary school teachers" (4) 13
fight "Fighting for the rights" situations against prejudice, injustice 
and crimes (4)
12
society "Struggling society" / fighting against difficulties in society 
(3)
11
citizen "Citizens demanding their rights" (5) 10
Seniors "Elderly in homes for asylum" situations on the needs of the 
elderly and health care eg
10
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Table 27
India results of university sample for Social Justice
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Girl Discrimination of girls (5) 10
Person (no pattern recognizable) 10
Creativity
Figure 11. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Creativity’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 28
UK results of university sample for Creativity
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
art “making art”, “art classes” (3) 40
write writing an essay/book/poem (4) 29
friend “friend” as relevant people (5) 29
create “creating art” [including books] (4) 28
make making something new (3) 23
music “Making music”, “Composing music”, “listening to music” (4) 22
creative Being/thinking creative is helpful/important (4) 21
work “Working as a group in uni”, “When thinking of new ideas -Could be at work” (3) 20
person “person” as relevant people (5) 20
student “students” as relevant people (4) 19
child important for children to learn new things (2) 19
artist “artists” as relevant people (5) 17
teacher “teacher” as relevant people (3) 16
idea “coming up with novel ideas” (5) 15
family “family” as relevant people (5) 14
come “come up with new ideas” (5) 13
problem “problem solving” (5) 12
piece “creating a piece of art” (4) 12
paint “painting” (5) 12
story “writing a story” (4) 11
draw “drawing” (4) 11
design designing something new (3) 11
creativity (no pattern recognizable) 11
need (no pattern recognizable) 10
class “art class” (4) 10
Table 29
Brazil results of university sample for Creativity
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
work "Be original work" (5) 23
create "Creating beautiful things." "Creating strategies to achieve 
the goal" (4)
19
new "New projects". "Create new products." "Proposing new 
ideas" (4)
18
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business "Companies looking for new ways." "Companies seeking 
growth" (4)
13
friend "Debating issues with friends" (4) 12
creativity "Can reach a solution with creativity" (4) [‘The Brazilian 
way’] 12
your "Improve their lives" (4) 12
different "Seek different things" (4) 11
creative "Needs to be very creative" (4) 10
day "Scientific articles produced daily (3) 10
Table 30
India results of university sample for Creativity
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Creative Being creative is useful 20
Person (no pattern recognizable) 16
Friend (no pattern recognizable) 14
Student (no pattern recognizable) 12
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Freedom
Figure 12. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Freedom’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 31
UK results of university sample for Freedom
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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freedom freedom rights. [More positive than negative liberty rights mentioned] (4) 36
person persons as relevant people (2) 26
family “family” as relevant people (5) 22
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 17
free “free to choose”, “free from the oppression” (3) 14
vote “voting” (4) 12
job “deciding on a job” (3) 12
student “students” as relevant people (4) 11
enjoy enjoying life (3) 10
choose having the possibility to choose between different things (3) 10
Table 32
Brazil results of university sample for Freedom
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
People "people knowing different places" (4) 32
Freedom "freedom of speech" (4) 21
Friends "friends and people knowing different places" (3) 20
your "exercising their freedom." "Defending your opinion" (3) 18
want "I want to travel" (2) 11
travel "travel without a plan." "Traveling with friends". "Family 
travels to have fun" (4) 11
Young "young adults and the elderly" (2) 10
All "all cultures of freedom" (2) 10
Table 33
India results of university sample for Freedom
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Freedom (no pattern recognizable) 24
Friend (no pattern recognizable) 18
Family (no pattern recognizable) 17
Person (no pattern recognizable) 16
Student Students need more freedom (4) 14
Time (no pattern recognizable) 10
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A varied life
Figure 13. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘A varied life’. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 34
UK results of university sample for A varied life
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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work “keep work life balance maintain”, “varying roles at work”, 
“balance school work and social life” (4) 37
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 37
person “people” as relevant people (3) 23
life “work life balance” (2) 20
family “family” as relevant people (5) 18
vary “varied life”, do varied things (5) 14
student “students” as relevant people (3) 12
experience gaining new/different experiences (4) 12
activity trying new/different activities (4) 12
thing “do a variety of things” (3) 11
job (no pattern recognizable) 10
Table 35
Brazil results of university sample for A varied life
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend "Friends and family going to new places". "Female friends 
enjoying" (4) 31
new "New cultures". "New foods". "New friends" (5) 21
work "Business traveling." "Working in several shifts" (4) 18
life "Healthier life". " choosing new ways of living" (3) 17
family "Family out of routine search through travel" (3) 13
know "See the world". "Meet new people" (5) 12
day "Travel on a daily basis with people." "Daily basis busy life 
routine" (4) 12
travel "Traveling and seeing the world." "You travel your friends 
and family" (4) 12
search "Attempts to make things." "Try to learn new traditions" (5) 11
familiar "Practicing different sports with friends and family" (4) 11
work "Coworkers, family and friends encouraging" (3) 11
different "'Practice different sports." "Seeing different places" (4) 10
several "Working at various jobs." "Work in various shifts" (4) 10
Table 36
India results of university sample for A varied life
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
life (no pattern recognizable) 23
friend (no pattern recognizable) 20
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family (no pattern recognizable) 16
person (no pattern recognizable) 15
Daring
Figure 14. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Daring’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 37
UK results of university sample for Daring
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person (no pattern recognizable) 25
sport “extreme sports” (3) 17
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 15
dare (no pattern recognizable) 12
risk “have to take risks in order to try and win” (3) 10
Table 38
Brazil results of university sample for Daring
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
Studying "taking a test without studying." "Leaving home to study in another city" 10
Table 39
India results of university sample for Daring
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
dare (no pattern recognizable) 15
person (no pattern recognizable) 15
situation (no pattern recognizable) 14
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Pleasure
Figure 15. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Pleasure’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 40
UK results of university sample for Pleasure
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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friend “spending time with family and friends”, “friends” as relevant 
people (4) 59
family “spending time with family and friends”, “family” as relevant 
people (4) 38
enjoy “Doing something you enjoy, such as a hobby”, “enjoy a 
fulfilling sexual relationship with their partner”, “enjoying food” 
(4)
29
person “people” as relevant people (3) 24
eat “enjoying food when eating”, “eating together” (5) 24
time “spending time with family and friends”, “leisure time” (4) 21
watch “watching a film” (4) 17
work (no pattern recognizable) 16
talk “talking” (5) 14
play “playing games” (4) 14
drink “drinking”, “having a drink” (4) 14
partner “partner” as relevant people (5) [with whom you can have 
pleasure] 13
holiday “on holiday” (4) 12
boyfriend “spending time with my boyfriend” (5) 11
Table 41
Brazil results of university sample for Pleasure
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend "Friends and family going to the movies." "Friends boyfriend 
playing video games" (4) 65
family "Family and friends having fun." "Family and friends having 
fun playing football" (5) 32
be "Being in the presence of nice people" (4) 30
pleasure "Experiencing pleasure in the work." "Pleasurable feeling of 
satisfaction" (3) 26
boyfriend "boy- or girlfriends and family traveling to see new places" 
(2) 21
day "Going to the cafeteria every day." "relief  the stress of 
everyday life" (4) 16
work "Experiencing pleasure in the work." "Happy to be working 
together" (4) 16
eat "Eating good food". "Friends and family eating in a bar" (4) 14
familiar "To shop with friends and family." "Family Reunion" (3) 14
know "Sightseeing", "Going to parks laughing with family" (4) 
[visiting, seeing, meeting, knowing have the same meaning in 
Portuguese in this context]
13
husband "Husband, friend and family activities for practicing a 
healthier life" (4) 13
time "Times of relaxation", "pleasant time" (4) 12
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individual "Individuals exercising" (3) 11
life "Healthier life". "Living in family life" (4) 11
attend "Watch a football game." "Watch a movie with a loved 
person" (3) 10
Table 42
India results of university sample for Pleasure
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend family and friends (3) 18
person (no pattern recognizable) 17
happy (no pattern recognizable) 10
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Success
Figure 16. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Success’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 43
UK results of university sample for Success
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
243
work “Team members work hard to win and be successful in their 
sport”, “working hard to meet deadlines and achieve goals” (3) 33
student “student striving for top grades” , “students” as relevant people 
(4) 28
exam ““passing your exams”, being good in exams (4) 22
job “a job interview”, “in a job” (4) 20
friend “friends” as relevant people (4) 20
win winning in order to be successful, e.g. a lottery, a game (3) 17
sport “sports competition”, “sports” as relevant situation (4) 17
university “university” as a relevant place (4) 16
family “successful home and family life”, “family” as relevant people 
(3) 16
hard “studying hard to do well in exams”, “work hard in order to be 
successful” (4) 14
achieve “achieve goals” (3) 14
successful “aim to be successful” (4) 13
success having success (4) 13
goal “achieve goals” (3) 12
race doing a race (2) 11
team “Team members work hard to win and be successful” (mostly 
sport teams) (4) 10
person (no pattern recognizable) 10
Table 44
Brazil results of university sample for Success
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person "People are approved in some selection" (5) [i.e. passing an 
entrance exam] 41
success "Financial success". "Success in studies" (4) 24
get "Able to meet objectives." (4) 23
friend "Friends celebrating his professional career" victorious 
situations friends (5) [e.g. if you have passed an entrance 
exam]
19
business "Private company" (3) 15
family "Family get to have a good income." "Families having fun on 
the beach" (5) 15
life "Overcome the obstacles of life" (4) 15
study "Studying for an entrance exams and passing them" (4) 14
its "His family". "Their goals" (3) 14
familiar "Family congratulating the success" (3) 12
goal "Life goals". "Personal goals" (4) 12
my "My life". "My mother" (3) 12
pass "Passing the entrance exams." (5) 12
professional "Professional achievement". "Professional recognition" (4) 12
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employment "Get a job" (5) 11
achievement "Personal fulfillment." "Professional achievement". 
"fullfilling of dreams" (5) 11
doctorate "Finishing a doctorate" (5) 10
Table 45
India results of university sample for Success
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend family and other people (4) 28
person (no pattern recognizable) 28
family family and friends (3) 21
life (no pattern recognizable) 15
success (no pattern recognizable) 15
work working hard (4) 13
hard working or trying hard (5) 12
good being good (3) 11
job (no pattern recognizable) 10
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Ambition
Figure 17. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Ambition’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 46
UK results of university sample for Ambition
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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job “applying for a new job”, “doing their job as best they can 
maybe to earn a promotion” (4) 31
work “working to achieve their goal” (5) 25
student “students” as relevant people (5) 24
achieve “working to achieve their goal” (4) (similar to ‘success’ 
instantiation) 15
university “university” as a relevant place (4) (similar to ‘success’ 
instantiation) 13
team “Being in a competitive sports team” (3) (very similar to 
‘success’ instantiation) 13
person (no pattern recognizable) 13
hard “working and training hard to achieve success” (4) (similar to 
‘success’ instantiation) 13
sport “sport” as relevant situation (4) 12
career “career” as relevant situation (4) 12
school “attending school and working hard to achieve good grades” (4) 10
Table 47
Brazil results of university sample for Ambition
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family
"Having children, friends and family" wish to build a Family 
(4) 14
want "Want it all". "Want sth. what you don’t have" (4) 14
get
"Get the top job." "Get a raise" Achieve professional success 
(5) 13
other
"Always passing in front of the other" (3) [i.e. in order to pass 
entrance exams] 13
post "Get the top job", "office" (4) [same like “get”] 10
colleague "Colleague being jealous" (4) 10
society "Competitive society". "Capitalist society" (4) 10
Table 48
India results of university sample for Ambition
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
job Getting a good job (4) 18
education (no pattern recognizable) 17
good good job (3), good education (2) 17
person (no pattern recognizable) 17
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work working hard (4) 14
ambition (no pattern recognizable) 11
friend friends and family (2) 11
hard working hard (5) 11
Wealth
Figure 18. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Wealth’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 49
UK results of university sample for Wealth
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family “providing for a family”, “family” as relevant people (3) 26
buy “buying a house” (3) 24
person (no pattern recognizable) 23
wealth “those with more wealth have greater choice in this” (3) 17
money (no pattern recognizable) 16
friend “friends” as relevant people (4) 16
child “provide children with what they need” (4) 13
shop “going shopping”, food and clothes (5) 12
house “buying a house” (4) 11
wealthy (no pattern recognizable) 10
food “buying food” (3) 10
afford being able to afford expensive things (4) 10
Table 50
Brazil results of university sample for Wealth
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend "Family and friends traveling" (5) 33
family
"Family friends have a healthy life." "Family living 
comfortable" (5) 31
wealth
"Family since greater wealth that does not exist" attaches 
great Importance to interpersonal relationships (4) [i.e. the 
most important thing what you can have is a family]
12
familiar "Family environment". "Family members caring" (4) 10
health "Taking care of health" (5) 10
life "Celebrating Life". "Improving the quality of life" (3) 10
Table 51
India results of university sample for Wealth
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family (no pattern recognizable) 22
friend (no pattern recognizable) 18
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money (no pattern recognizable) 16
wealth (no pattern recognizable) 15
person (no pattern recognizable) 12
life living a good/comfortable life (4) 11
Social Power
Figure 19. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Social Power’. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 52
UK results of university sample for Social Power
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person (no pattern recognizable) 27
power “social power”, (2) 25
social “having good social power will help greatly”, “The person with 
the highest social power is the person who decides” (3) 23
police “police” as relevant people with social power (4) 23
group “group” as relevant people (3) 17
friend “friends” as relevant people (4) 16
work (no pattern recognizable) 14
teacher “teachers” as relevant people with social power (4) 14
vote “trying to persuade people to vote for them” (5) 12
student “teacher has power to teach students”, “students as relevant 
people (4) 12
child “parents trying to discipline children” (3) 12
Table 53
Brazil results of university sample for Social Power
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
society "Welfare of society". "Democratic society" related to social 
situations common (5) [General well-being of society] 23
child "Children and adolescents promoting sports." "School feeding 
and housing of children" (3) 13
family "Social workers helping families' situations In which families 
receive help (4) 13
right "Right of citizens" (5) 12
improvement "Improvements to the population"; "Improvements to the 
community" (4) 12
community "Community, family and friends" (5) 11
government "Government that helps in feeding" (5) 10
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Table 54
India results of university sample for Social Power
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person (no pattern recognizable) 37
give give rights to people (12) 12
social social power (3) 12
girl (no pattern recognizable) 11
work (no pattern recognizable) 10
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Family Security
Figure 20. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Family security’. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 55
UK results of university sample for Family Security
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family “comforting other family members” (including financial 
support), “family” as relevant people (4) 87
child “keeping watch of the children, making sure they do not run off 
etc.” staying in contact with children (4) 24
member “family members” as relevant people (4) 20
parent “children/ parents” as relevant people (4) 18
time “supporting each other during hard times” (2) 14
support “providing support and advice, being there no matter what, 
sticking together”, “supporting you if you get into difficulties,  
providing a stable home” (5) 
14
provide provide support/reassurance/help 13
home “providing a stable home life” (3) 10
holiday “holiday” as a relevant situation (5) 10
Table 56
Brazil results of university sample for Family Security
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
son "Dad took son to play in the park." "Safety at home for parents 
and children" (3) 37
father "Physical presence of parents" (3) 36
mother "Father and mother come home" (3) 35
family "Leisure on the beach with the whole family." "Taking care of 
all the family" (4) 32
all "The whole family strolling carriage" (3) 22
security "Electronic security". "Needing more security and police at the 
streets" (4) 20
home "Installed electric fences in the wall of your home to feel safer" 
(3) 18
brother "health insurance for me, mother, father, sister, and nephew." 
"Support mother and brother" (2) 16
familiar "Contribute to the family income." "Mother and Father ensuring 
family financial situation" (4) 15
your "Pay your taxes". Woman denounces her husband for domestic 
violence "(2) 15
your "Having the risk of your home being burgled." " violence in  
public transport in your city" (2) 11
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Table 57
India results of university sample for Family Security
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
family (no pattern recognizable) 51
security security of one’s family (5) 14
life security of one’s life (4) 13
member family member (5) 13
person (no pattern recognizable) 12
child (no pattern recognizable) 11
care caring about others (3), not caring about others (3) 10
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Respect for Tradition
Figure 21. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Respect for tradition’. Numbers 
indicate how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours 
indicate that words were mentioned together.
Table 58
UK results of university sample for Respect for Tradition
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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family “family” as relevant people (4) 68
tradition respecting/understanding traditions (3) 35
person “persons” as relevant people who follow traditions (4) 33
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 30
Christmas Having Christmas dinner with family, spending time with family 
during Christmas (5) 24
respect “respecting the traditions” in various situations (4) 20
church “church” as a relevant place (5) 19
religious “religious ceremonies” (3) 16
eat “Eating Christmas lunch together”, “Eating, drinking, helping to 
clear up together, swapping news” (3) 16
celebrate Celebrating Christmas, marriage, birthday… (4) 13
present giving presents for Christmas or birthday (4) 12
day fathers/mother/valentines etc. day (4) 11
ceremony Religious and graduation ceremonies (4) 10
birthday “birthday” as relevant situation (5) 10
Table 59
Brazil results of university sample for Respect for Tradition
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
family "Celebrating festive days new, Christmas year, St. John's, 
Carnival, Easter lunch with family". "Family celebrating an 
event" (4)
32
father "Respect the request of the parents." "respect the parents" (5) 26
son "Presence of children in cults or services." "Son hear teachings 
of his father" (4) 23
your "Respecting others' opinions regardless of their culture" (3) 18
tradition "Keeping alive the traditions." "Annually celebrate something 
that considers a family tradition" (4) 18
respect "Respect your elders". "respect the parents" (4) 17
all "Following the tradition of all the men of the family must 
graduate" (3) 16
friend "Family and friends having fun." "Respect for religious beliefs 
neighbors friends" (4) 14
respect "Respect for the family." "Respect the holy holidays." (the 
‘Saint holidays’), "Respect for tradition" (5) 13
familiar "Family usually having lunch." "Ethical and respectful family" 
(4) 12
festival "Religious festivals". "Cultural feast". "June festivals" (5) 11
follow "Members of society follow certain dressing code." "Follow the 
traditions of their grandparents" (4) 11
city "Show the tradition of his city." "Anniversary celebration of the 
city" (4) 10
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Table 60
India results of university sample for Respect for Tradition
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
tradition (no pattern recognizable) 26
person (no pattern recognizable) 23
family (no pattern recognizable) 18
respect (no pattern recognizable) 17
wear wearing traditional dresses (5) 16
traditional traditional dresses (4) 15
dresses wearing traditional dresses (5) 13
festival (no pattern recognizable) 13
friend (no pattern recognizable) 13
culture (no pattern recognizable) 10
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Self-discipline
Figure 22. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Self-discipline’. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 61
UK results of university sample for Self-discipline
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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work “get work done trying your best to succeed” (3) 34
person “people” as relevant people, who are or should be self-disciplined (4) 34
discipline “need to discipline yourself”  (3) 24
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 22
student “students” as relevant people (5) 19
exercise “exercising” (4) 19
weight “losing weight” (5) 17
time (no pattern recognizable) 15
eat “Not eating all of the food”, “Resisting the urge to eat unhealthy food” (5) 15
give “Giving up smoking”, “Have to keep motivating yourself to run even if you want to give up” (3) 14
diet “dieting” (5) 13
study “studying” (5) 12
sport training/playing sport (4) 11
exam “exams” as relevant situations (4) 11
lose “losing weight” (5) 10
keep keeping yourself motivated/healthy (4) 10
Table 62
Brazil results of university sample for Self-discipline
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
your "Succeed in your professional career." "Have discipline in your work 
routine " (4)
23
all "Do all the work." "Every athlete needs discipline." "Every society needs 
a lot of self-discipline" (4)
14
day "Control in a situation of everyday life" (3) 12
teacher "Teachers teaching a new language." "Teachers and students studying" (4) 12
friend "Family leisure family friends in the park" (2) 11
student "Student does not respect the teachers." "Students completing the course" 
(4)
10
family "My family supports me and encourages me to be better qualified at work" 
(3)
10
Table 63
India results of university sample for Self-discipline
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
discipline “self-discipline” (5), “should maintain self-discipline” (3) 33
260
person “people” as relevant people, who are or should be self-
disciplined (5) 22
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 16
work “work” as typical activity (4), “work” place (4) 16
student “students” as relevant people (5) 13
family “family” as relevant people (5) 11
Obedience
Figure 23. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Obedience’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 64
UK results of university sample for Obedience
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
child “Children need to be obedient” (4) 31
obey “obey the law”, “obeying rules “ (3) 23
teacher “obey teachers” (4) 22
parent “parents” as relevant people, to whom you have to be obedient 
(4) 22
student “students” as relevant people, who have to be obedient (4) 21
order obeying orders (5) 15
obedient “attending school, being obedient as required by teachers”, “you 
[should] be obedient, you would learn and experience more than 
less obedient interns” (4)
15
obedience (no pattern recognizable) 15
law “Compliance with the law”, “obey the law” (5) 14
work “at work” as relevant situation (4) 13
tell High-ranking person tells inferiors what to do (4) 13
school “attending school, being obedient as required by teachers” (5) 13
rule obeying/following rules (4) 12
person (no pattern recognizable) 12
employee “employees” as relevant people, who have to be obedient (4) 10
Table 65
Brazil results of university sample for Obedience
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
father "Obey the parents." "listening to your parents" (4) 49
obey "Obey parents even without agreeing." "Obey the seniors." 
"Obey the rules" (5) 43
son "Son or daughter compliance to rules." "Apologize father and 
SON" (4) 28
teacher "Respect to the professor." "Classroom teacher and students 
who learn" (4) 22
student "Students who learn." "Students who respect staff members" (4) 21
ask "Parent and father asking to do things". "Professor asks for 
silence" (5) 20
rule "Accept boss’ rule." "Employees and companies following 
rules" (4) 20
follow "Follow the rules imposed by government." "Following the 
instructions" (4) 19
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mother " obey mother and father." "help your mother when she asks" 
(4) 14
old "listen to older people." "take advices from older people". "be 
obedient to older people" (5) 14
friend "Having respect for a friend" (3) 12
respect "Obeying and respecting older people". "respect older people." 
"Respect for parents" (5) 12
class "Obedience in classroom." "Attend to classes and obey the 
rules" (4) 11
law "Follow the law". “ obey the traffic law." "Obey the laws of the 
government" (5) 10
Table 66
India results of university sample for Obedience
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
work “at work” (4) 19
teacher “teacher” as typical people to whom one need to obey 16
family (no pattern recognizable) 14
obedience/obedient (no pattern recognizable) 14
student “student must be obedient” (2) 14
person (no pattern recognizable) 10
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Helpfulness
Figure 24. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Helpfulness’. Numbers indicate 
how often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
Table 67
UK results of university sample for Helpfulness
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
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help helping other people (4) 67
person helping (elderly) people (3) 45
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 37
need helping someone in need (3) 17
work “helping with work situations” (2) 13
student “students” as relevant people (4) 12
family “family” as relevant people (4) 12
customer “customer service” (4) 11
Table 68
Brazil results of university sample for Helpfulness
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
help "Helping friends and family." "Help in difficult moments 
parents friends and family" (4) 45
friend "Hear a familiar friend when needed" (4) 41
work "Help work colleagues". "Offer help to another coworker" (4) 40
colleague "Colleague offer help to another colleague." "Help the ‘next 
one’, neighbor or co-worker" (5) 24
elderly "Helping an elderly cross the street." "Gives rise to an elderly 
passenger who has no where to sit" (5) 18
street "Crossing the street elder or child." "Help a blind man cross the 
street" (5) 17
help "Help poor people." "Help by giving food." "Helping people in 
poverty" (4) 15
give "Gives a lift to another." "Giving another people place to sit" 
(4) 15
family "Help needy families." "Understand the demands of other 
families" (4) 15
offer "Help support". "Offer a ride." "Offer to help your mother" (5) 15
student "College students are helping their colleagues" (3) 14
familiar "Help friend and family when they are moving." "Pay a bill of a 
family" (4) 14
service "Provide the requested service." "Performing free services" (4) 13
passenger "A passenger offer your place to another" (4) 12
always "Always present on the job." "In the leisure area is always 
helpful" (4) 11
ask "Family and friends need help and ask for it" "A friend asks 
you to solve a problem" (4) 10
specify "Families need and ask for help." "One needs a ride." "Poor 
people need of food" (4) 10
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Table 69
India results of university sample for Helpfulness
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person “person” as relevant people who (should) give or 
receive help (3) 21
friend (no pattern recognizable) 14
Loyalty
Figure 25. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Loyalty’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
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Table 70
UK results of university sample for Loyalty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
friend “standing by your friends and being loyal to them”, “friends” as 
relevant people (4) 64
family “family” as relevant people, being loyal towards your family (3) 23
work “in a work place” (4) 22
person (no pattern recognizable) 22
relationship “in a relationship” (5) 19
support “Supporting your team at football, rugby”, “supporting each 
other” (e.g. family, friends) (4) 18
loyal “A stranger shows romantic interest in you, but you stay loyal to 
your boyfriend, girlfriend”, “standing by your friends and being 
loyal to them” (4) 
17
team “Staying Loyal to team by no underhand tactics and by good 
teamwork” (4) 15
colleague “defending a colleague” (2) 15
time spending time with close ones if they are in trouble (2) 13
partner “partner” as relevant people (4) 13
stay “staying loyal” (5) 12
secret “keeping secrets” (4) 10
Table 71
Brazil results of university sample for Loyalty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
friend "Do not lie to friend." "Friends who help in the crisis" (4) 72
loyalty "In every marriage there must be loyalty." "Have loyalty to 
your boss." (4) 25
familiar "Family always be faithful." "Help friends and family" (3) 23
fair "Relationship shows a couple loyal to another." "Be loyal to 
those we love." "Always be loyal and true to who is on our 
side" (4)
20
business "Demonstrate loyalty to the company that trusted him." "Have 
commitment to the company" (4) 17
always "Always attend the same company." "Always be faithful and 
loyal to those who are always on our side" (4) 15
all "Come together at all times" (3) 15
help "Friends who help in the crisis." "Help a needy person on the 
street." "Is always willing to help" (5) 14
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colleague "Co-workers being fair" (3) 13
friendship "The person is loyal to a friendship." "Friendship two friends 
keeping in touch whenever possible" (4) 12
brother "When a brother helps his other brother" (3) 12
dog "Dog shows loyalty to his master" (5) 11
husband "Husband respecting his wife." "Husband and wife being loyal 
to the commitment of marriage" (4) 11
woman "Marriage husband and wife." "" Woman is being faithful to her 
husband "(4) 11
boyfriend "The girlfriend of a friend is flirting with me" (3) 11
money "Working with money." "You lend money to friends" (4) 10
employee "Loyalty of an employee in the company" (5) 10
Table 72
India results of university sample for Loyalty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person (no pattern recognizable) 12
loyal (no pattern recognizable) 10
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Honesty
Figure 26. Result of the graphical similarity analysis for ‘Honesty’. Numbers indicate how 
often two words were mentioned together in single responses. Same colours indicate that 
words were mentioned together.
269
Table 73
UK results of university sample for Honesty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
relationship “in a relationship” (4) 31
honest “being honest” to friends, family etc. (4) 30
friend “friends” as relevant people (5) 30
family “family” as relevant people (4) 25
person (no pattern recognizable) 22
tell telling the truth (4) 21
partner “partner” as relevant people (5) 13
cheat “not cheating” (4) 13
lie do not lie (4) 12
police (no pattern recognizable) 11
court “court” as relevant situation (5) 11
Table 74
Brazil results of university sample for Honesty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Freq.
money "Politicians stealing government money." "Someone finds 
money on the ground and returns." "Returns the money he 
received" (4)
21
find "Find money". "Find documents and deliver the right person" 
(4) 15
return "Get a wrong change and return." "Do not keep the money for 
themselves returning to the owner" (5) 15
other "Be true to each other no lies." "Friends are honest with each 
other" (4) 15
change "Get a wrong change and return" (5) 15
friend "I am honest to friends." "Borrow money and give it back" (5) 14
receive "Get a wrong change and return." "Return the money he 
received wrong" (5) 13
its "Perceiving and understanding comprising its existence" (3) 13
honest "An honest person". "My mother she is an example of honest 
person." "An honest person does not accept what is not yours" 
(4)
12
wrong "Does not accept wrong change." "Get a wrong change and 
return" (5) 10
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Table 75
India results of university sample for Honesty
Word Meaning (Instantiation) Absolute 
Frequency
person “person” as typical people who should be honest (3) 34
friend (no pattern recognizable) 25
situation (no pattern recognizable) 18
honest “should be honest” (4) 16
family (no pattern recognizable) 12
parent “parents” as typical people 11
time (no pattern recognizable) 11
respect Being honest is to show respect to other people (5) 10
work To “work” as a typical activity for which honesty is 
important 10
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Detailed results of Study 5
Table A12
Study 5: Absolute frequencies of how often an instantiation thought to be related with various values (Brazil – UK)
Brazil United Kingdom
Unity with Nature Varied Equality
Creativit
y Wisdom Loyalty Unity ? Varied Equality
Creativit
y Wisdom Loyalty Unity ?
Walking outside (1u1) 13 4 1 2 3 47 2 2 39
Being in the garden (1u2) 4 3 2 57 1 40
Preserving the environment (1b1) 4 24 1 43 42
Planting trees (1b2) 1 9 58 1 43
Walking on the beach (1b3) 17 3 1 1 1 53 1 3 37
Spending a few hours in the park (1n1) 30 1 1 40 1 1 40
Wisdom Wisdom Daring Success Honesty Unity Varied Wisdom Daring Success Honesty Unity Varied
Giving advice (2u1) 63 1 2 1 1 29 14
Making important decisions (2u2) 60 6 5 2 29 10
Explaining something (2a1) 65 1 1 7 1 37 1 4
Receiving advice (2b1) 63 1 3 3 2 35 2 7
Solving conflicts (2b2) 61 1 3 2 19 1 20
Dealing with awkward situations (2b3) 31 22 1 12 4 15 6 16 3 1
A World of Beauty Power Broad Security
Obedien
ce Beauty Wisdom Power Broad Security
Obedien
ce Beauty Wisdom
Beauty pageants (3u1) 7 2 2 1 51 2 5 7 1 2 28 5
Walking outside (3u2) 3 16 3 1 39 4 1 1 38 1
Having fun with friends (3b1) 13 26 1 1 14 5
1
2 8 17 6 3 9
Enjoying life with close relatives (3b2) 2 56 3 3 9 4 42 1
Taking care of one’s own body (3b3) 1 4 3 5 31 24 5 1 2 3 5 12 13 4
Enjoying an art museum (3n1) 1 14 43 9 5 35 1
Social Justice Wealth Justice Loyalty Power
Ambiti
on Wisdom Wealth Justice Loyalty Power
Ambiti
on Wisdom
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Gay rights (4u1) 2 57 2 4 2
1
0 35 1 3 1 3
Ensuring that equity is applied equally to all (4u2) 65 3 3 1 1 1 35 2 1
Public services (4b1) 1 49 1 14 1 2 1 32 6 1 2
Fighting against prejudices and crimes (4b2) 68 2 44
Fighting against difficulties in the society (4b3) 1 58 2 3 2 1 39 1
Ensuring animal rights (4n1) 39 12 1 15 4 37 1 2 1
Broad-mindedness Protect Justice Freedom Daring Broad Honesty Protect Justice Freedom Daring Broad Honesty
Meeting new people (5u1) 1 38 1 29 1 5 5 32 1
Living in the moment (5b1) 47 8 11 1 17 20 3
Reducing prejudices (5b2) 34 15 20 1 19 3 20
Accepting other social orientations (5b3) 8 6 53 1 3 2 39
Approaching strangers (5b1) 2 13 14 39 1 4 4 13 22
Reading authors with different political views (5n2) 2 8 66 1 1 4 36
Protecting the environment Varied
Helpfuln
ess Wealth Protect Unity Daring Varied
Helpfuln
ess Wealth Protect Unity Daring
Putting certain rubbish in recycle bins rather than general waste* (6u1) 9 54 3 1 1 42
Making sure the lights are off (6u2) 3 21 4 36 7 1 5 1 39
Walk instead of using car for short distances (6u3) 8 2 1 48 6 38 4
Throwing garbage in the bin (6a1) 61 8 1 1 4 36 3 1
Saving water* (6b1) 6 3 52 11 1 1 35 3
Installing heat insulation in the house* (6n1) 10 8 25 11 3
1
3 1 4 8 25 2
Equality
Obedien
ce
Creativit
y Equality Protect
Discipli
ne Security
Obedien
ce
Creativit
y Equality Protect
Discipli
ne Security
Allowing all children to use all equipment (7u1) 5 8 20 1 10 12
1
4 4 5 22 6 2 4
Fair evaluation of job applications (7u2) 2 5 34 1 22 4 4 39 1
Fair treatment in the work place (7u3) 10 46 1 16 42
Treating everyone in the same way without
regard to their sex (7b1) 66 44
University quotas for blacks and Indians (7b2) 2 65 1 9 39 1
Discrimination against left-handed people (7n1) 2 22 10
3
1 1 1 17
2
2
273
Freedom Honesty Success
Helpfuln
ess Pleasure Protect Freedom ? Honesty Success
Helpfuln
ess Pleasure Protect Freedom ?
The right to vote (8u1) 4 11 2 47 3 1 39 3
Having the possibility to choose (8u2) 3 1 1 1 67 40
Knowing people from different places (8b1) 1 2 30 41 1 2 5 1 28 6
Defending one’s own opinion (8b2) 7 1 2 62 6 2 34 2
Traveling (8b3) 1 56 1 9 10 30
Questioning religious authorities (8n1) 1 3 3 1 47
1
4 6 32 3
Creativity
Disciplin
e Tradition Varied
Obedien
ce Protect
Creativit
y
Disciplin
e Tradition Varied
Obedien
ce Protect
Creativit
y
Making art (9u1) 1 2 4 1 1 60 1 43
Painting (9u2) 1 5 1 60 40
Being original at work (9b1) 24 2 2 5 1 36 2 40 1
Companies who aim to prosper (9b2) 30 4 1 4 27
1
0 16 1 2 1 16 8
Solving problems (9a1) 27 1 3 3 2 31 6 8 1 2 26 2
Thinking of new ideas (9a2) 5 1 60 41
A varied life Success Justice Tradition Pleasure Broad Varied Success Justice Tradition Pleasure Broad Varied
Maintaining a good work life balance (10u1) 49 13 4 1 5 3 34 1
Gaining new experiences (10u2) 22 10 11 33 1 8 31
Trying different activities (10a1) 18 1 11 5 30 2 13 27 1
Trying new food (10b1) 2 30 10 30 1 3 16 25
Trying to learn new traditions (10b2) 1 15 5 36 13 1 1 14 20 5
Practicing different sports (10b3) 1 25 2 39 2 7 1 31
Daring
Obedien
ce Wisdom Tradition Honesty Beauty Daring
Obedien
ce Wisdom Tradition Honesty Beauty Daring
Doing extreme sports (11u1) 5 1 1 3 56 42
Risk-taking (11u2) 1 1 2 2 63 3 40
Taking a test without studying (11b1) 1 8 1 55 8 1 37 4
Leaving home to study in another city (11b2) 14 1 50 2 4 3 37
Participating in an experiment that was not approved by an ethics 
committee (11n1) 1 1 8 1 49
1
6 9 1 26 4
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Living in a house without a smoke detector* (11n2) 1 3 5 1 1 21
3
5 1 4 1 27 8
Pleasure Security Pleasure Varied Freedom
Discipli
ne Power Security Pleasure Varied Freedom
Discipli
ne Power
Enjoy a fulfilling sexual relationship (12u1) 1 64 1 1 2 38 3
Having a drink (12u2) 51 8 10 1 1 1 36 1 1 1 1
Spending time with close relatives and friends (12a1) 19 48 4 3 1 1 34 7 1
Relief of stress from everyday life (12a2) 6 54 3 1 4 1 3 35 6 3
Being in the presence of nice people (12b1) 28 31 3 1 2 1 1 2 36 1 1
Watching a football game 12b2) 61 5 2 2 33 1 1 1 5
Success
Disciplin
e
Creativit
y Success Beauty Protect Power
Disciplin
e
Creativit
y Success Beauty Protect Power
Striving for top grades (13u1) 30 2 37 1 14 29
Aiming to be good in a job (13u2) 19 3 42 3 2 1 37
Achieving goals (13u3) 9 1 59 3 11 31
Passing an entrance exam for a job (13b1) 10 63 2 11 33
Being able to meet objectives (13b2) 11 4 57 1 20 20
Obtaining a PhD (13b3) 9 1 52 6 11 29 1
Ambition
Ambitio
n Beauty
Helpfuln
ess Loyalty Daring Wealth
Ambitio
n Beauty
Helpfuln
ess Loyalty Daring Wealth
Doing good work in order to obtain a promotion (14u1) 59 3 2 2 40 1 1 1
Applying for a new job (14u2) 29 16 1 15 4 8 39 1
Working to achieve your goals (14u3) 53 9 2 3 7 2 40 1
Having children, friends and family (14b1) 2 10 5 28 1 19 7 4 7 1 26 6
Getting the top job (14b2) 49 7 1 4 5 1 38 2
Wanting something what no one else has (14b3) 55 1 2 9 3 30 1 10
Wealth
Obedien
ce Varied Wisdom Security Wealth Daring
Obedien
ce Varied Wisdom Security Wealth Daring
Buying a house (15u1) 6 45 17 2 24 19
Going shopping (15u2) 1 11 3 46 2 4 1 5 1 32 1
Provide children with what they need (15a1) 1 3 33 29 3 2 1 1 35 5
Having many good friends * (15b1) 1 20 33 6 11 5 2 25 1 5
1
1
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Being able to celebrate life (15b2) 24 30 7 5 2 5 30 4 5 1
Being able to buy organic food* (15n1) 29 15 6 4
1
2 5 3 25 8
Social Power Success Unity Power Protect Wealth Varied Success Unity Power Protect Wealth Varied
Making decisions which are followed by other people (16u1) 5 41 7
2
3 1 41 1
Trying to persuade people to vote for you (16u2) 3 1 58 1 2 8 2 37
Providing welfare to society (16b1) 7 2 29 4 1 8
1
3 4 18 3 3 2
1
2
Strengthening the rights of citizens (16b2) 7 3 48 2 9 4 1 32 7
Being able to make improvements within a community (16b3) 7 1 49 2 4 1 3 7 3 14 10 2 1 3
Controlling other people (16n1) 59 5 2 6 1 38 2
Family Security
Helpfuln
ess Justice
Ambitio
n
Creativit
y
Securit
y Beauty
Helpfuln
ess Justice
Ambitio
n
Creativit
y
Securit
y Beauty
Comforting close relatives (17u1) 37 6 1 1 25 1 8 34
Keeping watch over the children (17u2) 34 4 1 27 1 5 1 34
Providing a stable home life (17u3) 7 2 59 1 2 40
Leisure time on the beach with close relatives (17b1) 9 1 6 18 28 6 28 14 2
Installing electric fences for your home* (17b2) 1 1 2 69 1 1 36 2
Ensuring a good income (17b3) 6 4 38 25 2 2 1 20 20
Respect for Traditon Tradition Pleasure
Helpfuln
ess Beauty Success
Creativit
y Tradition Pleasure
Helpfuln
ess Beauty Success
Creativit
y
Celebrating religious ceremonies (18a1) 60 10 1 2 2 42
Spending time with family at Christmas (18a2) 39 29 3 2 29 10 1
Honouring your parents’ requests (18b1) 53 12 1 1 30 10 2
Listening to your father’s advice (18b2) 53 2 8 1 5 22 11 6 1 3
Celebrating the anniversary of the city in which you live (18b3) 63 2 1 1 35 4 1
Celebrating a carnival (18n1) 23 35 5 8 19 19 1 2
Self-discipline Freedom Honesty Power
Creativit
y
Discipli
ne Wealth Freedom Honesty Power
Creativit
y
Discipli
ne Wealth
Exercising (19u1) 23 5 37 1 1 2 38 1 2
Losing weight (19u2) 10 3 51 1 4 1 1 38
Quitting smoking (19u3) 8 1 55 1 3 41
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Succeeding in your professional career (19a1) 1 8 8 4 32 18 1 1 1 3 28 9
Doing all your work (19b1) 1 8 2 63 1 1 40
Living your own life and not following the crowd (19n1) 1 8 2 63 1 1 33 1 1 5
Obedience Wisdom
Obedien
ce Freedom
Disciplin
e
Traditio
n Equality Wisdom
Obedien
ce Freedom
Disciplin
e
Traditio
n Equality
Complying with the law* (20a1) 6 46 11 5 3 39 2 2
Children need to comply (20a2) 5 49 13 6 1 38 2
A high-ranking person telling inferiors what to do (20a3) 8 33 3 5 5
1
9 3 32 1 1 1 3
Listening to older people (20b1) 26 27 13 31 5 7 1
Attending classes and following the rules (20b2) 5 41 1 19 2 1 1 30 9
Helping your mother if she asks for it (20b3) 2 60 1 2 2 1 30 1 5 2 2
Helpfulness Broad Varied Justice
Helpfuln
ess
Traditio
n
Creativit
y Broad Varied Justice
Helpfuln
ess
Traditio
n
Creativit
y
Customer service (21u1) 2 1 43 15 1 9 1 3 35 3
Supporting other people (21a1) 1 1 4 59 2 4 6 30
Supporting colleagues (21a2) 3 63 2 1 1 2 38 1
Offering a lift (21b1) 5 17 35 1 6 3 43 1
Giving food to poor people (21b2) 3 1 25 43 1 11 28
Accepting a gift (21n1) 17 7 14 18 1
1
9 5 2 2 1 16 1
1
3
Loyalty
Creativit
y
Obedien
ce Protect Loyalty Varied
Helpfuln
ess
Creativit
y
Obedien
ce Protect Loyalty Varied
Helpfuln
ess
Supporting your rugby team (22u1) 38 18 3
1
8 41 2
Defending a colleague (22u2) 56 1 14 2 1 36 4
Keeping secrets* (22u3) 1 3 59 3 1 39 3
Standing by your friends (22a1) 47 22 44
A husband who respects his wife (22b1) 3 61 2 39 1
Always working for the same company (22b2) 1 4 1 49 1 8 7 3 38
Honesty Justice Wisdom Honesty
Disciplin
e Power Pleasure Justice Wisdom Honesty
Disciplin
e Power Pleasure
Not cheating (23u1) 1 6 56 10 2 1 34 6
Telling the truth (23a1) 3 61 2 40
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Returning money which you have found or wrongly received 
(23b1)^ 3 65 1
Borrowing money and giving it back (23b2) 2 1 62 2 5 73 4 3
Completing an exam without cheating* (23n1) 7 56 7 1 40
Informing a car owner when you have accidentally damaged 
his/her car (23n2) 6 1 70 1 39
Note. Most frequent chosen value in bold if significant different from the second most often chosen value.  ?: “Don’t know”. Unity: Unity with nature, Beauty: A world of 
beauty, Protect: Protecting the environment, Justice: Social Justice, Broad: Broad-mindedness, Varied: A varied life, Power: Social power, Security: Family security, 
Tradition: Respect for Tradition, Discipline: Self-discipline.
1u1 is the first instantiation mentioned by British participants of the first value (here: Unity with nature), 2b3 is the third instantiation mentioned by Brazilian participants of 
the second value. The letter “a” in the middle stands for all (i.e., mentioned in all two countries), the letter “n” indicates that the instantiation was not mentioned by the 
participants in none of the two countries (i.e., was created by me).
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Detailed results of Study 6
Table A13
Study 6: Descriptive statistics and mixed ANOVA statistics
d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-happy -0.53 0.005 1.83 2.50 -0.66 230 5.95 0.016 0.03 94.70 0.000 0.29 3.16 0.077 0.01
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-surprised -0.23 0.238 0.77 -0.76 1.53 220 23.54 0.000 0.10 0.27 0.606 0.00 9.91 0.002 0.04
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-sad -0.12 0.545 -0.87 -2.48 1.61 212 26.48 0.000 0.11 76.78 0.000 0.27 19.96 0.000 0.09
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-embarrassed -0.19 0.322 -0.51 -1.10 0.59 213 8.23 0.005 0.04 18.72 0.000 0.08 2.71 0.101 0.01
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-angry -0.36 0.069 -1.12 -1.96 0.83 215 13.89 0.000 0.06 56.88 0.000 0.21 4.40 0.037 0.02
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-nervous -0.32 0.109 -1.08 -1.26 0.18 211 3.87 0.051 0.02 36.04 0.000 0.15 0.21 0.649 0.00
installs heat insulation in the house (6n1)-proud -0.22 0.254 1.71 1.51 0.20 214 5.38 0.021 0.02 53.44 0.000 0.20 0.20 0.655 0.00
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-happy -0.12 0.525
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-surprised -1.09 0.000
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-sad -1.11 0.000
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-
embarrassed
-0.55 0.005
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-angry -0.63 0.001
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-nervous -0.27 0.169
does not install heat insulation in the house (6n1-R)-proud -0.46 0.019
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-happy 0.10 0.598 -1.99 -3.46 1.48 225 5.89 0.016 0.03 125.35 0.000 0.36 9.83 0.002 0.04
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-surprised -1.46 0.000 -1.85 3.62 -5.48 223 0.23 0.629 0.00 3.32 0.070 0.01 141.22 0.000 0.39
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-sad -0.83 0.000 0.78 2.22 -1.44 210 12.89 0.000 0.06 49.07 0.000 0.19 12.77 0.000 0.06
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-
embarrassed
-0.81 0.000 0.06 1.60 -1.54 214 4.30 0.039 0.02 15.43 0.000 0.07 17.52 0.000 0.08
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-angry -1.50 0.000 0.44 2.85 -2.41 213 39.14 0.000 0.16 63.92 0.000 0.23 41.51 0.000 0.16
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-nervous -1.88 0.000 0.57 3.62 -3.05 212 72.83 0.000 0.26 93.58 0.000 0.31 59.22 0.000 0.22
lives in a house without a smoke detector (11n2 )-proud -0.30 0.122 -1.54 -1.67 0.13 212 3.80 0.052 0.02 46.76 0.000 0.18 0.08 0.779 0.00
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d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-happy -0.75 0.000
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-surprised 1.77 0.000
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-sad 0.01 0.952
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-
embarrassed
0.32 0.108
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-angry 0.03 0.867
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-nervous -0.15 0.458
lives in a house with a smoke detector (11n2 - R)-proud -0.26 0.192
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-happy -0.11 0.569 2.60 1.59 1.02 225 10.42 0.001 0.04 116.23 0.000 0.34 6.12 0.014 0.03
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-surprised -0.01 0.970 0.87 -0.16 1.03 217 5.42 0.021 0.02 3.63 0.058 0.02 5.12 0.025 0.02
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-sad -0.16 0.413 -1.22 -1.77 0.55 216 5.24 0.023 0.02 48.36 0.000 0.18 1.71 0.192 0.01
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-embarrassed -0.10 0.587 -0.54 -1.02 0.48 215 3.67 0.057 0.02 15.75 0.000 0.07 1.57 0.211 0.01
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-angry -0.22 0.264 -0.56 -1.08 0.52 211 8.16 0.005 0.04 17.79 0.000 0.08 1.93 0.166 0.01
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-nervous -0.01 0.962 -0.34 -1.07 0.73 212 3.82 0.052 0.02 11.81 0.001 0.05 3.53 0.062 0.02
is able to buy organic food (15n1)-proud 0.16 0.404 2.39 0.77 1.62 213 4.09 0.045 0.02 54.24 0.000 0.20 12.25 0.001 0.05
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-happy -0.86 0.000
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-surprised -0.63 0.001
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-sad -0.43 0.028
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-embarrassed -0.39 0.046
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-angry -0.54 0.007
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-nervous -0.52 0.008
is unable to buy organic food (15n1-R)-proud -1.12 0.000
recycles rubbish (6u1)-happy 0.22 0.262 3.85 3.37 0.49 221 0.10 0.755 0.00 294.40 0.000 0.57 1.26 0.262 0.01
recycles rubbish (6u1)-surprised 1.35 0.000 1.90 -1.74 3.64 214 3.25 0.073 0.02 2.00 0.159 0.01 58.92 0.000 0.22
recycles rubbish (6u1)-sad -0.19 0.324 -2.18 -2.24 0.06 220 1.47 0.226 0.01 94.05 0.000 0.30 0.02 0.893 0.00
recycles rubbish (6u1)-embarrassed -0.18 0.373 -1.38 -1.65 0.27 209 2.40 0.123 0.01 45.67 0.000 0.18 0.36 0.548 0.00
recycles rubbish (6u1)-angry -0.42 0.033 -2.35 -2.21 -0.15 212 2.69 0.103 0.01 110.21 0.000 0.34 0.11 0.738 0.00
recycles rubbish (6u1)-nervous -0.51 0.010 -1.76 -0.54 -1.21 212 0.33 0.566 0.00 35.34 0.000 0.14 8.30 0.004 0.04
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d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
recycles rubbish (6u1)-proud 0.10 0.618 3.83 3.56 0.27 214 0.03 0.873 0.00 252.41 0.000 0.54 0.33 0.569 0.00
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-happy -0.10 0.601
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-surprised -0.77 0.000
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-sad -0.15 0.424
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-embarrassed -0.25 0.210
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-angry -0.14 0.469
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-nervous 0.37 0.058
does not recycle rubbish (6u1-R)-proud -0.06 0.762
saves water (6b1)-happy 0.74 0.000 5.27 3.26 2.02 227 0.49 0.484 0.00 1233.26 0.000 0.84 61.10 0.000 0.21
saves water (6b1)-surprised 0.85 0.000 0.71 -0.88 1.60 212 6.17 0.014 0.03 0.01 0.919 0.00 11.42 0.001 0.05
saves water (6b1)-sad 0.01 0.964 -3.73 -2.25 -1.48 220 12.03 0.001 0.05 202.87 0.000 0.48 11.19 0.001 0.05
saves water (6b1)-embarrassed -0.05 0.785 -2.55 -1.71 -0.84 211 2.90 0.090 0.01 103.63 0.000 0.33 3.79 0.053 0.02
saves water (6b1)-angry 0.25 0.203 -3.32 -2.82 -0.50 216 7.54 0.007 0.03 206.61 0.000 0.49 1.29 0.257 0.01
saves water (6b1)-nervous 0.16 0.416 -2.51 -1.69 -0.82 212 7.49 0.007 0.03 92.64 0.000 0.30 3.28 0.071 0.02
saves water (6b1)-proud 0.76 0.000 4.60 2.50 2.11 212 2.77 0.098 0.01 323.63 0.000 0.60 25.96 0.000 0.11
wastes water (6b1-R)-happy -1.73 0.000
wastes water (6b1-R)-surprised -0.12 0.554
wastes water (6b1-R)-sad 0.80 0.000
wastes water (6b1-R)-embarrassed 0.40 0.039
wastes water (6b1-R)-angry 0.47 0.015
wastes water (6b1-R)-nervous 0.53 0.007
wastes water (6b1-R)-proud -0.65 0.001
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-happy -0.83 0.000 1.70 2.03 -0.33 222 36.20 0.000 0.14 85.78 0.000 0.28 0.66 0.419 0.00
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-surprised -0.01 0.962 1.55 1.31 0.24 222 0.35 0.553 0.00 40.07 0.000 0.15 0.27 0.606 0.00
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-sad -0.23 0.237 -1.20 -0.80 -0.41 216 0.39 0.535 0.00 20.52 0.000 0.09 0.77 0.380 0.00
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-embarrassed -0.41 0.039 -0.77 -0.42 -0.35 215 3.00 0.085 0.01 9.94 0.002 0.04 0.76 0.383 0.00
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-angry -0.47 0.018 -0.56 -0.61 0.05 209 8.97 0.003 0.04 9.67 0.002 0.04 0.02 0.890 0.00
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d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-nervous -0.75 0.000 -0.73 -0.26 -0.47 211 10.45 0.001 0.05 7.35 0.007 0.03 1.43 0.233 0.01
thinks of new artistic painting styles (9u1)-proud -1.04 0.000 1.86 3.01 -1.15 210 30.61 0.000 0.13 108.31 0.000 0.34 6.27 0.013 0.03
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-happy -0.81 0.000
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-
surprised
-0.16 0.410
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-sad 0.03 0.873
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-
embarrassed
-0.11 0.579
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-angry -0.38 0.056
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-nervous -0.24 0.215
does not think of new artistic painting styles (9u1-R)-proud -0.45 0.025
complies with the law (20a1)-happy 0.37 0.050 4.78 4.14 0.63 225 0.70 0.403 0.00 826.87 0.000 0.79 3.91 0.049 0.02
complies with the law (20a1)-surprised 1.31 0.000 0.35 -3.69 4.04 213 1.45 0.230 0.01 35.74 0.000 0.14 72.88 0.000 0.25
complies with the law (20a1)-sad -0.09 0.649 -3.44 -3.39 -0.05 216 0.08 0.775 0.00 279.55 0.000 0.56 0.01 0.905 0.00
complies with the law (20a1)-embarrassed 0.11 0.575 -2.51 -3.42 0.91 212 2.98 0.086 0.01 189.44 0.000 0.47 4.59 0.033 0.02
complies with the law (20a1)-angry 0.02 0.907 -3.09 -3.91 0.82 216 4.56 0.034 0.02 345.78 0.000 0.62 4.78 0.030 0.02
complies with the law (20a1)-nervous 0.24 0.220 -2.46 -3.60 1.15 213 2.43 0.121 0.01 210.77 0.000 0.50 7.81 0.006 0.04
complies with the law (20a1)-proud 0.33 0.091 4.20 3.34 0.87 216 0.66 0.417 0.00 349.66 0.000 0.62 4.36 0.038 0.02
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-happy -0.16 0.400
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-surprised -1.03 0.000
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-sad -0.02 0.923
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-embarrassed -0.41 0.036
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-angry -0.46 0.018
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-nervous -0.49 0.012
does not comply with the law (20a1-R)-proud -0.24 0.219
buys luxurious things (15u3)-happy -0.59 0.002 0.02 0.90 -0.87 223 6.38 0.012 0.03 3.50 0.063 0.02 4.26 0.040 0.02
buys luxurious things (15u3)-surprised -0.32 0.094 -0.13 0.36 -0.49 219 1.69 0.195 0.01 0.11 0.745 0.00 1.14 0.288 0.01
buys luxurious things (15u3)-sad -0.58 0.003 -0.21 -0.11 -0.10 215 13.30 0.000 0.06 0.74 0.390 0.00 0.06 0.804 0.00
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d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
buys luxurious things (15u3)-embarrassed -0.54 0.007 -0.08 0.66 -0.74 215 4.91 0.028 0.02 1.44 0.231 0.01 3.47 0.064 0.02
buys luxurious things (15u3)-angry -0.75 0.000 0.12 0.49 -0.37 212 18.61 0.000 0.08 2.79 0.096 0.01 1.21 0.274 0.01
buys luxurious things (15u3)-nervous -0.64 0.001 0.03 0.50 -0.47 211 10.56 0.001 0.05 1.69 0.195 0.01 1.82 0.179 0.01
buys luxurious things (15u3)-proud -0.36 0.066 -0.17 0.30 -0.47 214 3.15 0.077 0.01 0.01 0.921 0.00 0.86 0.356 0.00
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-happy -0.07 0.721
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-surprised -0.03 0.869
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-sad -0.43 0.029
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-embarrassed -0.05 0.786
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-angry -0.44 0.026
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-nervous -0.26 0.180
does not buy luxurious things (15u3-R)-proud -0.12 0.528
has many good friends (15b1)-happy 0.03 0.855 4.59 4.37 0.23 226 0.18 0.669 0.00 852.78 0.000 0.79 0.53 0.468 0.00
has many good friends (15b1)-surprised 1.05 0.000 0.32 -2.68 3.00 215 1.78 0.184 0.01 16.19 0.000 0.07 38.01 0.000 0.15
has many good friends (15b1)-sad -0.04 0.855 -3.26 -3.91 0.65 219 3.32 0.070 0.01 315.60 0.000 0.59 2.62 0.107 0.01
has many good friends (15b1)-embarrassed 0.03 0.896 -1.88 -1.50 -0.38 213 1.18 0.279 0.01 75.25 0.000 0.26 0.92 0.340 0.00
has many good friends (15b1)-angry -0.01 0.956 -0.78 -1.74 0.96 212 6.40 0.012 0.03 38.05 0.000 0.15 6.07 0.015 0.03
has many good friends (15b1)-nervous -0.06 0.768 -0.79 -1.78 0.98 213 7.33 0.007 0.03 35.32 0.000 0.14 5.62 0.019 0.03
has many good friends (15b1)-proud 0.26 0.184 3.84 1.97 1.88 213 4.34 0.038 0.02 202.88 0.000 0.49 18.90 0.000 0.08
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-happy -0.17 0.395
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-surprised -0.65 0.001
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-sad -0.37 0.056
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-embarrassed 0.22 0.248
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-angry -0.56 0.005
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-nervous -0.59 0.003
does not have many good friends (15b1-R)-proud -1.14 0.000
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-happy 0.73 0.000 1.95 -1.22 3.16 218 1.20 0.274 0.01 6.69 0.010 0.03 47.03 0.000 0.18
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-surprised -1.23 0.000 0.70 2.98 -2.28 223 23.24 0.000 0.09 47.86 0.000 0.18 22.20 0.000 0.09
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d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-sad -1.40 0.000 -0.64 1.55 -2.19 217 19.61 0.000 0.08 1.79 0.182 0.01 24.66 0.000 0.10
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-embarrassed -1.45 0.000 -0.27 1.48 -1.74 211 37.54 0.000 0.15 6.31 0.013 0.03 19.86 0.000 0.09
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-angry -1.61 0.000 -0.41 1.35 -1.77 210 38.90 0.000 0.16 3.52 0.062 0.02 22.59 0.000 0.10
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-nervous -1.66 0.000 -0.05 2.28 -2.33 212 49.64 0.000 0.19 21.23 0.000 0.09 30.82 0.000 0.13
installs electric fences around the house (17b2)-proud 0.25 0.197 1.30 -0.36 1.65 210 1.70 0.194 0.01 5.36 0.022 0.02 10.88 0.001 0.05
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
happy
-1.18 0.000
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
surprised
-0.02 0.920
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
sad
0.07 0.714
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
embarrassed
-0.22 0.254
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
angry
-0.20 0.304
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
nervous
-0.21 0.273
does not install electric fences around the house (17b2-R)-
proud
-0.70 0.001
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-happy 0.19 0.311 4.90 4.64 0.26 223 0.05 0.816 0.00 1020.25 0.000 0.82 0.73 0.394 0.00
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-surprised 0.58 0.004 0.74 -1.31 2.05 212 0.23 0.630 0.00 0.33 0.565 0.00 14.76 0.000 0.07
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-sad -0.08 0.683 -3.54 -4.26 0.72 215 4.37 0.038 0.02 328.47 0.000 0.60 2.82 0.094 0.01
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-embarrassed 0.14 0.485 -2.62 -3.55 0.93 212 2.05 0.154 0.01 181.20 0.000 0.46 4.21 0.041 0.02
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-angry -0.02 0.905 -3.08 -4.47 1.39 215 11.56 0.001 0.05 299.33 0.000 0.58 10.57 0.001 0.05
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-nervous -0.09 0.651 -2.54 -3.44 0.90 210 5.80 0.017 0.03 157.50 0.000 0.43 3.61 0.059 0.02
is able to keep secrets (22u3)-proud 0.17 0.383 3.91 3.47 0.44 214 0.15 0.703 0.00 282.41 0.000 0.57 0.96 0.329 0.00
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-happy -0.07 0.710
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-surprised -0.47 0.017
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-sad -0.41 0.035
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-embarrassed -0.38 0.050
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-angry -0.72 0.000
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d p of d Brazil 
M-diff
UK M-
diff
Brazil 
- UK 
M-diff
df2 F_C p_C η_C F_V p_V η _V F_IA p_IA η 
_IA
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-nervous -0.50 0.012
is unable to keep secrets (22u3-R)-proud -0.10 0.624
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-happy -0.08 0.676 4.42 4.47 -0.05 219 0.32 0.572 0.00 651.89 0.000 0.75 0.02 0.891 0.00
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-surprised 0.80 0.000 0.14 -3.60 3.73 211 1.50 0.222 0.01 33.33 0.000 0.14 50.87 0.000 0.19
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-sad -0.44 0.027 -3.23 -2.83 -0.40 219 2.48 0.117 0.01 158.86 0.000 0.42 0.65 0.420 0.00
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-embarrassed -0.36 0.065 -2.34 -2.61 0.28 211 6.87 0.009 0.03 104.21 0.000 0.33 0.32 0.570 0.00
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-angry -0.52 0.010 -2.57 -3.46 0.88 213 21.87 0.000 0.09 177.20 0.000 0.45 3.89 0.050 0.02
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-nervous -0.63 0.002 -2.41 -1.71 -0.70 212 2.38 0.125 0.01 79.91 0.000 0.27 2.16 0.143 0.01
completes an exam without cheating (23n1)-proud -0.12 0.536 3.99 4.55 -0.56 210 0.05 0.820 0.00 402.34 0.000 0.66 1.71 0.193 0.01
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-happy -0.08 0.688
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-surprised -1.17 0.000
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-sad -0.09 0.642
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-embarrassed -0.37 0.061
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-angry -0.75 0.000
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-nervous -0.01 0.971
completes an exam by cheating (23n1-R)-proud 0.31 0.124
Note. For convenience, the stronger effects are in bold (|d| > .70 and η > .04); d: Cohen’s d, whereas positive values indicate that Brazilians are scoring higher; p of d: p-
values of a two-sided between-subject t-test (Brazil – UK); M-diff: mean difference between positive and negative framing of instantiation within each country; Brazil – UK 
M-diff: Difference of M-diff (i.e., Brazil M-diff minus UK M-diff); df2: denominator degrees of freedom (all df1 were 1 and are therefore omitted); F_C: F-value country; 
p_C: p-value country; η_C: generalized omega square country; V: version (i.e., framing of instantiation, positive vs. negative); IA: interaction; -R is the recoded, i.e., 
reversed framed instantiation; for the explanation of (6n1) etc. see note of Table A12.
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Appendix B: Do students provide an accurate estimate of the general public?
(Manuscript accepted for publication in PlosOne)
Abstract
Most psychological studies rely on student samples. Students are usually 
considered as more homogenous than representative samples both within and across 
countries. However, little is known about the nature of the differences between student 
and representative samples. This is an important gap, also because knowledge about the 
degree of difference between student and representative samples may allow to infer 
from the former to the latter group. Across 59 countries and 12 personality (Big-5) and 
attitudinal variables we found that differences between students and general public were 
partly substantial, incoherent, and contradicted previous findings. Two often used 
cultural variables, embeddedness and intellectual autonomy, failed to explain the 
differences between both groups across countries. We further found that students vary as 
much as the general population both between and within countries. In summary, our 
results indicate that generalizing from students to the general public is problematic when 
personal and attitudinal variables are used, as students vary mostly randomly from the 
general public. Findings are also discussed in terms of the replication crisis within 
psychology.
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Student samples are extremely common in psychological and cross-cultural 
studies due to the facility of recruitment, lower cost of administration, and assumed 
lower response bias (e.g., Arnett, 2008). In cross-cultural research for example, students 
are thought to reduce the variability in the sample due to differences in education levels 
(Saucier et al., 2015), and were found to give a moderately good estimate of 
representative or teachers samples (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Fischer & 
Schwartz, 2011). However, many concerns are raised in using student samples for 
psychological studies regarding issues of representativeness, generalizability, and 
comparability of results (Henrich et al., 2010; Peterson & Merunka, 2014; Sears, 1986). 
For example, Greenfield (2014) argued that differences between socioeconomic groups 
are larger than differences between countries. As students have usually high 
socioeconomic status, this further challenges the generalizability of data from students. 
Indeed, students are, on average, more homogeneous than non-student participants, as a 
large second-order meta-analysis revealed (Peterson, 2001). Importantly, in this study 
the non-student samples were often only another subgroup from the general public (e.g., 
housewives). 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has systematically compared students 
with the general public across many countries. For example, are students indeed more 
homogeneous across countries and is it legitimate to generalize from student samples to 
the general public? In the present paper we intend to explore potential differences 
between student and representative samples and to shed more light on potential 
predictors of the difference between student and representative samples: The mere 
existence of such differences is not problematic as long as they can be systematically 
predicted. We focus on variables which are important in personal and social psychology: 
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Five personality variables (the Big-5 dimensions) and seven attitudinal variables such as 
moral attitudes or respect towards the elderly.
Two important variables in cross-cultural research are collectivism or 
embeddedness, and individualism or autonomy (Schwartz, 2006). For example, people 
in autonomous countries prefer to stand out and to follow their own goals (Schwartz, 
2006). This would suggest that students in autonomous countries are more likely to 
follow their own goals than students in embedded countries, who, in contrast, will adopt 
the goals of the general public. Therefore, we expect that the difference between 
students and the general public vary as a function of how autonomous or embedded a 
society is.
The present study further investigates some under explored issues. Specifically, 
we aim to compare students with the general public from 59 countries across several 
variables, expecting that students are, in general, more homogeneous than the general 
public, both across countries (Hypothesis 1a) and also within countries (Hypothesis 1b). 
Furthermore, we aim to explain the difference between students and the general public 
as well as the variability within student samples. We expect that the difference between 
students and the general public is larger in more autonomous countries, as there is less 
pressure to adjust one’s own personality, attitudes and views along with the general 
population (Hypothesis 2a). With the reverse true for embeddedness (Hypothesis 2b), 
because of the large negative correlation with autonomy (Schwartz, 2006). In line with 
this argument, we also expect that within-student variability is greater in autonomous 
countries as there is more acceptance of individual development (Hypothesis 3a). With 
the reverse true for embeddedness (Hypothesis 3b). This view is also supported by the 
finding that, across 80 countries, autonomy was strongly and positively correlated with 
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income and democratization (Schwartz, 2006). In summary, we are interested in patterns 
of variability, not mean differences.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b require some further evaluations. Based on previous 
research we further assumed, that for several variables the sign of the difference is the 
same across countries. For example, a large cross-sectional study found systematic 
personality (Big-5) differences between younger and older participants (Srivastava, 
John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003). Younger participants scored higher on neuroticism and 
openness to new experiences, but lower on agreeableness and conscientiousness 
compared to older participants. No relation was found between age and extraversion. 
Hence, we assumed that all student samples score higher on neuroticism and openness to 
new experiences but lower on agreeableness and conscientiousness. However, we expect 
that the magnitude of the difference between students and the general public is larger in 
countries higher in intellectual autonomy.  
The present study is also interesting from another point of view. Recently, it was 
found that more than half of the studies within psychology could not be replicated (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015). However, this reproducibility project was criticized for 
not taking contextual differences into account, as some studies were replicated in 
another country, which may have partly caused the low reproducibility rate (Bavel, 
Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 2016). This is in line with calls for studies to 
explore whether effects vary across contexts and if so, how (Gelman, 2014). If we find 
systematic differences between students and the general public (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) 
this would us allow to make specific predictions about when a study, which compares 
students and the general public, can be replicated in a different context. 
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Method
Participants. We used the most recent version of the World Values Survey 
(WVS, 6th round), which includes samples of 86,272 general public participants 
(51.20% female) from 60 countries, with a mean age of 41.68 years (SD = 16.58). Data 
were retrieved from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (data set released on 16 April 
2015). Data from Argentina were excluded as the employment status was missing. Of 
the remaining 84,737 participants, 6,352 reported being students (M = 105.90 per 
country, SD = 79.24), leaving 78,385 non-students (M = 1328.22, SD = 442.45). Non-
surprisingly, across all 59 countries the general public was almost twice as old (M = 
43.23, SD = 16.10) as the students (M = 21.98, SD = 6.64, d = 2.74). Also, students were 
on average more educated than the general public, t(8301.14) = 51.42, d = 0.68. Because 
the non-students vary strongly with regard to factors such as their income, education, 
employment status, and political attitudes within each country, we refer to the non-
student samples as general public. 
Materials. In total, we used two independent and twelve dependent variables. 
The independent variables were embeddedness as an estimator of collectivism, and 
intellectual autonomy as a proxy for individualism (Schwartz, 2006). Both are part of 
Schwartz’ (2006) cultural value orientation model. To measure the cultural value 
orientations, participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how much each of the 
56 values is a guiding principle in their life. Examples include “FREEDOM (freedom of 
action and thought)” for intellectual autonomy and “OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting 
obligations)” for embeddedness. The 56 values were combined to form seven CVOs, 
including embeddedness and intellectual autonomy (Schwartz, 2006). The data were 
centered on an individual bases, i.e., the individual overall mean for the 56 items was 
subtracted from each participant response. This was done to correct for individual scale 
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use tendencies and to investigate the relative importance of CVOs (Schwartz, 1992, 
2006). The CVOs were made publicly available by Schwartz (Schwartz, 2008). 
The dependent variables were chosen out of the wide range of variables available 
in the WVS, based on good reliabilities (αs ≥ .70). We used the items of the Morally 
Debatable Scale (Harding & Phillips, 1986), which were divided into three sub-scales 
after a principal component analysis [cf. 13]: attitudes towards liberal personal-sexual 
behaviours (7 items, α = .89), dishonest-illegal behaviours (5 items, α = .83), and 
domestic violence (3 items, α = .78). For example, participants were asked how 
justifiable they find homosexuality or abortion (personal-sexual behaviours), stealing 
property or accepting a bribe (dishonest-illegal), and a man beating his wife (domestic 
violence). Responses were given on a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (never justifiable) 
to 10 (always justifiable). 
The other variables were trust in strangers (e.g., “How much do you trust people 
of another religion?”, 3 items, α = .79), understanding of democracy (e.g., is 
“Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” an essential characteristic of 
democracy?, 6 items, α = .74), confidence in political institutions (e.g., “How much trust 
do you have in the parliament?”, 6 items, α = .87), and perceived respect of own society 
towards elderly (e.g., “People over 70 are viewed with respect by my society”, 3 items, 
α = .71).
Additionally, we included the ten-item personality inventory which measures 
each of the so called Big-5 dimensions of personality with two items (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann Jr., 2003). The five dimensions are extraversion (e.g., “I see myself 
as someone who is outgoing, sociable”), agreeableness (e.g., “I see myself as someone 
who is generally trusting”), conscientiousness (e.g., “I see myself as someone who does 
a thorough job”), neuroticism (e.g., “I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily”), 
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and openness to new experiences (e.g., “I see myself as someone who has few artistic 
interests” [reversed coded]). One item of each dimension was reversed coded. 
Responses were given on a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 
(agree strongly). As the measure was designed to measure five broad dimensions with 
only two items, reliabilities were as expected (Gosling, n.d.) low (αs ≤ .39). 
Nevertheless, other psychometric qualities such as convergent validity or test-retest 
reliabilities were found to be good (Gosling et al., 2003). Data for this measure was 
available for 25 countries. 
Results
We have made the transformed data available (i.e., the summary statistics for all 
60 countries) for Hypotheses 2a and 2b along with the R script used to compute them. 
The other steps of the analyses (i.e., the tests for Hypotheses 1 and 3) can be reproduced 
with the R script and the original WVS data which can be obtained from 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
To test Hypothesis 1a – are students more homogeneous compared to the 
representative sample? –, we first computed separate medians for each group, country, 
and variable, as some variables were skewed. Variation of the medians within the 
students across the 59 countries was then compared with the variation within the general 
public, using a Levene test for each of the 7 DVs. This tested the null hypothesis that the 
variances of the medians do not differ between both groups. For example, the standard 
deviation of the medians for the student samples for trust in science across all 59 
countries was 0.31, and for the general public samples 0.32 (see Table 1, columns 2-3 
for SDs). Contrary to Hypothesis 1a, none of the Levene tests reached statistical 
significance, neither for the Big-5 (all Fs[1, 48] < 2.70, ps > .10) nor the seven 
attitudinal variables (all Fs[1, 116] < 1.05, ps > .30), indicating that the variation of the 
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medians was approximately the same for students and the general public across all 59 
countries. To test Hypothesis 1b, we computed the within-country variability (standard 
deviation) separate for each of the two groups and each country and compared the SDs 
using independent sample t-tests. None of the twelve t-tests reached statistical 
significance, neither for the Big-5 dimensions (ts[23] ≤ 0.80, ps > .43, and ds ≤ .22) 
nor seven attitudinal variables (ts[57] ≤ 1.97, ps > .05, and ds ≤ .36). Because the 
medians may not be normal distributed, we additionally computed twelve Wilcoxon 
rank sum test. However, results remained the same (all ps > .06). This indicates that 
students were on average as heterogeneous as the general public both between and 
within countries.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b stated that the difference between students and the general 
public is greater in autonomous countries, and smaller in embedded ones. Cohen’s ds 
were computed as a measure of the difference between the two groups for all 59 
countries. Cohen’s ds differed up to |.80|, but mainly between -.5 and .5, whereas the 
distribution of ds were mostly normal with a mean of around 0 (see Table 1, column 4 
for the means of d). Next, we correlated the absolute value of d for each variable with 
the country average score for intellectual autonomy and embeddedness. 
Table 1
Zero-order correlation coefficient of Cohen’s d (student vs. general public) and 
within country variance of students with predictors
Cohen’s d Variance
SD Stud SD GP Embed Intellectual 
Autonomy
Embed Intellectual 
Autonomy
Extraversion 0.25 0.20 0.10 -.22 .37 -.65** .61*
Agreeableness 0.40 0.54 -0.08 -.01 .14 .63** -.52*
Conscientiousness 0.67 0.70 -0.25 -.51* .38 .06 -.07
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Neuroticism 0.29 0.25 0.03 -.27 .22 -.31 .43
Openness 0.36 0.32 -0.02 -.13 .11 -.52* .56*
MA: Domestic violence 0.89 0.92 0.06 -.11 .14 .18 -.21
MA: Dishonest-illegal behavior 0.75 0.73 0.18 -.47** .49** .16 -.20
MA: Personal-sexual behavior 1.74 1.56 0.21 -.10 .07 -.35* .24
Trust in strangers 0.31 0.32 -0.04 -.11 .18 .07 -.17
Understanding of democracy 0.81 0.77 -0.03 .30 -.22 .38* -.40**
Confidence in pol. Institutions 0.40 0.41 -0.03 -.20 .26 .20 -.22
Respects towards elderly 0.38 0.38 -0.02 -.02 -.08 .23 -.31
Note. SD: Standard deviation, Stud: Students, GP: General public, Embed: Embeddedness, : 
mean standardized difference of students to general public (if d > 0: Students score higher); N of countries 
for SD (columns 2-3) = 25 (Big-5) and 58-59, N of countries (columns 5-8) = 16 (Big-5) and 39-40.
* p < .05, ** p < .01
The predicted pattern of results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b was found only for 
moral attitudes towards dishonest-illegal (Table 1, columns 5-6). In countries with 
higher embeddedness values, students endorsed moral attitudes towards dishonest-illegal 
behaviours more similarly to the general public. The reverse pattern was observed in 
countries high in intellectual autonomy (this is not surprising, given that embeddedness 
and intellectual autonomy were strongly negatively correlated, r = -.87). Of the 
remaining 22 correlations only one reached statistical significance (Table 1, columns 5-
6). 
We have also used the Human Developmental Index (United Nations 
Developmental Programme, 2014) and the Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2012) as independent variables. However, because of high correlations with 
intellectual autonomy (r = .70 and r = .64, respectively), results were very similar and 
are, therefore, omitted. We have further added the tightness scores (Gelfand et al., 2011)
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as an independent variables for 20 countries. This also did not change the pattern of 
results.
Because of this failure to find a predictor for the difference between students and 
general public, we investigated the d-scores more closely. Within each variable, some of 
the ds were positive, others negative, both with and without reaching statistical 
significance. To give an illustration, we have selected six countries for two of the 
personality variables and eight countries for the remaining seven variables and plotted 
the d-scores for each variable (Figures 1-3). Countries were selected based on the 
number of participants which originate from them on average in psychological research 
(Arnett, 2008) and effect size. Please note that in some countries effect sizes were larger 
than the ones depicted here (see data). Figure 1 depicts the d-scores for 
conscientiousness and openness for six countries. For example, students in Brazil, 
China, and Germany were less conscientious than the general public, but more in 
Colombia and Pakistan. In Figure 2, the d-scores for moral attitudes towards (domestic) 
violence, dishonest-illegal behaviour, and towards personal-sexual behaviours are 
depicted. In Figure 3 the d-scores for trust in strangers, understanding of democracy, and 
perceived respect towards elderly are displayed. Some differences between the students 
and the general public were larger compared to others (e.g., moral attitudes towards 
dishonest-illegal behaviours vs. understanding of democracy). 
Additionally, we explored the percentage of occasions for which the null-
hypothesis was supported or the alternative hypothesis. For this, we computed the Bayes 
factor (BF) for all 537 student-general public comparison, as the classical frequentist 
approach does not allow to address the question whether the data supports the null 
hypothesis (Dienes, 2014). BFs were computed with the R package BayesFactor (2016), 
with the default prior of r = .707. Out of the 537 computed BFs, 23 showed strong 
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support for the null hypothesis (BF < 1/10), 299 moderate support (BF < 1/3), 97 
moderate support for the alternative hypothesis (BF > 3) and 78 strong support for the 
alternative hypothesis (BF > 10). For the remaining 40 BFs neither support for the 
alternative nor null hypotheses was found (1/3 < BF < 3). 
Figure 1. Cohen's d of student - general public comparisons for two of the Big-5 
dimensions. See text for explanation.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Figure 2. Cohen's d of student - general public comparisons for moral attitudes (MA). 
See text for explanation.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Figure 3. Cohen's d of student - general public comparisons for several attitudinal 
variables.
° < .08, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b – students in countries with high (vs. low) 
intellectual autonomy (vs. embeddedness) values are more heterogeneous – the standard 
deviation of students within each country was computed and correlated with the average 
intellectual autonomy and embeddedness score of each country. This was done for all 
twelve variables. This hypothesis was only partially supported for extraversion, 
openness, and moral attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviours. Specifically, students 
in countries high in embeddedness were on average more homogenous, i.e., the variance 
was lower. For the variables agreeableness and understanding of democracy the pattern 
of correlations was even the opposite of the expected. The pattern of results for the 
remaining variables was mixed (Table 1, columns 7-8).
Discussion
Contrary to previous findings (Peterson, 2001) and reflections (Greenfield, 
2014), students were across 59 countries and twelve variables as heterogeneous as the 
general public. Also, for some variables students scored higher (lower) in some 
countries than the general public, although previous research has implied that students 
should score lower (higher) because of age effects (Srivastava et al., 2003). However, 
consistent with previous findings (Peterson, 2001), we were neither able to explain the 
difference between students and the general public nor the variability of students across 
countries. Differences between students and the general public in some countries were 
positive, negative, or non-significant (cf. Peterson & Merunka, 2014). This challenges 
the claim that students are a moderately accurate estimate for the representative sample 
(Diener et al., 1995; Druckman & Kam, 2011). 
Implications and limitations. Our findings have important implications for 
psychological research. First, we demonstrated that students vary both across and within 
countries as much as the general public. This means that universities do not influence 
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personality attitudes of students or at least not in the same way across countries and/or 
subjects. A possible explanation for this is that the subject of study has an impact on 
psychological variables. For example, it was found that psychology students 
increasingly value benevolence over the course of three years, whereas business students 
increasingly value achievement and power (Bardi, Buchanan, Goodwin, Slabu, & 
Robinson, 2014). In other words, the apparent random differences between students and 
general public across countries may be partly attributed to differences in the subject of 
the students; we did not control for the subject, as we did not have any data available for 
this and the average student sample size of 105 per country would have been too small 
to conduct subgroup analyses. Hence, this would be a possible way to go for a further 
cross-cultural study, to compare students from different subjects across countries.  
Moreover, because students are both younger and more educated than the 
general public, we do not know if age or level of education – or an interaction – is 
responsible for the large variability within the student sample. Next, we have found that 
neither embeddedness nor autonomy predicted the difference between students and the 
general public, indicating that students in embedded countries differ as much from the 
general public as in autonomous countries. In other words, autonomy and 
embeddedness, as measured within a society, do not predict attitudes of students relative 
to the general public. Also, we found that students, despite being on average only half of 
the age, scored in some countries higher on conscientiousness and agreeableness and 
lower on neuroticism and openness. This partly relativizes findings from cross-sectional 
studies which imply that younger people score lower on conscientiousness and 
agreeableness but higher on neuroticism and openness (Srivastava et al., 2003). 
Together, this further supports the claim that generalizing from students to the general 
public within personal and social psychology is problematic (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010; 
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Sears, 1986), at least whilst we do not know what predicts those differences. Our 
Bayesian analyses further supported this claim. In order to be able to generalize from the 
students to the general public, we would require that they do not differ. However, our 
Bayesian analysis revealed that for only 23 out of 537 comparisons (4%) strong 
evidence for the null hypothesis. 
To illustrate why generalizing from students to the general public is problematic, 
assume a researcher wants to test her hypothesis that Chinese are more open towards 
new experiences than Pakistani. She collects one student sample in each country and 
finds allegedly strong support for her hypothesis, t(204) = 9.84, p < .0001, d = 1.38 (data 
for this example is taken from WVS). However, this strong effect is biased, as the 
general public between both countries barely differ, d = 0.15 (because of the large 
sample size the difference is still significant: t[2826] = 3.81, p = .0001, see Figure 1). 
Overall, this indicates that we cannot generalize from student samples to the 
general public, because they differ randomly across countries and variables, based on 
our current knowledge. These findings are also relevant, as they provide limitations with 
regard to the replicability of psychological research and may also explain failed 
replication. Take the variable ‘perceived respect towards elderly’ as an example. The 
difference between the student samples and general public was, even in industrialized 
countries such as Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and the USA, highly inconsistent 
(Figure 3). The results from New Zealand for example failed to replicate in any of the 
three other countries. 
In sum, the failure to replicate psychological findings may not only be due to low 
power, questionable research practices such as p-hacking, HARKing, or publication bias 
(Button et al., 2013; Kerr, 1998; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons et al., 
2011), but also because effects of context were not considered in the replication. 
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